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This thesis explores the international and national legal tools binding the EU and Russia 
in the energy field and how they impact on the EU-Russia geopolitical relationship. This 
work will focus on natural gas regulation, given the rising importance of this energy 
source on the global scale. The approach used starts from legal analysis and is constantly 
enriched by taking into account economic, political and practical considerations. 
From the international law perspective, we argue that the rules of World Trade 
Organization (‘WTO’) represent the only workable legal framework in the instant case. 
Internally, we identified the Lisbon Treaty as a turning point of European energy 
regulation. Pre-Lisbon gas legislation could be problematic when assessed under WTO 
rules and its application showed a lack of coherence with external EU energy relations. 
By contrast, we found that the Lisbon Treaty and the ensuing legislation are likely to 
empower the EU with the adequate tools to overcome the pre-Lisbon problems and build 
solid bilateral relations with Russia. This could be a major improvement to secure EU 
natural gas supply since economic data show that Russia is likely to remain the most 
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Summary: 1. Premise – 2. The Importance of a Secured Energy Supply – 3. Geopolitics 
and Energy – 4. Energy Dependence and the International Economic Order – 5. Defining 
Features of the Energy Market – 6. Natural Gas and the EU – 7. Applicable Legal 
Framework – 8. Research Questions and Hypothesis – 9. Methodology and Structure.  
 
1. Premise 
This PhD thesis is about the impact of international and EU regulations on EU-Russia 
energy relations. With this aim, it analyses the compliance of the most important EU 
measure regulating the internal natural gas market with the applicable international rules 
binding the EU in the field.  
This chapter lays down the conceptual framework of the thesis. It sets out the main 
concepts and trends covering a wide range of fields connected to energy (international 
relations, economics, law etc.), which are key elements to facilitate the reading of the 
following chapters of the thesis.  
We will start off from the description of the energy sector and of its most important 
features and concepts. Then, we will sketch out the main characteristics of the natural gas 
field and will explain the reasons justifying its importance in the current world-wide 
energy scenario. Lastly, we will focus on the EU-Russia relationship and pose some 
questions, which will be answered in the following chapters of the thesis. 
Reference to the conceptual framework will be made, when appropriate, in the following 




2. The Importance of a Secured Energy Supply  
From the beginning of mankind, access to energy sources has largely determined the 
difference of peoples’ living conditions. The most powerful countries have always been 
those that were able to benefit from huge natural resources, or to durably purchase them 
from their commercial partners. This is particularly true today, since modern societies 
massively need energy sources to fuel their economies. The importance of energy supply 
in today’s world is undisputable. Can you imagine living one single day without 
electricity, with no lights, computers, TVs and mobile phones, but also no transportation 
systems such as trains or metro lines? Perhaps for some this could even be a welcome 
escape from routine. However, this condition would not probably last long. In any country 
where energy disruptions happened, unexpected blackouts would immediately disrupt the 
industrial production system and the delivery of public services, causing serious damage 
to the conditions of everyone living in that region.1 
The guarantee of personal and collective security of the citizens is one of the very first 
prerogatives of nation states. This holds true especially in the case of energy matters, 
because of the strategic importance of the security of the energy supply for the citizens’ 
welfare and for industrial production.  
                                                   
1 In Case C-72/83 Campus Oil and Others v Minister for Industry and Energy [1983] ECR 2727, para 34, 
the Court of Justice of the European Communities (now Court of Justice of the European Union) admitted 
that ‘petroleum products, because of their exceptional importance as an energy source in the modern 
economy, are of fundamental importance for a country's existence since not only its economy but above all 
its institutions, its essential public services and even the survival of its inhabitants depend upon them. An 
interruption of supplies of petroleum products, with the resultant dangers for the country's existence, could 
therefore seriously affect the public security that Article 36 allows States to protect’. More recently, US 
Secretary of State, ‘Statement on Energy Diplomacy on 21th Century’ (2012) <https://2009-
2017.state.gov/e/enr/rls/202263.htm> accessed 11 November 2017, and Royal Academy of Engineering, 
‘Counting the Cost: The Economic and Social Costs of Electricity Shortfalls in the UK’ (2014) 16 – 17 
<https://www.raeng.org.uk/publications/reports/counting-the-cost> accessed 11 November 2017. The 
report of the Royal Academy of Engineering describes the effects of six outages in developed countries 





3. Geopolitics and Energy 
Geopolitics is a complex and often unstructured web of interactions on a global scale and 
can be defined as a power struggle between people, businesses and institutions (as 
political actors) of different countries under geographical, economic and technological 
constraints.2 Hence, any assessment of the balance of power between countries cannot be 
limited to an analysis of their governments’ actions, but should include an analysis also 
of the specific businesses and the individuals involved.  
Geopolitical constraints set the framework for what is possible to achieve at a particular 
point in time and constitute structural elements of the world system.3 As mentioned, 
geopolitical constraints are geography, economics and technology. Geography limits 
what is possible in the natural world and reinforces custom barriers. Economics relates to 
the forces which determine the price formation, interest rates, inflation levels and trade 
barriers. Technology determines what is possible to achieve from a technical point of 
view. These constraints are not unchangeable, as it is possible for political actors to alter 
the environment in which they operate. Moreover, geopolitical constraints are often 
interrelated and co-dependent. For instance, a new technical discovery that overcomes a 
geographical constraint may lead to the formation of a new market and thereby also 
overcome a previous economic constraint. So, while geographic and technological 
constraints preclude, for the time being, the exploitation of Arctic gas reserves, new 
drilling techniques (technological change) and/or the melting of Arctic ice (geographical 
change) may make the reserves available in the future. In light of this potential new 
                                                   
2 Ernst and Young, ‘Navigating Geopolitics in Oil and Gas’ (2015) 6 <http://www.ey.com/Publication/vw 
LUAssets/EY-navigating-geopolitics-in-oil-andp-gas/$FILE/EY-navigating-geopolitics-in-oil-andp-gas.p 
df> accessed 11 November 2017. 
 





scenario, governments need to enter into agreements with one another and promulgate 
laws and regulations to govern the present and future operations of the energy companies 
seeking to exploit the fields. 
The energy field contributes more than other sectors to shape geopolitical relations 
between countries because of its strategic importance for the countries concerned and the 
pervasive presence of the State in the economy (see below).  
4. Energy Dependence and the International Economic Order 
When a country cannot satisfy its energy demand internally, it must import to make up 
for the shortfall. The more energy is imported, the more the importing country is 
dependent upon foreign energy producers. Energy dependence is a key feature in the 
geopolitical relations between States. Indeed, exporting countries can exert their influence 
on importing countries’ sovereignty by leveraging their position. This happens quite 
frequently. To give an example, the ‘gas wars’ between Ukraine and Russia were 
characterised by the Russian threat to cut-off the gas supply to Ukraine, leaving millions 
of Eastern Europeans in the cold. We shall return to the gas wars in more detail below.4 
Compounding the effects of the natural inequality of distribution of energy resources are 
modern economic forces, which foster relationships of mutual dependence among 
countries. These economic forces draw their strength from the comparative advantage 
theory that underpins liberalism and international trade. According to the comparative 
advantage hypothesis, countries should specialise in economic activities for which they 
                                                   
4 ‘Gas wars’ is an expression that refers to the disputes between Ukrainian oil and gas company Naftogaz 
and Russian gas supplier Gazprom over natural gas supplies, prices, and debts. These disputes have grown 
beyond simple business disputes into transnational political issues – involving political leaders from several 
countries – threatening natural gas supplies in numerous European countries dependent from Russian gas 





enjoy a comparative advantage over other countries (e.g. price, availability of resources 
etc.) and import everything else.5  Overall, this is more efficient and cost effective than 
producing everything internally.  
In case of energy, production costs determine the extent of the comparative advantage 
that will be enjoyed by a supplier country. The importance of energy requires that it 
should be sufficiently and continuously available at a reasonable price.6 The import-
export relationships created, which characterise the capitalistic worldview, strongly 
incentivise the creation of dependency relations between countries and shape the 
international economic order. 
5. Defining Features of the Energy Market  
Three features have come to define the energy market in recent decades.  
The first is supranational regulation, which is an aspect and result of the progressive 
globalisation of the economy in general, and the increasingly interconnected nature of the 
energy market in particular. New transportation technologies have had a particularly 
powerful impact on the natural gas market. In recent years, the widespread adoption of 
the liquefaction technique has created new trade flows between countries that previously 
did not have commercial relations in this industry owing to the  transportation constraints 
via pipeline.7 The liquefaction technique has been combined with another innovation, 
                                                   
5 For an overview of the matter, see Michael E Porter, Competitive Advantage: Creating and Sustaining 
Superior Performance (Simon and Schuster 2008); Andrea Maneschi, Comparative Advantage in 
International Trade: A Historical Perspective (EE 1998). 
 
6 Gonzalo Escribano and Javier Garcia-Verdugo, ‘Energy Security, Energy Corridors and the Geopolitical 
Context: A Conceptual Approach’ in Jose Maria Marin-Quemada, Javier Garcia-Verdugo and Gonzalo 
Escribano, Energy Security for the EU in the 21st Century – Markets, Geopolitics and Corridors (Routledge 
2012) 27. 
 
7 The liquefaction technique transforms natural gas into a liquid – so-called ‘liquefied natural gas’ or ‘LNG’ 
– simplifying its transportation. The liquefaction technique requires huge investments, both by the 




‘fracking’, which enables  the exploitation of previously unavailable natural gas and oil 
reserves trapped in porous rock layers.8 The development of new technologies facilitating 
the creation of a global energy market pushed for the adoption of regional and 
international energy regulation schemes, especially in areas with a high level of 
integration or similar economic development.9 In the absence of all-encompassing 
international guidelines regulating the matter, transnational law issues emerged.10    
The second is the contrast between the public and private interests that drive the actions 
of market operators. More broadly, this is a matter that touches upon the role of the State 
in the national economy, which often crops up as an issue whenever an industry is 
characterised by the presence of a natural monopoly (e.g. natural gas, electricity, 
telecommunications and railways).11 Even in capitalist economies, governments often 
intervene directly in the energy market.12 In some cases, even when States do not directly 
                                                   
terminals and the use of dedicated ships (so-called ‘LNG carriers’), preserving natural gas below the 
gasification point. This technique increases the number of producing countries able to compete for the 
satisfaction of the global natural gas demand.   
 
8 Fracking is a slang term for hydraulic fracturing, which is the process of creating fractures in rocks and 
rock formations by injecting specialised fluid into cracks to force them to open further. The larger fissures 
allow more oil and gas to flow out of the formations and into the wellbore, from where they can be easily 
extracted (Source: Investopedia, ‘Fracking’ (2017) <http://www.investopedia.com/terms/f/fracking.asp> 
accessed 18 May 2017). 
9 The discussions about energy in the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP) and in the 
Comprehensive Economic and Trade Agreement (CETA), as well in the WTO treaty, and the intention to 
upgrade the Energy Charter Treaty to a global scale, evidence this trend. The application of the Energy 
Charter Treaty principles at a global scale is one of the objectives of the International Energy Charter. See 
Energy Charter Secretariat, ‘International Energy Charter’ (2015) <http://www.  
europarl.europa.eu/meetdocs/2014_2019/documents/itre/dv/energy_charter_faq_/energy_charter_faq_en.
pdf> accessed 23 July 2017. 
10 Transnational law regulates actions or events that transcend national frontiers. It involves individuals, 
corporations, states, or other groups − not just the official relations between governments of states. This is 
typical of fields which could strongly impact on the geopolitics of a country.  
 
11 See chapter II, section 2.1. 
 
12 State-owned enterprises play a particularly important role in network industries. The OECD estimated 
that in value terms state-owned enterprises active in the energy and transport sectors count for about 40% 
of the total value of state-owned enterprises and about 43% of total state-owned enterprises jobs. The 
concentrated presence of state-owned enterprises in these sectors makes their performance extremely 
relevant for the determination of spill-overs to the rest of the economy. See European Commission, ‘State-




own energy companies, specific control mechanisms have been implemented.13 Left to 
their own devices, private companies will not satisfy a nation’s service needs if the costs 
of  infrastructure construction and maintenance exceed expected revenues (e.g. rural 
areas). In principle, this behaviour excludes important shares of the population from the 
energy service. This state of affairs is not acceptable from the State perspective, which 
wants these essential facility services to be available to all its citizens. Accordingly, 
wherever the sector underwent privatisation and liberalisation (notably in Europe), 
governments stepped in to impose universal service obligations on private-sector 
operators.14   
The third is the rapid spread of renewable energy sources. Since the 1970s, renewable 
energy production has bloomed. The International Energy Agency reports that from 1973 
to 2014 the percentage of primary energy produced from renewable sources in OECD 
countries went from 4.6% to 9.5%.15  At the same time, total consumption rose by 40%.16 
                                                   
<https://ec.europa.eu/info/sites/info/files/file_import/ip031_en _2.pdf> accessed 21 June 2017. In Europe 
the scope of public ownership in various sectors of the economy is particularly extensive in some of the 
new Member States such as Poland, Croatia, Romania and Slovenia. However, state-owned enterprises 
prominently feature also in some EU15 Member States such as France, Italy and Sweden. 
 
13  One example is the so-called ‘golden-share', allowing the public power to benefit from control rights 
through the ownership of a single share of the energy company concerned. See: Stefan Grundmann and 
Florian Möslein, ‘Golden Shares - State Control in Privatised Companies: Comparative Law, European 
Law and Policy Aspects’ (2003) <http://ssrn.com/abstract=410580> accessed 1 May 2016. 
 
14 A ‘universal service’ has the following characteristics: 1) promotes the availability of quality services at 
just, reasonable, and affordable rates; 2) increases access to advanced telecommunications services 
throughout the country; 3) advances the availability of such services to all consumers, including those in 
low income, rural, insular, and high cost areas at rates that are reasonably comparable to those charged in 
urban areas. See Olga Batura, Universal Service in WTO and EU law: Liberalisation and Social Regulation 
(Springer 2016) 43; Damien Geraldin, The Liberalisation of Electricity and Natural Gas in the European 
Union (Kluwer Law International 2001) 19. 
 
15 International Energy Agency, ‘Key World Statistics’ (2015) 7 <http://www.iea.org/ 
publications/freepublications/publication/KeyWorld_Statistics_2015.pdf> accessed 22 May 2016. The 
European Commission defines ‘primary production of energy’ as ‘any extraction of energy products in a 
useable form from natural sources. This occurs either when natural sources are exploited (for example, in 
coal mines, crude oil fields, hydro power plants) or in the fabrication of biofuels’. See Eurostat, ‘Glossary: 
Definition of Primary Production of Energy’ (2017) <http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/statistics-






For the most part, renewable energy sources are used to produce electricity, but may also 
be harnessed directly for thermal purposes. The success of clean energies is often due to 
the availability of generous subsidies  to enable them to compete economically with the 
production costs of energy deriving from ‘grey’ (polluting) sources.17 The adoption of 
green energy incentivising policies responds mainly to two needs: first, to combat climate 
change, and second, to decrease dependency on third countries by reducing imports, 
fostering local production.    
6. Natural Gas and the EU 
The EU is currently the largest energy importer in the world, importing 53% of the energy 
it consumes at an annual cost of around 400 billion euros.18 Relationships based on trust 
with supplier countries are therefore essential to the well-being of European citizens. One 
of the most imported energy sources is natural gas, which serves as the principal back-up 
when power generation from renewable sources fails to meet demand.19  
Natural gas currently amounts to 23.8% of the total energy consumed in the EU and is 
the only ‘grey’ energy source that has seen an increase in the consumption since the 
                                                   
17 Green energies have been incentivised in several countries all over the world through the adoption of 
measures which help investors to pay back the investments made and compete with the higher production 
costs of renewables. Grey energy is another word for polluting energy or non-renewable energy. In 
generating grey energy, fossil fuels are used such as coal, oil or gas. 
 
18  European Commission, ‘Press Release: Energy Union: Secure, Sustainable, Competitive, Affordable 
Energy for Every European’ (2016) <http://europa.eu/rapid/press-releaseIP-15-4497en.htm> accessed 16 
July 2016. 
 
19 See Eurostat, ‘Share in Renewables of Energy Consumption in the EU’ (2016) 
<http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/web/energy/data/shares> accessed 16 July 2017; Elena Verdolini, Francesco 
Vona, David Popp, ‘Bridging the Gap: Do Fast Reacting Fossil Technologies Facilitate Renewable Energy 
Diffusion?’ (2016) National Bureau of Economic Research Working Paper 22454/2016 
<http://www.nber.org/papers/w22454?utm_campaign=ntw&utm_medium=email&utm_source=ntw> last 





1990s, thanks also to the technological developments related to gas liquefaction.20 Indeed, 
since 1990 the share of coal and lignite in EU28 primary energy consumption decreased 
from 28.9% to 18.2%, whereas oil dropped from 35% to 30.1%.21 The foregoing features 
reflect a worldwide trend which witnesses the success of natural gas on a global scale.22  
Since its inception, the EU has been based on a free-market ideology. According to neo-
classical economic theory, perfect competition leads to allocative and productive 
efficiency and therefore to increases in  consumer welfare.23 While the internal (i.e. EU) 
gas market should essentially be governed by the rules of the free market, geopolitics can 
sometimes get in the way.24 In this respect, a geopolitical risk to the security of supply 
arises ‘when a change or breakdown in the international economic order or system or a 
part of that system takes place […] that results or could result in absolute or relative 
scarcity in energy flows’.25 In the natural gas market, the break of the international 
economic order could mainly derive from economic, political and regulatory factors.26   
                                                   
20 European Environment Agency, ‘Primary Energy Consumption by Fuel’ (2016) 
<http://www.eea.europa.eu/data-and-maps/indicators/primary-energy-consumption-by-fuel6/assessment> 




22 The general conclusion of this work will analyse the future developments of the industry.   
 
23 Glenn Hubbard and Anthony P O'Brien, Microeconomics (Paerson Prentice Hall 2006) 243.  
 
24 This danger is common to other fields, such as the financial markets. See Gregory Dunn, ‘The Rise of 
Economics in Contemporary Geopolitics’ (2015) Harvard International Review <http://hir.harvard. 
edu/article/?a=8304> accessed 7 July 2016. 
 
25 Clingendael International Energy Programme, ‘Study on Energy Supply, Security and Geopolitics: Final 
Report’ (2004) 37 <http://www.clingendaelenergy.com/inc/upload/files/Study_on_energy_supply_ 
security_and_geopolitics.pdf> accessed 7 July 2016. 
 





7. Applicable Legal Framework   
The way EU Members States procure natural gas has changed considerably in the last two 
decades, but European dependence upon third (i.e. non-EU) countries has remained 
constant.27 A legal framework that binds the EU and its suppliers is fundamental to 
guarantee the stability and security of the energy supply of the Union. A solid legal 
framework requires international agreements that take all the interests of the parties 
involved into account, set out clear regulatory parameters, and enshrine the principles of 
mutual trust and recognition among the undertakings operating in the respective 
territories. In the absence these conditions, mutable economic forces and politically-
motivated interests can easily endanger the stability of international energy relationships.   
Over the years, the European regulator has dramatically modified the internal natural gas 
market structure and the way private undertakings – usually State-controlled entities – 
conduct their businesses in the Union. All of this must comply with the existing 
international rules binding the EU in the energy field. The compliance with international 
rules is especially relevant in case of high volumes traded between the parties, such as it 
happens with natural gas. 
A turning point in the EU’s energy strategy was the Lisbon Treaty. As this thesis attempts 
to show, this is the dividing line between two types of approach to the EU energy issues, 
which reflect a different competence allocation between Member States and the Union, 
in line with the trend towards a supranational regulation described in section 5 above. A 
further interventionist push has come from the current European Commission, which has 
                                                   
27 For an extensive overview see Rafael Leal-Arcas, Costantino Grasso and Juan Alemany Ríos, ‘Energy 
Security, Trade and the EU: Regional and International Perspectives (EE 2016) 26-40; Mekdi P Amineh 
and Wina HJ Crijns-Graus, ‘Rethinking EU Energy Security Considering Past Trends and Future Prospects’ 
(2014) 13 Perspectives on Global Development and Technology, 767-780 <https://www.difesa.it/SMD_/ 





made energy a top priority of its mandate and supported the creation of a proper 
‘European Energy Union’.28 
8. Research Questions and Hypothesis  
Considering the importance of natural gas regulation on the relationships between the EU 
and third countries, this thesis will try to answer to the following questions: What is the 
actual impact of the current international legal framework on the energy relationships 
between the EU and its suppliers? Are the EU measures taken in the natural gas field 
compliant with the international law rules binding the Union? How did the Lisbon Treaty 
change the EU approach to the energy regulation?      
With reference to the structure of the natural gas market, we will test the hypothesis that 
EU-Russia energy relationship is not only about dependence, but also about 
interdependence. Moreover, we will also test the claim made by Russia regarding the 
putative incompatibility of Directive 2009/73/EC, regulating the EU natural gas market 
('Gas Directive’), with the rules of the World Trade Organization (‘WTO’).29 Lastly, we 
will assess the hypothesis that the introduction of a specific section related to energy in 
the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union modified the energy relationship 
between the EU and its suppliers.    
This research is significant because it analyses the EU-Russia energy relationship in the 
light of the mutable regulatory approach to energy of the EU legislator, which is still 
evolving. Indeed, some of the regulations looked at in this thesis were promulgated 
                                                   
28 See chapter IV, section 3. 
 
29 Russia Federation, ‘Request for Consultations by the Russian Federation’ (2014) 
<https://docs.wto.org/dol2fe/Pages/FE_Search/FE_S_S006.aspx?Query=(%20@Symbol=%20(wt/ds476/
1%20))&Language=ENGLISH&Context=FomerScriptedSearch&languageUIChanged=true#> accessed 





between April and October 2017, which means we have an opportunity to be among the 
first to comment on them. More generally, the situation has significantly changed since 
2010, and has been evolving in parallel with a renewal of interest in energy matters at the 
global level. Lastly, this thesis also closely examines the Gas Directive vis-à-vis WTO 
rules, a matter that is currently at the centre of a dispute pending before the WTO Dispute 
Settlement Body, whose outcome could severely affect the way the EU regulates its 
energy relations with third countries.  
9. Methodology and Structure  
Russia is by far the biggest gas supplier of the EU and in the last decade the EU-Russia 
energy relationship has been characterised by several political and legal contrasts. These 
are unique features among EU supplying countries. For this reason, in this work we have 
chosen to analyse the EU-Russia energy relationship.  
We shall approach the issues outlined in this work from a legal perspective, and shall also 
take account of economic, practical and political considerations to enrich our analysis. 
This approach offers a clearer understanding of the current position of the EU with respect 
to its suppliers and of its likely position in the years to come. 
The thesis is divided in five chapters. Chapter I will present the economic, political and 
legal backdrop to the EU-Russia energy relationship. It will begin with a description of 
the EU’s natural gas market and explore the EU dependence on Russia. Finally, we will 
focus on the international legal instruments and on the domestic rules that apply between 
the EU and Russia. 
Chapter II will outline the main features of the Gas Directive, the main piece of legislation 




operating in the EU, including Gazprom, the most important Russian State-controlled 
energy company. Lastly, chapter II will explain the reasons justifying the analysis of the 
Gas Directive vis-à-vis WTO rules.  
Chapter III will consider the Gas Directive in the light of the WTO General Agreement 
on Tariffs and Trade and the General Agreement on Trade in Services and focus in 
particular on the anti-discrimination and the market access rules laid down under both 
agreements. The conclusion of the chapter will outline the impact of the legal 
investigation on the EU-Russia energy relationship.  
Chapter IV begins with an overview of how the Lisbon Treaty impacted on the EU energy 
industry. It proceeds with a description of the Energy Union project and analyses two 
recent pieces of legislation, one relating to the intergovernmental energy agreements 
between EU members and third countries, and the other to the commercial agreements 
between natural gas market operators. We will then sum up the main characteristics of 
the post-Lisbon approach and outline its impact on EU-Russia energy relations.   
Chapter V, which concludes the thesis, summarises the findings of the previous chapters 






THE EU-RUSSIA ENERGY RELATIONSHIP 
Summary: 1. Introduction – 2. Natural Gas: An Overview – 3. Focus on Russia – 4. The 
Game-Changers of the EU-Russia Energy Relationship – 5. International Legal 
Framework – 6. Internal Measures – 7. The Failure to Develop a Common EU Energy 
Approach Against Russia – 8. The Impact of Internal Measures at the International Level 
– 9. Interim Conclusion. 
 
1. Introduction 
This chapter underlines the importance of natural gas for the EU, especially in its 
relationship with Russia. It outlines the basic quantitative features characterising the field 
and the main characteristics of the EU-Russia interaction. It highlights that, 
notwithstanding the unilateral buyer-supplier relation, from an economic viewpoint 
interdependence is the key feature to interpret the EU-Russia energy relationship. This 
finding is important also from a legal perspective, since any internal regulatory issue in 
one country has much more impact on the other countries in case of strong economic 
interdependence. 
Afterwards, the thesis tests the international legal framework applicable to the EU-Russia 
energy relationship in order to answer to the first question outlined in the introduction of 
this work.1 We will underline that, except for World Trade Organization (‘WTO’) rules, 
applicable since Russia’s accession in late 2012, there is no international legal tool 
currently able to influence the balance of power between the two parties. Indeed, the 
Partnership and Cooperation Agreement, the only bilateral agreement currently in force, 
lays down only general principles of cooperation between the two countries and its 
                                                   




provisions do not guarantee an effective enforcement. The same holds true for the other 
sources of international law. 
In the absence of strong international law commitments, the relationship between the two 
countries has been widely crafted by the adoption of domestic protectionist measures. 
Both the EU and Russia adopted and enforced internal legislation targeting foreign 
entities which operate in their territory, imposing more demanding conditions than those 
applicable to internal companies. In addition to that, because of different energy mixes 
and dependency rates from Russian gas, single EU Members often negotiated on a 
bilateral basis with Russia. This led to a lack of coherence of the EU action in the field. 
2. Natural Gas: An Overview 
Natural gas is of utmost importance for the functioning of the European economy. The 
reliance of the EU on this fossil fuel dates back to after the end of the Second World War, 
when European countries used to grant exclusive concessions for the exploitation of their 
natural resources and increased during the Cold War, when the first pipelines supplying 
Eastern Europe from Russia were built.2 Nowadays, natural gas utilisation has become 
very common and its importance is witnessed by the widespread diffusion of gas pipelines 




                                                   
2 The first pipelines connecting Russia and Countries Members of the European Community, now European 














   Figure 1:  European Pipeline Network (Source: HIS Eurogas) 
The EU currently imports 69.1% of the natural gas needed to fuel its economy, as it has 
insufficient internal production to cope with its demand of gas.3 Russia is the biggest 
supplier of the Union, with a market share that in 2015 reached 29.4% of the European 
imports.4 Other countries, namely Norway, Algeria, Qatar and Libya currently satisfy 
25.9%, 8.8%, 6.1% and 1.7% of the European imports demand.5   
The role of natural gas as a fundamental driver for economic development is not a 
phenomenon limited to Europe. Over the years, the importance of natural gas to satisfy 
the world’s energy demand has steeply risen, also in countries of recent industrialisation 
such as China, which strongly incentivised investments in the natural gas field, to the 
                                                   
3 Eurostat, ‘Energy Production and Imports’ (2015) <http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/statistics-
explained/index.php/Energy_production_and_imports> last accessed 6 January 2018. 
 







detriment of coal production.6 Globally, natural gas consumption more than doubled from 
1980 to 2016.7 The discovery of new modalities for the transport of the resource, 
combined with its chemical characteristics (the percentage of carbon in natural gas is the 
lowest in carbon-intensive fossil fuels)8 and its versatile uses in industry and at home, are 
at the basis of its current and future success.9 Natural gas, which allows for less polluting 
emissions in respect of the other fossil fuels, is chosen as the principal source backing the 
development of green energies in case of their temporary insufficient production.10 
Despite the importance of the gas imports for the European economy over the years and 
until mid-2000s, natural gas has not been at the centre of public debate. It was only in 
2006, with the first of the so-called ‘gas wars’ between Russia and Ukraine, that the 
European security of supply came under the spotlight.11 A dispute over transit fees for 
                                                   
6 The Chinese natural gas incentive process started with the 12th five-year plan, which can be downloaded 
from the following link: <http://cbi.typepad.com/china_direct/2011/05/chinas-twelfth-five-new-plan-the-
full-englishversion.html> last access 16 July 2017. 
 
7 British Petroleum, ‘Statistical Review of the World Energy’ (2015) <www.bp.com/...2015/bp-statistical-
review-of-world-energy-2015-workbook.xlsx> last accessed 18 May 2017. In 2016, global natural gas 
production increased to 3552 billion cubic metres. In 1980 it amounted to 1448 billion cubic metres. See 
British Petroleum, ‘Natural Gas Production’ (2017) <https://www.bp.com/en/global/corporate/ energy-
economics/statistical-review-of-world-energy/natural-gas/natural-gas-production.html> accessed 7 
January 2018; Andrea Gilardoni, The World Market for Natural Gas: Implications for Europe (Springer 
2008) 40. 
 
8 Ayhan Demirbas, Methane Gas Hydrate (Springer 2010) 68. 
 
9 Roderick Kefferputz, ‘Shale Fever: Replicating the US Gas Revolution in Europe’ (2010) CEPS Policy 
Briefs 201 <http://www.ceps.be/book/shale-fever-replicating-us-gas-revolution-eu> accessed 1 January 
2014. For the International Energy Agency, natural gas will be the most popular energy source of the next 
25 years. See International Energy Agency, ‘World Energy Outlook 2016 Sees Broad Transformations in 
the Global Energy Landscape’ (2016) <https://www.iea.org/newsroom/news/2016/november/world-
energy-outlook-2016.html> accessed 7 January 2018.  
 
10  Elena Verdolini, Francesco Vona and David Popp, ‘Bridging the Gap: Do Fast Reacting Fossil 
Technologies Facilitate Renewable Energy Diffusion?’ (2016) National Bureau of Economic Research 
Working Paper 22454/2016 <http://www.nber.org/papers/w22454?utm_campaign=ntw&utm_medium= 
email&utm_source=ntw> last access 16 July 2017. 
 
11 The gas disputes between Russia and Ukraine are well described in Jonathan Stern, Simon Pirani and 
Katja Yafimava, ‘The April 2010 Russo-Ukranian Gas Agreement and its Implications for Europe’ (2011) 
6 Oil Gas and Energy Law Journal; Sijbren de Jong, Jan Wouters and Steven Sterkx, ‘The 2009 Russian – 
Ukranian Gas Dispute: Lessons for European Energy Crisis Management after Lisbon’ (2011) 15 European 





gas destined for Europe, and the Russian decision to raise natural gas prices up to the 
European levels, led to the sudden interruption of Russia’s supply to Ukraine.12 Since 
Ukraine represented the most important transit country for the gas destined for Europe,13 
the interruption caused an immediate cessation of the Russian supply to several European 
countries, provoking serious emergencies for industrial production and house heating. 
During the emergency, Hungary – the most damaged country – lost 40% of its Russian 
gas supply, France, Romania and Slovakia about 30%, Italy 25% and Poland 14%.14 
This event pushed the European institutions to take the problem of guaranteeing the 
security of natural gas supply in the old continent more seriously. An immediate 
acknowledgment of this potential problem was included in the 2006 green paper on 
‘European Strategy for Sustainable, Competitive and Secure Energy’, where the 
European Commission (‘EC’) underlined the need for a concrete action of the European 
institutions to solve the problems related to the January 2006 events.15 This document 
paved the way for the adoption of stronger regulatory measures in the natural gas market, 
as well as to actions aimed at diversifying the supply and enhancing energy efficiency.16  
                                                   
12 Ibid.  
 
13 In 2006, 80% of the gas imported in Europe from Russia transited through Ukraine. After the emergency, 
the priority of the Union has been to diversify its supply sources and build new pipelines to be less 
dependent from the situation of a single country. In this regard, the Nord Stream pipeline plays a key role, 
bringing Russian gas to Germany bypassing Ukraine.   
 
14 Pami Aalto, The EU-Russian Energy Dialogue: Europe’s Future Energy Security (Ashgate 2008) 23-41. 
 
15 European Commission, ‘A European Strategy for Sustainable, Competitive and Secure Energy’ COM 
(2006) 105 final. 
 





3. Focus on Russia 
Among EU suppliers, the position of Russia deserves an in-depth analysis. According to 
the most recent statistics, Russia is the second biggest natural gas producer in the world, 
and also holds the largest reserves.17 2017 data show that Russia’s proven reserves 
currently amount to 30% of the total reserves of the planet (see chart below). These 
records underline not only the primacy of the country for the satisfaction of the current 
EU demand, but also highlight its crucial importance for the future of the world’s energy 
needs.18      







By virtue of Federal Law No. 117-FZ of 18 July 2006 ‘On Export of Gas’, Gazprom is 
by law the sole company which can export the natural gas extracted in Russia. The legal 
monopoly on the export of the second natural gas producing country gives the company 
                                                   
17 US Energy Information Administration, ‘Russia’ (2017) <https://www.eia.gov/beta/international/ 
analysis.cfm?iso=RUS> accessed 27 November 2017. Russia estimated reserves amount to 1,688 trillion 







a tremendous market power, especially in terms of contractual bargaining when dealing 
with European clients. This contributes to the enormous value of the company, which, in 
2011, was the most profitable undertaking of the globe.19 
The position of EU Member States (‘MSs’) vis-à-vis Gazprom differs from one State to 
another. For historical reasons, Gazprom still enjoys a dominant position on transit and 
supply in most of Eastern European MSs that were formerly part of the Soviet Union. 
This picture significantly differs in Western Europe, where the situation is more 
fragmented, and EU MSs tend to be less dependent on Russian gas (see table 1, Eurostat). 
The price of the commodity differs from one EU country to another, depending on a 
variety of factors (e.g. bargaining power of buyers, prices set by competitors, historical 
ties etc.).20  
Gazprom’s strategic importance for Russia derives also from its shareholding structure. 
In fact, the major shareholder of the company is the Russian Federation, which owns a 
stake equal to 50.002%.21 The position of control over the company is even more relevant 
when considering both the restrictions imposed by its internal by-laws and the Russian 
                                                   
19 RT, ‘Russia’s Gazprom is the World Most Profitable Company – Forbes’ (2012) 
<https://www.rt.com/business/gazprom-profit-list-forbes-391/> accessed 27 November 2017; RT, 
‘Gazprom No Longer World's Most Profitable Company’ (2013) <http://rt.com/business/gazprom-profit-
decline-lng-demand-615/> accessed 27 November 2017. ExxonMobil and Apple overtook Gazprom in 
2012. 
 
20 Nathalie Hinchey and Anna Mikulska, ‘LNG Versus Russian Gas in Central and Eastern Europe: Playing 
Poker on A Continental Scale’ (2017) <https://www.forbes.com/sites/thebakersinstitute/2017/08/24/lng-
versus-russian-gas-in-central-and-eastern-europe-playing-poker-on-a-continentalscale/#36de1ea22c3a> 
accessed 5 January 2018. Price differential between Eastern and Western European countries (up to 40%) 
has been heavily criticised by the European Commission in the antitrust investigation against Gazprom (see 
section 6.1.2). See also The Guardian, ‘Brussels Accuses Gazprom of Unfair Pricing of Gas in Eastern 
Europe’ (2015) <https://www.theguardian.com/business/2015/apr/22/brussels-accuses-gazprom-unfair-
pricing-gas-eastern-europe> accessed 5 January 2018.   
 
21  The Russian Federation is represented by the Federal Agency for State Property Management. Other 
relevant participations are owned by the Bank of New York Mellon (26.95%) and ‘other registered entities’ 
(23.04%). Source: OAO Gazprom, ‘2012 Annual Report’ (2012) 126 <http://www.gazprom.com/ 





laws regulating foreign investments in strategic companies, which require a prior 
governmental authorisation in case of third countries’ companies willing to acquire a 
participation exceeding 5% of the voting share.22   
















                                                   
22 Sergey Seliverstov, ‘Energy Investments in the EU and Russia: Investment Regulation under the Third 
Energy Package and the Russian Law on Foreign Investments in Strategic Sectors’ (2013) 
<www.rug.nl/research/...law.../s.seliverstov.pptx> accessed 22 November 2017; Tania Alves Calvao and 
Alexey Morozov, ‘Russia and Brazil: Learning Each Other’s Experience in Attracting Foreign Investments 
to Energy Sector’ (2011) Oil Gas and Energy Law Journal 13-15 <http://www.ogel.org> accessed 28 
September 2017. It is doubtful that foreign investors would be interested in participations in Russian entities 
of less than 25% minus one share. It is only starting with 25% that shareholders receive the following 
minimum set of rights necessary for corporate governance under Russian corporate law: right to block 
decision regarding amending the company’s charter, right to increase or decrease the amount of charter 
capital; right to appoint representatives to the board of directors and to organise a shareholders’ meeting.  
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The legal monopoly on the export of such a huge amount of natural gas, coupled with the 
control exercised by the Russian Government on the business strategies of the company 
and, consequently, on its subsidiaries, could make of Gazprom a powerful weapon in the 
hands of Russia for the management of its external relations.In addition to the above, the 
internal activity of the gas giant is of utmost importance for Russia in terms of the 
economic return generated for the country. In fact, Gazprom alone contributes for 8% of 
the Russian GDP, and almost a quarter of the overall Russian company income tax 
revenues yearly raised by the State.23 
Moreover, Gazprom’s strategic importance for Russia also derives from the application 
of a dual pricing policy, by which natural gas sold abroad is much more expensive than 
natural gas supplied inside the country.24 This particularly holds true for natural gas 
supplied for domestic use, whereby prices are regulated at low non-market levels by the 
State.25 
                                                   
23 Joseph Kuepper, ‘Gazprom & Russia’s Natural Gas Industry: The Risks & Rewards of Investing in 
Russian Natural Gas’ (2013) <http://internationalinvest.about.com/od/globalmarkets101/a/Gazprom-and-
Russias-Natural-Gas-Industry.htm> accessed 22 November 2013. These records mostly derive from the 
duties applied on the export of hydrocarbons. While reducing the export duties applied to several goods 
(e.g. leathers, mustard seeds, crabs etc.), the commitments made by Russia upon WTO accession did not 
modify the duties applied to natural gas, equal to 30%. See Sidley Austin LLP, ‘Russia and the World Trade 
Organization: Consequences of Accession for the Russian Fuel and Energy Complex and Other Industries 
of Russian Economy’ (2012) <http://rosenergo.gov.ru/upload/english.pdf> accessed 15 October 2013; 
David Tarr, ‘The Crucial Role for Competition in the Russian Gas Market: Implications for Russia and 
Europe’ (2013) International Association for Energy Economics <https://www.iaee.org/en/ 
publications/newsletterdl.aspx?id=116> accessed 30 November 2013. 
 
24 See Ilaria Espa, ‘The Role of the WTO in Addressing Regulatory Pricing Policies in the Energy Sector’ 
in Photini Pazartzis and Maria Gavouneli, Reconceptualising the Rule of Law in Global Governance, 
Resources, Investment and Trade (Hart Publishing 2016) 391-404. 
 
25 This policy allows Russia to differentiate between clients in a way to enhance domestic welfare – social 
purpose – and support its internal economy. These effects have been heavily criticised, and this policy has 
been labelled by some as an illegal subsidy in favour of Russian domestic producers. See Alexander 
Jouravlev, ‘The Effect of the European Union’s Unbundling Provisions on the EU-Russia Gas Relationship 
and Russia’s Accession to the World Trade Organization’ (2011) 6 <https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers. 
cfm?abstract_id=1969502> accessed 17 June 2017. Pursuant to the commitments made upon WTO 
accession, Russia will ‘continue to regulate price supplies to households and to other non-commercial users, 
based on domestic social policy consideration’. See also Vitaliy Pogoretsky, ‘The System of Energy Dual 
Pricing in Russia and Ukraine: The Consistency of the Energy Dual Pricing System with the WTO 
Agreement on Anti-Dumping’ (2012) 4(10) Global Trade and Customs Journal 




The monopolistic position of Gazprom on the export of Russian natural gas is an issue 
for the EU’s security of supply. Nonetheless, the EU-Russia relationship cannot be seen, 
as some scholars suggest, merely as one that is at the mercy of the Russian company.26 
Even though Gazprom represents the most important – or even the sole – supplier of 
several European countries, in turn the EU is fundamental to satisfy Russia’s security of 
demand which, for reasons related to the historical development of the infrastructure, is 
almost exclusively guaranteed by EU MSs.27 Existing fixed infrastructure, combined with 
new projects’ construction cost and time, make impossible for Russia to diversity its 
supply in the short-term.  
In addition to that, the EU can leverage on several factors, such as its market size (500 
million consumers), the adoption of energy efficiency policies to stabilise natural gas 
consumption and the possibility to incentivise the diversification of energy 
suppliers/supply sources. This supports former President of the Commission Barroso’s 
statement according to which to date ‘interdependence’ is the most crucial aspect linked 
to the sale and utilisation of energy resources, and no company can pretend to act 
unilaterally for the satisfaction of its own interests without considering the others’ view.28 
                                                   
members opposing dual pricing have historically argued that states administering dual-pricing policies are 
indirectly subsidising their energy intensive industries by providing them with cheaper inputs. Members 
maintaining dual pricing policies, on the other hand, believe they are merely exploiting their comparative 
advantage, using dual pricing as a development tool to diversify their economies, leaving the issue unsettled 
in the WTO. See Anna Marhold, ‘Fossil Fuel Subsidy Reform in the WTO: Options for Constraining Dual 
Pricing in the Multilateral Trading System’ (2017) International Centre for Trade and Sustainable 
Development (ICTSD) 6. 
 
26 Lisa Pick, ‘EU-Russia Energy Relations: A Critical Analysis’ (2012) Polis Journal 339. 
 
27 According to the European Commission, 70% of the gas exported by Russia is dispatched in Europe. See 
Eurostat, ‘Energy Production and Imports’ (2013) <http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/statistics-explained/index. 
php/Energy_production_and_imports/it> accessed 28 March 2016. 
 
28 Josè Barroso, ‘Towards a New Energy Future: Showing Solidarity and Embracing Our Interdependence’ 






In other words, the relationships within the natural gas market should always be based on 
the mutual cooperation of the subjects involved.  
4. The Game-Changers of the EU-Russia Energy Relationship 
In the previous sections, we have highlighted the basic features which characterise the 
EU-Russia energy relationship. Accordingly, we can say that:  
(i) the EU-Russia relationship is a very complex subject, in which public and private 
interests are very intertwined;  
(ii) Natural gas has a key role in this relationship and, for the time being, its future 
success does not seem to be endangered by the development of renewable 
energies;  
(iii) Geographical, historical and economic constraints make ‘interdependence’ a 
peculiar feature of the EU-Russia energy relationship. 
The first two findings fully reflect the concepts outlined in the introduction of the thesis, 
where we described the characteristics of the energy market in general. In contrast, the 
third finding is an exception to the dependency relation theory outlined in the conceptual 
framework,29 because of the fixed transportation infrastructure which bind the two 
parties. As mentioned in the introduction, this scenario could change because of 
economic, political and regulatory factors.30 
From an economic perspective, the widespread diffusion of LNG and the progressive 
exportation of US shale gas could be a game-changer of the EU-Russia energy 
relationship, disrupting the paradigm constituted by pipeline connection. Nowadays, 
                                                   
29 See introduction, section 4. 
 





more than 22% of the EU import capacity is guaranteed by LNG, which comprises 18% 
of EU imports.31 However, the market evolution will very much depend on the price the 
source (nowadays LNG costs some 30% more than Gazprom’s gas in Europe supplied 
through its ‘most expensive’ route, via Ukraine)32 and on the investments required to ship 
gas to Europe. New technological discoveries reducing LNG costs, as well as 
modifications of existing geographical constraints (e.g. the melting of Arctic ice and the 
opening of new navigation routes) could be major drivers for the evolution of the current 
scenario. 
Another aspect which could impact on the EU-Russia energy relationship is the game of 
political alliances of the two parties. In particular, the EU-US relationship could be a 
game-changer of the EU-Russia energy balance. In 2014, the EU followed the US and 
applied trade sanctions to Russia because of the annexation of Crimea.33  This led not 
only to diplomatic consequences (e.g. the interruption of a new EU-Russia bilateral 
agreement and the exclusion of Russia from the G8 summit) but also impacted on energy 
sector activities, by denying the export of certain energy-related equipment and 
technology to Russia.34  
In July 2017, the US Congress has approved harsher sanctions towards Russia, which 
could have important implications for Europe because they target any company that 
                                                   
31 European Commission ‘Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, 
the European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of Regions: On an EU Strategy for 
Liquefied Natural Gas and Gas Storage’ COM (2016) 49 final. 
 
32  Elena Mazneva and Anna Shiryaevskaya, ‘Putin's Russia Seen Dominating European Gas for Two 
Decades’ (2017) <https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2017-03-01/putin-s-russia-seen-dominating-
european-energy-for-two-decades> accessed 12 November 2017. 
 
33 European Commission, ‘EU Sanctions Against Russia over Ukraine Crisis’ (2017) 
<https://europa.eu/newsroom/highlights/special-coverage/eu-sanctions-against-russia-over-ukraine-crisis_ 







contributes to the development, maintenance or modernisation of Russia’s energy export 
pipelines.35 The sanctions could affect the maintenance or upgrading of existing pipelines 
from Russia and elsewhere around the Caspian Sea which are participated by EU entities 
(e.g. Nord Stream 2 and Turkstream).36 This situation created political tensions between 
the EU and the US administration, without any response agreed on by European leaders. 
The enforcement of the new sanctions could lead to the abortion of the projects concerned, 
aimed at increasing EU supply differentiation through the opening of at least two new 
transit routes for Russian gas to Europe bypassing Ukraine. In addition to the politically-
motivated reason related to Crimea, the harshness of the sanctions imposed could be read 
as the US attempt to push the EU to purchase US shale gas instead of Russian gas.37 
Lastly, the adoption of international and internal regulation schemes could impact on the 
EU-Russia energy relationship given the high economic interdependence existing 
between the two territories, seen above in the chapter. Indeed, the adoption of regulatory 
measures targeting foreign businesses operating or willing to operate in the reciprocal 
territory would affect the whole economic activities in the energy sector of the relevant 
country abroad. This is true especially in case of Russia. As seen, Gazprom contributes 
to a substantial amount of Russia’s GDP and its foreign activities are almost exclusively 
developed in the EU.38 In this context, legal changes could become a way to shape the 
                                                   
35 For an overview of the US sanctions against Russia see <https://www.congress.gov/bill/115th-
congress/senate-bill/341?q=%7B%22search%22%3A%5B%22russia+sanctions%22%5D%7D> accessed 
12 November 2017. 
 
36 Both projects aim at supplying the EU with Russian gas bypassing Ukraine. The first project is a twin 
pipeline system through the Baltic Sea which connects Russia and Germany and doubles the capacity of 
the Nord Stream, already in operation (See <https://www.nord-stream2.com/> accessed 12 November 
2017). The second projects will connect Russia and Turkey through pipelines laid under the Black Sea (see 
<http://www.gazpromexport.ru/en/projects/> accessed 12 November 2017. Both pipelines are sponsored 
by Gazprom.  
 
37 To date, the amount of US shale gas sold to Europe is minimal compared to Russian piped gas. OAO 
Gazprom, ‘Investor Day’ (2018) <http://www.gazprom.com/f/posts/41/295497/investor-day-2018-en.pdf> 
accessed 3 April 2018. 
 




reciprocal energy relationship. The effective impact of energy regulation on the EU-
Russia relationship is the main topic of this work and will be analysed starting from the 
next section of this chapter.       
5. International Legal Framework 
As mentioned in section 5 of the introduction of this work, one of the key features of the 
energy market is the tendency to regulate the matter at the supranational level. This 
section analyses the international legal constraints tying the EU and Russia in the energy 
sphere, in view of determining which rules currently shape the EU-Russia energy 
relationship.  
As we will see, lots of the provisions currently applicable are non-binding on the parties 
and are conceived as soft law mechanisms to enhance the cooperation between the EU 
and Russia.  
To facilitate the reading, we will divide international law constraints between bilateral 
and multilateral tools. 
5.1 Bilateral Tools 
5.1.1 Partnership and Cooperation Agreement and other EU-Russia Bilateral Tools 
Bilateral relations between the EU and Russia have predominantly been based on the 
Partnership and Cooperation Agreement (hereafter ‘PCA’),39 which was signed in 1994 
and entered into force on 1st December 1997 for an initial duration of ten years. The 
agreement, which has been renewed annually since 2007, has provided a legal framework 
                                                   
 
39 Agreement of Partnership and Cooperation Establishing a Partnership Between the European 





for bilateral trade and has regulated political, economic and cultural relations between the 
EU and Russia. The PCA covers a wide range of policy areas; however, its focus has been 
aimed at promoting trade, investment and harmonious economic relations. Under Article 
106, the PCA is automatically renewed unless either party gives notice of termination. 
Both the EU and Russia have agreed to leave it in place until a new agreement is signed.40 
The PCA therefore remains the basis for EU-Russia relations until replaced by a new 
agreement.41 
All EU institutions have recognised the need to revise the legal framework of EU-Russia 
relations given the limitations of an incoherent energy policy towards Russia after EU 
enlargement.42 Indeed, as regards to the regulation of the energy field in general, and of 
natural gas in particular, the PCA remains rather vague.43 Article 65, which specifically 
targets the energy sector, provides that: 
Cooperation shall take place within the principles of market economy and the 
European Energy Treaty, against a background of the progressive integration 
of the energy markets in Europe. 
In addition to Article 65, several other PCA provisions can have an indirect influence on 
the EU-Russia energy relation. These are the most favoured nation (Article 10),44 freedom 
                                                   
40 Katinka Barysch, ‘Report from the 4th Friedrich-Ebert Stiftung and Foundation for Unity for Russia 
Roundtable’ (2006) Friedrich-Ebert Stiftung 2 <http://www.cer.org.uk/pdf/partnership_with_russia 
_barysch_dec06.pdf> accessed 10 March 2015. 
 
41 Delegation of the European Union to Russia, ‘Political Relations: Legal Framework’ (2012) 
<http://eeas.europa.eu/delegations/russia/eu_russia/political_relations/legal_framework/index_en.htm> 
accessed 24 September 2016. 
 
42 Peter Van Elsuwege, ‘Towards a Modernisation of EU-Russia Legal Relations?’ (2012) 5 EU-Russia 
Papers, Centre for EU-Russia Studies, University of Tartu 3 <http://hdl.handle.net/1854/LU-2134081> 
accessed 8 September 2016. 
 
43 Ibid 6. 
 
44 Pursuant to Article 10 PCA: ‘1. The Parties shall accord to one another the general most-favoured-nation 




of transit (Article 12(2)),45 investment protection (Article 58 and Article 28),46 and 
general insurance of a positive economic climate (Article 34).47 However, some of these 
provisions (e.g. Articles 10 and 12) make explicit reference to World Trade Organization 
(‘WTO’) rules and are therefore redundant after the entry of Russia in the WTO (see 
section 5.2.2 below). Others (e.g. Articles 34 and 58) are more policy indications than 
prescriptive norms. In addition to the above, the non-binding character of the 
recommendations taken by the Cooperation Council,48 makes the recourse to the PCA a 
palliative tool to protect the energy interests of the parties. For these reasons, the PCA, as 
it stands now, is not a suitable tool to regulate EU-Russia reciprocal relationships. 
The challenges surrounding the modernisation of EU-Russia relations need to be 
addressed as Russia’s withdrawal from the Energy Charter Treaty in 2009 (see section 
5.2.1 below) has effectively rendered EU-Russia energy cooperation essentially based on 
non-legally binding dialogues and commitments, the most important being the EU-Russia 
                                                   
to: advantages accorded to adjacent countries in order to facilitate frontier traffic; advantages granted with 
the aim of creating a customs union or a free-trade area or pursuant to the creation of such a union or area; 
the terms ‘customs union’ and ‘free trade area’ shall have the same meaning as those described in paragraph 
8 of Article XXIV of the GATT or created through the procedure indicated in paragraph 10 of the same 
GATT article; advantages granted to particular countries in accordance with the GATT and with other 
international arrangements in favour of developing countries’. 
 
45 Pursuant to Article 12(2) PCA: ‘The rules described in Article V, paragraphs 2, 3, 4 and 5 of the GATT 
shall be applicable between the Parties’.   
  
46 Pursuant to Article 58 PCA: ‘Bearing in mind the respective powers and competences of the Community 
and the Member States, cooperation shall aim to establish a favourable climate for investment, both 
domestic and foreign, especially through better conditions for investment protection, the transfer of capital 
and the exchange of information on investment opportunities’. 
 
47 Pursuant to Article 34(1) PCA: ‘The Parties shall use their best endeavours to avoid taking any measures 
or actions which render the conditions for the establishment and operation of each other's companies more 
restrictive than the situation existing on the day preceding the date of signature of the Agreement’. 
 
48 Pursuant to Article 101 PCA: ‘Each of the Parties may refer to the Cooperation Council any dispute 
relating to the application or interpretation of the Agreement. The Cooperation Council may settle the 
dispute by means of a recommendation. In the event it is not possible to settle the dispute by 
recommendation, either Party may notify the other of the appointment of a conciliator; the other Party must 
then appoint a second conciliator within two months. For the application of this procedure, the Community 
and its Member States shall be deemed to be one Party to the dispute. The Cooperation Council shall appoint 
a third conciliator. The conciliators' recommendations shall be taken by majority vote. Such 





Energy Dialogue. This was conceived as a forum where all issues of mutual concern in 
the energy sector (gas, electricity, nuclear sectors) could be addressed. Over 100 experts 
nominated by Member States and Russia are active in the Energy Dialogue. Their main 
activity consists of identifying problems of the energy relations and working on common 
approaches to address them. The main issues over the years concerned investment, 
infrastructure, trade and energy efficiency. These issues are addressed within working 
groups through exchanging of views and information, sharing experience and performing 
studies. This approach has proven useful in removing much misunderstandings and even 
solving some sensitive issues within the EU-Russia energy relation. The groups can also 
make proposals, conclude understandings and cooperation agreements, and identify key 
(infrastructure) projects. However, despite positive influence on various areas of the EU-
Russia energy relation, Energy Dialogue is ‘only’ an institutional mechanism of political 
cooperation. Thus, all its products bare a rather political, ‘soft-law’ value. The lack of 
legally binding decisions substantially diminishes importance of the Energy Dialogue for 
the EU-Russia energy relations. 
The new EU-Russia Partnership Agreement (PA) was expected to provide a 
comprehensive framework for bilateral trade and investment relations, with a view to 
improving the regulatory environment by building upon the WTO rules and going beyond 
the PCA provisions.49 The EU welcomed Russia’s WTO membership and has been eager 
to pursue a deep and comprehensive economic integration agreement following Russia’s 
accession.50  
                                                   
49 European Commission, ‘Trade – Russia’ (2016) <http://ec.europa.eu/trade/creating-opportunities/ 
bilateral-relations/countries/russia/> accessed 14 September 2016. Negotiations on the new EU-Russia 
Partnership Agreement were launched at the 2008 Khanty-Mansyisk Summit.  
 
50 Rafael Leal-Arcas, ‘The EU and Russia as Energy Trading Partners: Friends or Foes?’ (2009) 14(3) 





In this respect, the EU seems to be in favour of a new agreement with clearly defined 
terms on energy and security based on the Union’s acquis which it hopes to export,51 
whereas it is unlikely that Russia, as a major gas exporter, will agree to a new PA with 
provisions incorporated through an extension of the EU’s acquis.52 In the same vein, 
despite Moscow’s desire to remain outside the ambit of EU legal regulation, it is doubtful 
whether the EU will ever acquiesce to an agreement with Moscow on terms incompatible 
with EU law.53 These manifestly inconsistent views have subsequently reduced 
negotiations on a revised bilateral framework to a piecemeal process. Furthermore, 
following Russia’s annexation of Crimea, the EU has suspended all bilateral talks on the 
point. The EU and Russia can therefore be said to have entered a stalemate, with little 
sign of this state of affairs abating any time soon.54 
5.1.2 EU Member States-Russia Bilateral Treaties 
In addition to the PCA and the other tools described in the previous section, EU-Russia 
energy relationships are shaped by the bilateral treaties (‘BITs’) signed between Russia 
and various individual EU Members.55 A BIT is an international law instrument that has 
                                                   
51 Andrei Konoplyanik, ‘A Common Russia-EU Energy Space: The New EU-Russia Partnership 
Agreement, Acquis Communautaire and the Energy Charter’ (2009) 27(2) Oil Gas and Energy Law Journal 
261.   
 
52 Tatiana Romanova, ‘The Russian Perspective on the Energy Dialogue’ (2008) 16(2) Journal of 
Contemporary European Studies 223. 
 
53 Andrei Konoplyanik, ‘Russia: Don’t Oppose the Energy Charter, Help to Adapt it’ (2009) 76(7) 
Petroleum Economist 2. 
 
54 Christian Nitoiu, ‘Is Meaningful Cooperation Between the EU and Russia still Possible?’ in Christian 
Nitoiu, Avoiding a ‘Cold War’: The Future of EU-Russia Relations in the Context of the Ukraine Crisis 
(LSE IDEAS 2016) 94. 
 
55 Hereafter, the list of the BITs signed by and between Russia and EU Members (date of signature/date of 
entry into force): Austria (1990/1991), Belgium (1989/1991), Bulgaria (1993/2005), Czech Republic 
(1994), Denmark (1993/1996), Finland (1989/1991), France (1989/1991), Germany (1989/1991), Greece 
(1993/1997), Hungary (1995/1996), Italy (1996/1997), Lithuania (1999/2004), Luxembourg (1989/1991), 
Netherlands (1993/1996), Romania (1993/1996) Slovakia (1993/1996), Spain (1990/1991), Sweden 





a substantial impact on the energy relations between the contracting countries. Although 
not specifically aimed at energy, its provisions apply to a broad range of different assets 
that BITs consider as ‘investments’ and as such, they have a direct influence on the 
investments in the energy sector. Thus, BITs constitute a legal frame for the energy 
investments between the contracting parties. Amongst the typical provisions of the 
specific regime created by the BITs are the national and most favoured nation treatment, 
fair and equitable treatment, prohibition of unlawful expropriations, and guarantee of free 
transfer of funds. However, the protection granted under the single BIT largely depends 
on the specific wording of the clauses at issue.56 
Pursuant to Article 351(1) TFEU: 
The rights and obligations arising from agreements concluded before 1 
January 1958 or, for acceding States, before the date of their accession, 
between one or more Member States on the one hand, and one or more third 
countries on the other, shall not be affected by the provisions of the Treaties.57 
Therefore, in relation to BITs signed with non-EU countries prior to MSs’ accession to 
the EU, the conflict between two incompatible obligations is resolved in favour of the 
BIT by EU law itself. Article 351(1) does not apply only to those agreements that breach 
the fundamental constitutional principles of EU law.58 
                                                   
56 For example, the agreements with Austria, Belgium, Luxembourg, Finland, Germany, Spain and the 
United Kingdom are provided with so-called ‘narrow dispute resolution clauses’, which limit the access to 
arbitration only to disputes concerning the amount or mode of compensation to be paid in case of 
expropriation. See Reinisch August, ‘How Narrow are Narrow Dispute Settlement Clauses in Investment 
Treaties?’ (2011) 2(1) Journal of International Dispute Settlement 117. 
 
57 Article 351 covers also secondary law sources. See Anthony Arnull, Catherine Barnard, Michael Dougan 
and Eleanor Spaventa, A Constitutional Order of States? Essays in EU Law in Honour of Alan Dashwood 
(Hart Publishing 2011) 135. 
 





The question of the inter-relationship between EU energy law and international 
investment law was at the centre of the Commission v Slovakia case before the Court of 
Justice of the European Union.59 This dealt with the implementation of the second energy 
package in Slovakia, which negatively impacted on the priority access to the electricity 
network of a company owned by a Swiss investor.60 The Court confirmed the applicability 
of Article 351(1) TFEU to the case at issue and considered that Slovakia was bound by 
international obligations towards the Swiss investor on the basis of the BIT concluded by 
the country with Switzerland before its accession to the EU and in compliance with the 
pacta sunt servanda principle.61 The reasoning of the Court confirmed the opinion of 
Advocate General Jaaskinen.62   
In addition to the above, one should consider instances in which the incompatibility 
between EU law and an international agreement comes at a later stage because of the 
adoption of new EU regulations or a new allocation of competence between the EU and 
its MSs. This is another situation in which MSs can derogate to EU law to respect the 
international obligations arising from the agreement signed and to comply with the pacta 
sunt servanda principle.63 Following this line of reasoning, the German Federal 
                                                   
 
59 Case C-264/09 Commission v Slovakia [2011] ECR I-08065. 
  
60 The second energy package is an all-encompassing intervention issued in 2003 regulating the EU energy 
market. See section 6.1.1. 
 
61 Anatole Boute, ‘The Protection of Russian Investments in the EU Energy Market: A Case in Support of 
Russia’s Ratification of the Energy Charter Treaty’ (2014) 29 ICSID Review 545. The pacta sunt servanda 
principle is included under the Vienna Convention on the Law of the Treaties and is recognised as a general 
principle of international law. See United Nations, Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (1969) Article 
26. 
 
62 Commission v Slovakia (n 59). 
 
63 See Tilman Dralle, ‘A Glance into the Future: The Prospective Investment Law Regime between the 
European Union and the Russian Federation’ (2013) Dresden Research Paper on International Economic 
Law 2/2013 <https://tu-dresden.de/gsw/jura/ifve/jfoeffl9/ressourcen/dateien/globaltransaxion/veroeffent 





Constitutional Court stated that ‘a legally existing factual situation in the Member States 
will in principle not be adversely affected by a later step of integration’.64 Similarly, in 
Regulation 1219/2012, establishing transitional arrangements for BITs between MSs and 
third countries, the EU legislator underlined that old treaties should be maintained until 
new agreements between the EU and the relevant non-EU country enter into force.65 
It is worth mentioning that Article 351(2) TFEU requires MSs to ‘take all appropriate 
steps’ to eliminate any incompatibility between BITs in force and EU law, in order to 
preserve the principle of supremacy of EU law.66 Although the TFEU refers to 
‘established’ incompatibilities, in a series of cases dealing with BITs concluded with 
extra-EU countries, the Court of Justice of the European Union interpreted this clause as 
referred to all those risks which could create potential future conflicts, even if there are 
no actual incompatibilities.67 Commentators criticised this broad interpretation which, 
paradoxically, would require MSs to denounce or renegotiate all their prior international 
agreements that fall under the scope of EU law.68 Notwithstanding the similarities to the 
                                                   
64 2 BvE 2/08 30 June 2008, 380. 
 
65 European Parliament and Council Regulation 1219/2012 of 12 December 2012 establishing transitional 
arrangements for bilateral investment agreements between Member States and third countries’ [2012] OJ 
L351, Art 3. 
 
66 Pursuant to Article 351(2) TFEU: ‘To the extent that such agreements are not compatible with the 
Treaties, the Member State or States concerned shall take all appropriate steps to eliminate the 
incompatibilities established. Member States shall, where necessary, assist each other to this end and shall, 
where appropriate, adopt a common attitude’. 
 
67 Case C-205/06 Commission v Austria [2009] ECR I-1301; Case C-249/06 Commission v Sweden [2009] 
ECR I-1335; Case C-118/07 Commission v Finland [2009] ECR I-10889. See Alina Kaczorowska, 
European Union Law (4th edn, Routledge 2016) 279; Robert Schütze, Foreign Affairs and the EU 
Constitution: Selected Essays (CUP 2014) 108; Marc Bungenberg, Joern Griebel and Steffen Hindelang, 
International Investment Law and EU Law (Springer 2011) 86. 
 
68 See Schütze (n 67) 109, according to which, ‘any international agreement falling within the competences 
of the Union would be incompatible with the effectiveness of (subsequently adopted) European legislation’. 
A way to solve the potential dispute would be a direct engagement of the Commission in the negotiation 
process. See Panos Koutrakos, EU International Relations Law (Hart Publishing 2015) 347; Marc 
Bungenberg and Christoph Herrmann, Common Commercial Policy After Lisbon (Springer 2013) 57; Jorun 





previous cases, in Commission v Slovakia the Court did not address this issue because the 
Commission has not pleaded Article 351(2).69 Afterwards, the EU legislator seems to 
have clarified the matter with the adoption of Regulation 1219/2012.70  
For the reasons above, in case of contrast between EU law and BITs between MSs and 
Russia it is reasonable to adopt the following interpretation: BITs find application 1) when 
they have been signed before the accession to the EU of the relevant MS; or 2) in the 
event of a supervened incompatibility due to a change in EU law. Most of the agreements 
with Russia were signed at the end of the Soviet era.71 In case of Austria, Bulgaria, Czech 
Republic, Finland, Hungary, Lithuania, Romania and Slovakia, BITs were signed before 
their accession to the European Union and, therefore, should find application in case of 
incompatibility with EU law.72 This means that BITs between EU MSs and Russia could 
hamper the application of EU law in a uniform way throughout the territory of the Union. 
For this reason, MSs’ BITs do not seem to be the more appropriate legal tool to guarantee 
a coherent regulation of the EU-Russia energy relationship. As we will see in chapter IV, 
the Lisbon Treaty significantly impacted on this topic. 
                                                   
69  Case C-264/09 Commission v Slovakia [2011] ECR I-08065, Opinion of AG Jaaskinen, paragraph 72. 
Article 12 of Regulation (EU) No 1219/2012 explains the conditions under which Member States are 
empowered to conclude and/or maintain in force bilateral investment agreements signed between 1 
December 2009 (date of entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty) and 9 January 2013 (date of entry into force 
of Regulation (EU) No 1219/2012). Regulation (EU) No 1219/2012 has been issued on the basis of the new 
EU competence on foreign direct investments (see chapter IV, section 2.2). 
 
70  This will be analysed in detail in chapter IV, section 2.2. 
 
71 See footnote 55.  
 
72 Hereafter, the list of the countries with their accession year: Austria (1995), Bulgaria (2007), Czech 
Republic (2004), Finland (1995), Hungary (2004), Lithuania (2004), Romania (2007), Slovakia (2004). The 





5.2 Multilateral Tools 
5.2.1 Energy Charter Treaty 
Bilateral relations aside, from an international perspective the Energy Charter Treaty 
(‘ECT’) constitutes the only intergovernmental agreement in the energy field backed by 
an investor-State dispute settlement mechanism.73  
The ECT covers various energy related fields, including investment, trade, transit, 
competition, energy efficiency, access to capital, transfer of technology and protection of 
environment. 
Through its provisions, the ECT tends to create a stable and non-discriminatory regime 
for trade of energy materials and products between the contracting parties. This regime is 
based on the rules of WTO Agreements (see the next section below). Through reference 
to the WTO in its Article 4, the ECT thus applies the rules of the GATT/GATS to the 
ECT contracting parties that are not members of the WTO.74  
In addition to trade, ECT transit provisions were seen as a key element during the initial 
negotiations, given that several ECT members are remote producing countries while 
others are major transit countries. Article 7 ECT lays down the rights and obligations 
concerning transit of energy through territory of a contracting state. This article mainly 
                                                   
73 Yulia Selivanova, ‘Managing the Patchwork of Agreements in Trade and Investment’ in Andreas 
Goldthau and Jan M Witte (eds), Global Energy Governance: The New Rules of the Game (Brookings 
Institution Press 2010) 61. For a background, see Thomas Wälde, The Energy Charter Treaty: An East-
West Gateway for Investment and Trade (1996 Kluwer Law International). 
 
74 Yulia Selivanova, ‘The Energy Charter and the International Energy Governance’ in Yulia Selivanova, 






‘facilitates’ transit in two ways: by granting access to existing networks and by 
encouraging construction of new transport capacity. 
As regards to investments, the ECT distinguishes between two stages in the investment 
process and grants them a different protection. The pre-investment stage concerns access 
to foreign investors and it is protected by ‘soft law’ measures. Two interesting provisions 
in this regard are the ‘standstill’ provision of Article 10(5)(a) and the ‘rollback’ provision 
of Article 10(5)(b). The former requires contracting parties not to introduce new 
restrictions, while the latter mandates the reduction of existing restrictions on foreign 
investments.75 The post-investment stage concerns investments already made and is 
protected by binding ‘hard-law’ measures. For this kind of investments, the ECT imposes 
several obligations on the contracting parties. Article 13 ECT protects foreign investors 
from unlawful expropriation. Article 10(1) protects investors from breaches of individual 
investment contracts. The same article obliges contracting parties to provide ‘equitable 
and fair treatment’ and ‘most constant protection and security’. Lastly, national treatment 
and most favoured nation provisions oblige the contracting parties not to discriminate 
against investors from the ECT contracting states with regard to national and other foreign 
investors.76  
The ECT regime is reinforced by a specific dispute settlement mechanism. This is a major 
confidence builder for foreign investors. ECT contains two forms of binding dispute 
settlement. Investor-to-State arbitration under Article 26 is provided for investment 
disputes. State-to-State arbitration under Article 27 concerns all disputes arising from the 
interpretation or application of the ECT (except disputes concerning competition and 
environment). Article 26(2) gives investors direct access to one of the international 
                                                   
75 Angus C Johnston and Guy Block, EU Energy Law (2012 OUP) 286-289. 
 




arbitration forums, namely: International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes 
(ICSID), the United Nations Commission on International Trade Law (UNCITRAL), or 
the Arbitration Institute of the Stockholm Chamber of Commerce. The awards rendered 
under this dispute settlement mechanism are final and directly enforceable. 
To date, the ECT has been signed or acceded to by fifty-two states, the European Union 
and Euratom (the total number of its signatories is therefore fifty-four).77 Article 45(1) 
allows signatories to apply the treaty provisionally pending its entry into force, to the 
extent that such provisional application is not inconsistent with the constitution, laws or 
regulations of the country.78 Despite the significance of the ECT as a legal framework in 
the energy field, Russia never ratified the treaty and instead opted for provisional 
application under Article 45(1) ECT. 
Moscow, which had stalled on ratification, having linked it to consensus on the ECT 
Transit Protocol, finally announced that it would have terminated provisional application 
on 20 August 2009.79 Russia’s concerns were linked to the fact that the ECT did not 
sufficiently consider the interests of energy-producing countries and particularly those in 
foreign midstream and downstream energy markets.80 Indeed, the perception of an Euro-
                                                   
77 Energy Charter, ‘Members and Observers’ (2017) <http://www.energycharter.org/who-we-are/members-
observers/> accessed 1 May 2017. 
 
78 Article 45(1) of the Energy Charter Treaty reads: ‘Each signatory agrees to apply this Treaty provisionally 
pending its entry into force for such signatory in accordance with Article 44, to the extent that such 
provisional application is not inconsistent with its constitution, laws or regulations’. 
 
79 Practical Law, ‘Russia Withdrawing from Energy Charter Treaty’ (2009) <http://uk.practicallaw.com/7-
422-4842?service=dispute> accessed 24 September 2016. 
 
80 Boute (61) 526. According to Investopedia, ‘midstream activities include the processing, storing, 
transporting and marketing of oil, natural gas and natural gas liquids’. ‘Downstream operations can include 
refining crude oil and distributing its byproducts — such as gasoline, natural gas liquids, diesel and a 
variety of other energy sources — down to the retail level. The closer an oil and gas company is to the 
process of providing consumers with petroleum products, the further downstream the company is said to 
be’. See <https://www.investopedia.com/terms/m/midstream.asp> and <https://www.investopedia.com/ 






centric nature of the ECT is well-grounded in the origins of the treaty, which was meant 
to be a tool to extend European investment interests into former communist countries.81 
Russia’s announcement to terminate provisional application and withdraw from the ECT 
deprived Russian investments of additional protection abroad, which should have been a 
source of concern, given Russia’s issues with the Third Energy Package (see section 6.1.1 
below).82 
Indeed, Russian companies that invested in the other contracting parties were protected 
under the ECT before Russia’s termination of the provisional application. Following the 
decision to terminate the agreement, these investors lost all the protection rights conferred 
by the ECT. Consequently, all the investments made by Russian companies in the EU 
after the termination notice are not protected under the ECT. According to Boute, only a 
new ratification of the ECT by Moscow would reactivate the right of Russian investors 
to challenge measures that the EU had adopted before Russia terminated its provisional 
application.83 However, the same author argues that, given the special status of EU law 
under the ECT,84 the eventual claim brought by a Russian investor would likely find a 
negative response by the appointed arbitral tribunal.85 
                                                   
81 Thomas Walde, ‘Arbitration in the Oil, Gas and Energy Field: Emerging Energy Charter Treaty Practice’ 
(2004) Transnational Dispute Management 4. This view is supported by the words of the Tribunal in the 
Electrabel case, where the court claimed that ‘a presumption of no-contradiction exists between the ECT 
and EU law’. See Electrabel S.A. v Hungary ICSID ARB/07/19 (30 November 2012) 4.134. 
 
82 Ibid. Only a new ratification of the ECT would reactivate the possibility for Russian investors of 
launching arbitration proceedings against the Third Energy Package on the basis of the rights that these 
investors benefited from before Russia terminated its provisional application. See Boute (n 61) 525. 
 
83 Boute (n 61) 541. 
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At the same time, Russia’s withdrawal from the ECT did not have immediate 
consequences for foreign investment protection, given that an arbitral tribunal for the 
Yukos case held that Russia was bound by the ECT for investment pre-dating its 
withdrawal on 19 October 2009,86 despite not having ratified the treaty.87 In particular, in 
accordance with Article 45(3), investments made in Russia prior to the withdrawal date 
would be protected for an additional 20-year period.88 Only new investments made after 
the termination notice do not enjoy the protection granted under the ECT.89 
In light of the above, until a new ratification, the withdrawal of Russia renders the ECT 
unable to be used to assess the reciprocal regulations adopted in the energy sector and 
shape EU-Russia energy relationship.  
                                                   
86 The Yukos case, which was believed to be politically motivated, is arguably the most controversial 
investment arbitration case of all time. As CEO of Russia’s largest oil firm, Mikhail Khodorkovsky was 
arrested for alleged tax fraud and Yukos was subsequently dismantled and auctioned off. For an overview 
of the case see Richard Youngs, Energy Security: Europe's New Foreign Policy Challenge (Routledge 
2009). 
 
87 EUobserver, ‘Investors Call for Tough EU-Russia Energy Treaty’ (2009) <http://euobserver.com/? 
aid=29084> accessed 10 September 2016; Konoplyanik (n 53) 3.   
 
88 After long and complex litigation proceedings, a final award was rendered in July 2014 of US$50 billion 
against the Russian State, however Russia appealed to the District Court of The Hague, which ruled in April 
2016 that Russia was not bound by the ECT because it had not ratified the Treaty. This judgement has 
subsequently suspended any enforcement of Yukos-related fines, pending a final appeal by investors to the 
Supreme Court of the Netherlands. This view of non-applicability of the ECT to Russia is contentious. It 
therefore remains to be seen whether the view of non-applicability of the ECT to Russia is maintained in 
the appeal to the Supreme Court of the Netherlands. At the time of writing, the dispute is not settled yet.  
 
89 The definition of ‘investment’ under the ECT is very broad and covers ‘every kind of asset, owned or 
controlled directly or indirectly by an investor including (a) tangible and intangible, and movable and 
immovable, property, and any property rights such as leases, mortgages, liens, and pledges; (b) a company 
or business enterprise, or shares, stock, or other forms of equity participation in a company or business 
enterprise, and bonds and other debt of a company or business enterprise; (c) claims to money and claims 
to performance pursuant to contract having an economic value and associated with an investment; (d) 
intellectual property; (e) returns; (f) any right conferred by law or contract or by virtue of any licences and 





5.2.2 WTO Agreement 
On 22 August 2012 Russia became a member of the WTO after almost 20 years of 
protracted negotiation. Russia’s accession was perceived as a monumental occasion to 
definitively embrace a market economy model and deepening EU-Russia trade 
relations.90 The occasion was also hailed as an opportunity to enhance the current legal 
framework, which was considered limited in nature under the PCA.91  
During WTO negotiations, future Member States of the organisation proposed limited 
commitments in relation to energy. Several reasons explain this choice. First, WTO 
founders did not want to make large concessions considering the strategic importance of 
the sector for their internal security and geopolitical leverage. In this respect, when the 
Uruguay round took place,92 the presence of national monopolies in Europe hampered the 
development of transnational energy trade. Second, energy producing countries were not 
founding members of the WTO, and therefore did not contribute when the agreements 
were drafted. Some of these countries entered WTO at a later stage (e.g. Qatar in 1996, 
Saudi Arabia in 2005 and Russia in 2012) while others, such as Libya and Algeria, are 
still not members.93 Lastly, the presence of vertically integrated undertakings in national 
                                                   
90 Guillaume Van der Loo, ‘EU-Russia Trade Relations: It Takes WTO to Tango?’ (2013) 40(1) Legal 
Issues of Economic Integration 7. 
 
91 Natasha Georgiou and Andrea Rocco, ‘The Energy Union as an Instrument of Global Governance in EU-
Russia Energy Relations: From Fragmentation to Coherence and Solidarity’ (2017) 9(1) Geopolitics, 
History and International Relations 245.  
 
92 The Uruguay Round was the last of eight completed rounds of the GATT. It took place from 1986 to 
1994 and led to the creation of the World Trade Organization with GATT remaining as an integral part of 
the WTO agreements. See World Trade Organization, ‘The Uruguay Round’ (2018) <https://www.wto.org/ 
english/thewto_e/whatis_e/tif_e/fact5_e.htm> accessed 7 April 2018. 
 
93 Not by chance, none of these countries, except Kazakhstan, are to date members of the ECT. The list of 
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markets did not allow to draw a net distinction between energy goods and services.94 Only 
with the liberalisation of the sector this conceptual separation became clearer.95 
Notwithstanding the limited commitments, the applicability of WTO rules, in particular 
those included under the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (‘GATT’) and the 
General Agreement on Trade in Services (‘GATS’) to the energy sector is indisputable.96 
GATT regulates the international trade of goods of any kind between MSs of the 
organisation. However, it does not define the concept of a ‘good’ as such.97 According to 
the WTO Secretariat, the main characteristic to define a product as a ‘good’ in the 
meaning of the GATT is the ‘storability’,98 for which a product is storable when it can be 
put in a place where it is available for future use.99 In this respect, natural gas can be 
                                                   
94 Wen-Chen Shih, ‘Energy Security, GATT/WTO, and Regional Agreements’ (2009) 49 Natural 
Resources Journal 440. 
 
95 Thomas Cottier, Garba Malumfashi, Sofya Matteotti and Olga Nartova, ‘Energy in WTO Law and Policy’ 
in Thomas Cottier and Panagiotis Delimatsis, The Prospects of International Trade Regulation: From 
Fragmentation to Coherence (CUP 2011) 3. Further comments on the inadequateness of the WTO rules in 
relation to energy can be found in Yulia Selivanova, ‘International Energy Governance’ (2012) American 
Society of International Law Proceedings 394 -396. 
  
96 WTO rules do not provide for an adequate energy investment regime. The scope of the TRIMs is limited 
to the trade-related effects of the investments only and its application to investments in the energy sector 
has been put under question by many. Similarly, other WTO agreements can have an impact on the energy 
sector, although less pronounced then the above discussed GATT and GATS. See Catherine Redgwell 
’International Regulation of Energy Activities’ in Martha M Roggenkamp, Catherine Redgwell, Inigo Del 
Guayo and Anita Ronne (eds.), Energy Law in Europe: National, EU and International Regulation (2007 
OUP) 137-138. 
 
97 Thomas Cottier, Sofya Matteotti-Berkutova and Olga Nartova, ‘Third Country Relations in EU 
Unbundling of Natural Gas Markets: The ‘Gazprom Clause’ of Directive 2009/73 EC and WTO Law’ 
(2010) NCCR Working Paper 6/2010, 9 <http://www.nccr-trade.org/publication/third-country-relations-in-
eu-unbundling-of-natural-gas-markets-the-gazprom-clause-of-directi/> last accessed 26 August 2014. 
 
98 WTO Secretariat, Guide to the GATS, An Overview of Issues for Further Liberalization of Trade in 
Services (Kluwer Law International 2001) 26. See also Danae Azaria, ‘Energy Transit under the Energy 
Charter Treaty and the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade’ (2009) 27(4) Journal of Energy & Natural 
Resources Law 565; Nurlan Kurmanov, ‘Transit of Energy Resources Under GATT Article V’ (2013) 32(4) 
International Energy Law & Regulation 178; Rafael Leal-Arcas, ‘The Resumption of the Doha Round and 
the Future of Services Trade’ (2007) 29(3) Loyola of Los Angeles International & Comparative Law 
Review 362. 
 





stored in its natural state inside old depleted natural gas fields. This technique, commonly 
referred to as ‘gas storage’, is used to accumulate significant amounts of natural gas 
during times of lower consumption in order to prevent unexpected shortages during high-
consumption periods. 
Like the definition of ‘good’ under the GATT, the meaning of the term ‘service’ is not 
laid down under the GATS. However, this agreement sets out four different modalities in 
which a service can be traded, and it is therefore subject to its rules.100 First, a service can 
be supplied from the territory of one country to another country (so-called ‘cross-border 
supply’). Second, consumers from one country can use a service in another country (so-
called ‘consumption abroad’). Third, a company of one country can set up a branch and/or 
a subsidiary in another country and provide services therein (so-called ‘commercial 
presence’). Lastly, people can move from one country to another and provide services in 
the latter (so-called ‘movement of natural persons’). 
In case of natural gas, trade in services is made through cross-border supply and 
commercial presence. The WTO services classification (W/120), a comprehensive list of 
services sectors and sub-sectors covered under the GATS used for WTO accession, does 
not include a specific section on energy. However, gas related activities can be retrieved 
in three sub-sections: (i) services incidental to mining, rendered on a fee or contract basis 
at oil and gas fields; (ii) services incidental to energy distribution; and (iii) transportation 
via pipeline of crude or refined petroleum and petroleum products and of natural gas.101 
Services which are closely related to the production of the goods are not covered by the 
GATS. In this case the GATT finds application, because the production-related services 
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cannot be separated from the good itself.102 In the gas field these activities are, for 
example, liquefaction and gasification.103  
The applicability of WTO treaties to the energy sector and the fact that both the EU and 
Russia are members of the organisation make WTO rules a valuable option to enforce 
EU’s and Russia’s reciprocal stances.  
Furthermore, Article 23(1) of the WTO Dispute Settlement Understanding (‘DSU’) 
provides that the jurisdiction of the WTO dispute settlement mechanism is compulsory 
and exclusive in nature for disputes that arise out from any of the WTO covered 
agreements.104 Strict timeframes are established for the various stages of the dispute 
settlement process. The final remedy for a breach of the WTO provisions established by 
the WTO adjudication is the withdrawal or amendment of the WTO-inconsistent measure. 
DSU also provides for temporary remedies like compensation and suspension of 
concessions (retaliation).105 
5.2.3 Custom and other International Law Sources 
In the previous sections we analysed the bilateral and multilateral treaties binding the EU 
and its Members to Russia. In addition to that, the EU-Russia gas relationships can be 
shaped, at least in principle, by international custom.106 
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106 Article 38 of the Statute of the International Court of Justice identifies the following sources of 
international law: international conventions; international custom; the general principles of law recognised 
by civilised nations; judicial decisions and the teachings of the most highly qualified publicists of the 




Customary rules are particularly significant where the relations between States are not 
subject to an agreement. Even where a treaty is in force, customary rules find application 
to fill in lacunae, when there is a specific reference in the treaties or as a source of 
interpretation of these latter.107 As it is widely known, the creation of a customary rule 
requires the presence of two elements: general practice and opinio iuris.108 Once 
identified, custom applies to all countries and can therefore be invoked by any foreign 
investor, irrespective of whether its State of origin has entered into a BIT with the country 
where the investment is made, with the exception of the so-called ‘persistent objectors’.109  
Over the years, the role of custom dramatically decreased in the investment dispute 
settlement, as well as in the discussions between commentators and practitioners. Even 
the OECD admitted that the blooming of BITs requiring prompt, adequate and effective 
compensation deprived the debate on customary rules of practical significance for foreign 
investors.110 Indeed, the rapid growth of BITs can be explained by the failure of 
customary rules to provide sufficient guidance and protection for the investments made. 
This was underlined in the widely-known Barcelona Traction case.111 
                                                   
 
107 Moshe Hirsh, ‘Sources of International Investment Law’ (2011) International Law Association Study 
Group on the Role of Soft Law Instruments in International Investment Law, 15-17 
<https://ssrn.com/abstract=1892564> accessed on 6 April 2017. 
 
108 Article 38(1) of the Statute of the International Court of Justice sets out these two requirements. 
 
109 See, among the others, James A Green, The Persistent Objector Rule in International Law (OUP 2016). 
 
110 OECD, ‘Indirect Expropriation and the Right to Regulate in International Investment Law’ (2004) 
OECD Working Paper on International Investment 04/2004 <https://www.oecd.org/daf/inv/investment-
policy/WP-2004_4.pdf> accessed 2 January 2018. 
 
111 Barcelona Traction Light and Power Co Ltd. (Belgium v Spain) [1970] ICJ Rep 4 46-47, where the ICJ 
stated that: ‘Considering the important developments of the last half century, the growth of foreign 
investments and the expansion of the international activities of corporations, in particular of holding 
companies, which are often multinational, and considering the way in which the economic interests of 
States have proliferated, it may at first sight appear surprising that the evolution of law has not gone further 
and that no generally accepted rules in the matter have crystallized on the international plane’. The 
Barcelona Traction case describes a situation which has remained unchanged to these days. Commenting 
on the US 2004 model BIT, Judge Schwebel, former president of the ICJ, pointed out that the lack of 




The contested utility of customary international law to protect investments in the absence 
of a BIT has again been the object of discussion in Diallo, a case dealing with the 
compensation of a Guinean majority shareholder and manager of two companies he had 
been doing business with in Zaire (Mr Diallo), who was arrested and expelled from the 
country.112 Guinea acted in support of Mr Diallo by providing diplomatic protection, a 
‘classic’ defensive action under public international law through which a State has the 
discretionary right to protect its natural or legal nationals injured abroad.113 In Diallo, the 
International Court of Justice (‘ICJ’) observed that: 
In contemporary international law, the protection of the rights of companies 
and the rights of their shareholders, and the settlement of the associated 
disputes, are essentially governed by bilateral or multilateral agreements for 
the protection of foreign investments, such as the treaties for the promotion 
and protection of foreign investments, and the Washington Convention of 18 
March 1965 on the Settlement of Investment Disputes between States and 
Nationals of Other States, which created an International Centre for 
Settlement of Investment Disputes (‘ICSID’), and also by contracts between 
States and foreign investors. In that context, the role of diplomatic protection 
somewhat faded, as in practice recourse is only made to it in rare cases where 
treaty regimes do not exist or have proved inoperative.114 
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Model Bilateral Investment Treaty: An Exercise in the Regressive Development of International Law’ 3(2) 
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The overall compensation awarded by the ICJ to Guinea was minimal considering the 
amount claimed. Whilst the amount sought was US $11.5 million, the total sum awarded 
was US $95,000. Guinea’s claims in terms of loss of earnings and loss of potential 
earnings were rejected by the Court.115  
In the context of Diallo, it seems that the incorporation of local subsidiaries precludes an 
effective relief by means of diplomatic protection. This concern is expressed also in the 
joint opinion of two dissenting judges, who argued that ‘[T]he low standard of protection 
of shareholders under customary law is now confined to the wretched of the earth like 
Mr. Diallo … we believe that this case sets a dangerous precedent for foreign investors 
unprotected by bilateral investment treaties’.116 
For the reasons above, as outlined by McLachlan, three decades after the Barcelona 
Traction case we still cannot define what the international jurisprudence includes in the 
‘minimum standard of treatment’ of an investor under customary international law.117 
Indeed, the elements of widespread practice and self-observed legal obligation, required 
for the formation of a customary rule, are not apparently well adapted to meet the pressing 
problems of the day.118 
                                                   
115 Ahmadou Sadio Diallo (Republic of Guinea v Democratic Republic of the Congo) (Judgment) [2012] 
ICJ Rep 324 56-57. 
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Similar considerations to the ones made about custom find application in case of general 
principles of law, the other source of international law listed by Article 38 of the ICJ 
statute.119 
In the light of the above, international custom cannot be considered as an effective way 
to shape EU-Russia energy relationship. 
5.3 Conclusive Remarks on the Applicability of International Law Tools 
In the absence of strong bilateral commitments and considering the limited protection of 
multilateral law remedies except WTO rules (applicable between the parties only since 
2012), over the years the EU and Russia adopted protectionist measures to limit the access 
to their energy resources and infrastructure. In this context, restrictions on energy 
investments and retaliations to gain political leverage became the order of the day in EU-
Russia energy relations.120 This clearly leaves room for opportunistic and politically 
motivated decisions which could hamper the development of the energy projects 
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A Paradox’, in Brabandere and Gazzini, Sources of Transnational Investment Law (Martinus Nijhoff 2012) 
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concerned with negative consequences on the welfare of final consumers.121 All of this 
will be analysed below.    
6. Internal Measures   
In the previous sections, we analysed the multilateral and bilateral legal tools which could 
impact on the EU-Russia energy relationship. This section outlines the internal regulatory 
measures taken by the EU and Russia to shape their domestic natural gas markets which 
could impact on third countries’ companies.  
6.1 EU Measures 
In section 3 of this chapter we have seen that interdependence is one of the key 
characteristics of the EU-Russia relationship due to geographical, economic and physical 
constraints. While EU energy legislation is only binding on EU MSs and the Energy 
Community countries,122 it will nevertheless have implications for other third countries, 
by promoting or hindering energy trade and investments.  
During the 1990s, when most national electricity and natural gas markets were still 
monopolised, the European Union and the Member States decided to open these markets 
gradually to competition. The first liberalisation directives (First Energy Package) were 
adopted in 1996 (electricity) and 1998 (gas), to be transposed into Member States’ legal 
systems by 1998 (electricity) and 2000 (gas). The Second Energy Package was adopted 
in 2003, its directives to be transposed into national law by 2004, with some provisions 
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entering into force only in 2007. With the adoption of the first two packages, industrial 
and domestic consumers were now free to choose their own gas and electricity suppliers 
from a wider range of competitors. 
The last significant action regulating the European energy market was the Third Energy 
Package. This was adopted in March 2009, before the Lisbon Treaty, and repealed the 
Second Energy Package.  
The most significant piece of natural gas legislation included under the Third Energy 
Package is Directive 2009/73/EC (hereafter, ‘the Gas Directive’), which is of utmost 
importance in the context of the pro-competitive steps taken by the European Union to 
achieve a single European energy market.123 It was published on 13 July 2009, after two 
and a half years of negotiations which followed the 2007 Energy Sector Inquiry.124 This 
latter, which consisted of a thorough analysis of the levels of competition present in the 
European electricity and natural gas markets following the first two energy packages,125 
depicted a critical situation in regards to the competitive environment and the 
liberalisation processes. According to the European Commission, this situation had to be 
attributed to structural deficiencies derived from the domination of the historical 
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Union ‘TEU’) the desire to achieve a true common market greatly increased. Accordingly, Article 3(3) 
TEU provides that one of the EU’s objectives is a highly competitive social market economy.    
 
124 European Commission, ‘DG Competition Report on Energy Sector Inquiry’ SEC (2006) 1724. 
 
125 The first two energy packages adopted by the European legislator are not described in this thesis. 
However, useful information can be retrieved from Energy Community Secretariat, ‘The Energy 
Community: The Legal Framework’ (2010) <http://www.energy-community.org/pls/portal/docs/ 
808177.PDF> accessed 26 November 2013; Enrico Salerno, ‘L’Attuazione della Prima Direttiva sul Gas 
Naturale (98/30/CE) e le Modifiche Introdotte dalla Nuova Direttiva (2003/55/CE)’ in Laura Ammannati, 





operators of the national markets, which led to a persisting national concentration, a 
consequence of too little integration and too little interconnection between Member 
States. This was coupled with the chronic lack of transparently available market 
information, the consequent distrust in the pricing mechanisms, and the presence of long-
term downstream contracts tying big importing customers.126 Along with the need to 
strengthen sectoral regulation, the EC described as beneficial the antitrust enforcement to 
cope with problems related to the presence of vertically integrated operators foreclosing 
the market.127 
In response to the findings of the Energy Sector Inquiry, the Gas Directive provided for 
several actions. In particular, it introduced stronger unbundling measures, while 
guaranteeing incentives for investments in infrastructure by allowing for the derogation 
of the provisions on unbundling and third party access to pipelines on a case-by-case 
basis. Moreover, it provided enhanced powers for the national regulatory authorities, also 
in respect to dispute settlement mechanisms. Lastly, it set out rules to regulate the 
behaviour of third country entities in the EU, by expressly extending the regime applied 
to domestic companies and adding specific requirements as condition to operate in the 
EU territory.128  
6.2 Russia Measures 
The Third Energy Package and its provisions on third countries’ companies (see chapter 
II) were intended to address concerns in Brussels regarding restrictions imposed on EU 
                                                   
126 European Commission (n 124) 4; Victor Von Hoorn, ‘’Unbundling’, ‘Reciprocity’ and the European 
Internal Energy Market: WTO Consistency and Broader Implications for Europe’ (2009) 18 
European Energy and Environmental Law Review 55.  
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companies trying to invest in Russia’s energy market.129 The Yukos case of 2003 served 
as a stark reminder of the lengths to which the Russian state would go to retain control 
over its oil and gas sector.130 However, the cases of Sakhalin II131 and Shtokman132 in 
2006 raised the most concerns in Brussels as both cases were flagrant examples of 
arbitrary state intervention in the oil and gas sector.  Further concerns were raised with 
Russia’s adoption of the Law on Foreign Investments in Strategic Companies (Law 57-
FZ) in April 2008,133 which set out the oil and gas sector as a strategic sector for which 
investment now required government approval.134 As a result, foreign investors were 
required to obtain consent for any acquisition in excess of 50% in companies deemed to 
be strategic, which enabled the designated authority to monitor the activities of foreign 
investors in the energy sector and other sectors of the economy.135 
                                                   
129 Belyi (n 120) 124. See also Peter Van Elsuwege, ‘Towards a Modernisation of EU-Russia Legal 
Relations?’ (2012) EU-Russia Papers 5, Centre for EU-Russia Studies, University of Tartu 24 
<http://hdl.handle.net/1854/LU-2134081> accessed 8 September 2016. 
 
130 See footnote 86. 
 
131 Sakhalkin II, an oil and gas development project on Sakhalin Island in Russia, was governed by a 
Partnership Sharing Agreement which meant that the Russian state could not receive any profit until all 
costs incurred by the foreign company had been recovered. Shell was criticised of the high cost overruns 
which had subsequently brought about massive losses to the Russian Federation, including serious 
environmental damages to the region. All environmental concerns and issues regarding the project were 
swiftly resolved when Shell agreed to sell a majority stake in the project to Gazprom. 
 
132 Shtokman is one of the world’s largest gas fields, for which Gazprom was in need of a partner as it 
lacked the necessary advanced technology to extract gas from this field. A short list of candidates was 
announced in September 2005, which included Norwegian Statoil and Norsk Hydro; American 
ChevronTexaco and ConocoPhillips; and French Total. Lengthy negotiations ensued until Gazprom finally 
declared that it no longer needed a partner, which was due to the fact that the candidates had not made a 
substantial enough offer of a stake in exchange for Shtokman. A decision was finally made in 2007 when 
Total, Statoil and Norsk Hydro finally agreed to become partners with Gazprom. 
 
133 Law 57-FZ ‘On the Procedure for Contributing Foreign Investments in Legal Entities which are of 
Strategic Importance for the Defence of the Country and Security of the State’ (so-called ‘Law on Foreign 
Investments in Strategic Companies’).   
 
134 Article 7 Law 57-FZ. See also Sergey Seliverstov, ‘Energy Security of Russia and the EU: Current Legal 
Problems’ (2009) Note de L’Institut Francais des Relations Internationales (IFRI) 16. 
 
135 Seliverstov (n 134). Law 155-FZ of 1 July 2017 amended Law 57-FZ by extending the special regulation 
(and thresholds) for approval of transactions which is established by Law 57-FZ for foreign state-controlled 
investors (i.e. foreign states and international organisations, except for such organisations listed in the Order 
of the Russian Government No. 119-r dated 3 February 2012 and organisations under their control) on 




The subsequent amendment of a number of laws, in particular the 2008 revision of the 
Russian Law on the Subsoil,136 was another cause for concern in Brussels. Law 58-FZ 
amended and repealed certain legislative provisions, including the Law on the Subsoil, 
which was the fundamental legislative act and general framework for licensing, 
exploration and development activities relating to natural resources in Russia.137 The 
2008 amendment enabled the Russian government to grant approval to terminate the right 
to mineral exploration and production whether the foreign entity had a license or not.138 
Significantly, the license could only be granted to Russian entities controlled by the state, 
with at least a five-year experience in the field.139 As a result of these limitations, only 
Gazprom and Rosneft qualified for the licenses.140  
Following the opening of the 2012 EU antitrust investigation towards Gazprom,141 the 
Kremlin adopted Decree No. 1285/2012 ‘On Protection Measures for the Interests of the 
Russian Federation When Russian Legal Entities Perform Their Foreign Economic 
                                                   
Russian Strategic Investments Law: Special Regulation for Transactions Involving Offshore Companies’ 
(2017) <https://www.whitecase.com/publications/alert/amendments-russian-strategic-investments-law-
special-regulation-transactions> accessed 15 April 2018. 
 
136 Law 2395-121, dated 21 February 1992 ‘On Subsoil’. 
 
137 Kaj Hóber, ‘Law and Policy in the Russian Oil and Gas Sector’ (2009) 27(3) Journal of Energy & Natural 
Resources Law 432.    
 
138 Ibid 438. 
 
139 Seliverstov (n 134) 17. 
 
140 Ibid 18. 
 
141 In September 2012, the EC formally opened proceedings against Gazprom. The Commission acted in 
consequence of the concerns – motivated by informal complaints filed by some importing countries – that 
Gazprom might have abused its dominant market position in Central and Eastern European Member States, 
in breach of Article 102 TFEU. The Commission investigation, the widest ever made within the European 
energy market, assessed whether to charge the Russian gas giant with exclusionary behaviours, such as 
market partitioning, obstacles to network access, barriers to supply diversification, as well as possible 
exploitative behaviour, such as excessive pricing. Case updates can be retrieved from European 
Commission, ‘Antitrust Cartel Cases: 39816 Upstream Gas Supplies in Central and Eastern Europe’ (2018) 






Activities’, prohibiting from that day forward those Russian companies (and their 
subsidiaries) included in the definition of ‘strategic companies’ under Decree 
No.1009/2004 to (i) provide information regarding the company activities, except those 
disclosed according to the Russian law; (ii) amend contracts entered into by the strategic 
companies with foreign counterparts, and any other documents related to commercial 
policy of the strategic companies in the foreign states; and (iii) dispose of shares in foreign 
companies, rights to conduct business activity in the foreign states, or immovable 
property located abroad; when requested by foreign states, international organisations, 
unions of foreign states, or bodies (institutions) of these organisations (including their 
regulatory or/and controlling bodies), without the previous consent of the competent 
Russian authority.142  
Decree 1285/2012 authorised a supervising body to refuse the required consent in case of 
actions that could harm Russia’s ‘economic interests’. The meaning of this expression 
has remained undefined.143  The timing of the issuance of the Decree 1285/2012 − one 
week after the opening of the EU investigation − reveals that this protective measure was 
adopted in retaliation to the EU action, as an attempt to hamper the EC’s investigation.  
7. The Failure to Develop a Common EU Energy Approach against Russia 
Inconsistencies between the EU’s Third Energy Package and Russia’s unfavourable 
foreign investment climate were brought to the fore in 2014 by the South Stream case. 
This related to a joint venture between Russia, six EU countries (Bulgaria, Hungary, 
Greece, Slovenia, Croatia and Austria) and Serbia (member of the Energy Community) 
                                                   
142 White and Case LLP, ‘Strategic Companies’ (2012) <http://www.russianlawonline.com/ 
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regarding the South Stream gas pipeline, one of the most important gas supply projects 
engineered in the last few years, aimed at supplying the EU with Russian gas bypassing 
Ukraine.144 The South Stream was the rival project of the EC-backed Nabucco pipeline, 
aimed at bringing natural gas from the Caspian area to the EU through Turkey.145 
The EC found that the intergovernmental agreements signed between single MSs and 
Russia were incompatible with EU law, in that they violated EU rules on unbundling, 
providing exclusive gas transportation rights to South Stream shareholders.146 Moreover, 
they provided for unrestricted transit of Russian gas, violating the EU’s third party access 
rules.147 The Commissions objections to South Stream ensued, which eventually resulted 
in Russia aborting the project, depriving EU consumers of a different supply source and 
prompting criticism from Putin regarding EU energy legislation.148 
The different views held by Moscow and Brussels with regard to their respective 
legislation is a source of contention in EU-Russia relations. Russia views its laws on 
foreign investment as a necessity for the purpose of protecting its strategic industry, which 
is one of the central pillars of the Russian economy.149 However, Moscow views the EU’s 
                                                   
144 The project was meant to link the EU with Russian gas bypassing Ukraine through pipelines lying under 
the Black Sea. For an overview of the project see: <http://www.south-stream-transport.com/project/> 
accessed 20 August 2016. 
 
145 The Nabucco pipeline was abandoned in 2013 to favour another project, the Trans-Adriatic Pipeline, 
currently under construction. See Alexandros Petersen, ‘The Nabucco Pipeline Project is Dead’ (2011) 
Oil&Gas Journal <https://www.ogj.com/articles/print/volume-109/issue-45/general-interest/comment-the-
nabucco-pipeline .html> accessed 20 August 2016. 
 
146 Euractiv, ‘South Stream Bilateral Deals Breach EU Law, Commission Says’ (2013) 
<http://www.euractiv.com/section/competition/news/south-stream-bilateral-deals-breach-eu-law-commiss 
ion-says/> accessed 20 August 2016. For an overview of unbundling, see chapter II, section 2.1. 
 
147 Ibid. For an explanation of third party access rules see chapter II, section 2.2. 
 
148 Ibid. See Gleb Bryanski, ‘Putin Says EU Energy Laws Are Uncivilised 'Robbery’’ (2010) 
<http://in.reuters.com/article/2010/11/26/idINIndia-53174220101126> accessed 1 December 2016. 
 
149 EUobserver, ‘EU and Russia to Sign Trade Memo Amid US Mockery’ (2010) <http://euobserver. 
com/9/31442> accessed 10 September 2016; Euractiv, ‘EU Backs Russia’s WTO Bid at ‘Best Ever 
Summit’’ (2010) <http://www.euractiv.com/en/global-europe/eu-backs-russias-wto-bid-best-ever-summit-




Third Energy Package as detrimental to the investment climate between the EU and 
Russia.150  
Divided views on reciprocal market access have created somewhat of a rift within the EU 
between old and new Member States, especially those part of the former Soviet Union.151 
This has led to a state of affairs where a compromise is harder to achieve, which in turn 
has facilitated Russia taking advantage of the lack of a unified stance on the matter.152 
The EU has much to gain from a united stance towards Russia, given the recurring energy 
cuts and the protracted negotiations on a revised bilateral agreement, all of which are 
detrimental to energy cooperation.153 However, different priorities, historical ties, 
national loyalty, energy mixes and market positions have resulted in a discord within the 
EU in its approach towards Russia.154 The inability of the EU to speak with a single voice 
is the reason why the EU has failed to develop a coherent strategic approach towards 
Russia.155 
Developing a coherent external energy policy depends to a large degree on institutions 
following general rules rather than cutting individual deals.156 The Commission, which is 
in favour of pursuing a common external energy policy, was keen to pave this way when 
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launching its 2020 Energy Strategy.157 EU Member States that prefer to pursue individual 
barter deals inadvertently enable supplying countries to pursue their own agenda, thus 
creating a vicious circle, which is hard to break.158 Inevitably, in order to overcome this 
practice, it is important that Member States act to the benefit of a collective whole in their 
bilateral relations with Russia rather than pursuing what is to their exclusive benefit.159 
However, some Member States have questioned to what extent a common energy policy 
was truly in their interest. Countries such as France, Germany, UK, Italy and the 
Netherlands were reluctant to relinquish sovereignty based on their market size and 
power.160 Different energy exposures of individual Member States have largely been the 
obstacle to a strengthened commitment to external EU energy relations.161 The lack of 
coherence and unified stance within the EU was apparent in a series of high profile cases, 
the deal between Gazprom and Germany E.ON Ruhrgas on the Nord Stream being 
perhaps the most prominent.162 Indeed, the deal for the construction of the Nord Stream 
pipeline was seen by some as a deliberate move to bypass traditional transit countries, on 
a bilateral commercial basis between Germany and Russia, lacking any form of European 
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solidarity.163 Today, these controversies are still prominent, with the construction of Nord 
Stream 2 being a case in point.164  
8. The Impact of Internal Measures at the International Level  
In the previous two sections, we outlined the measures adopted by the EU and Russia to 
regulate their internal energy markets and, indirectly, their energy relationships in the 
absence of specific international law obligations in the field. 
As we will see in chapter IV, the Lisbon Treaty is a turning point of the European energy 
policy, so that we can distinguish between a pre-Lisbon Treaty and post-Lisbon Treaty 
approach to the regulation of the EU energy field. The pre-Lisbon approach, outlined in 
the previous sections of this chapter, is characterised internally by a pervasive regulation 
of the market aimed at enhancing competition and externally by bilateralism as a default 
approach of engagement with third countries, which ultimately favoured the adoption by 
Russia of a divide-and-rule policy towards EU MSs.  
With the Lisbon Treaty, the EU radically changed its approach to the energy matters. The 
new European approach is characterised by the progressive centralisation of the energy 
competences at the European level and by a primary role of the EU institutions in dealing 
with energy issues of European relevance. Moreover, since the finalisation of the internal 
energy market is getting closer, the EU concentrates its efforts on enhancing the security 
of supply of the Union. For this reason, the Gas Directive, issued in 2009, remains the 
most important measure regulating the internal energy market. 
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Given the current economic scenario, in which the EU is a net importer of gas and 
Gazprom is its major supplier, the analysis of EU regulation is crucial to evaluate the 
possible consequences of the internal legal framework on the balance of power between 
the EU and Russia. Indeed, despite being very strict on foreign companies, Russian 
internal regulation has not the same economic impact on EU companies. Among the EU 
measures, as seen above, the Gas Directive is the most relevant piece of internal energy 
legislation for its impact on foreign companies. The Gas Directive must comply with the 
international law obligations binding the EU in the energy field. For this reason, it will 
be analysed in the next chapters of this work.   
9. Interim Conclusion 
This chapter showed the importance of natural gas as an indispensable driver for the 
present and future economic development of the European Union and sketched out the 
legal framework applicable to the EU-Russia energy relationship. 
From an economic and geopolitical perspective, we underlined that the relationship 
between the EU and Russia, its most important supplier, is not as unbalanced as one could 
think. Russia is indispensable for the EU’s well-being, and, likewise, the EU is centrally 
important to the Russian economy. This verified the hypothesis made in the introduction, 
according to which EU-Russia energy relationship is not only about dependence, but it is 
characterised also by a high level of interdependence.165 This strict link entails that any 
relevant change in the economy, politics or regulation of one has direct effects on the 
other. This is relevant for our research, focused on the impact of international and internal 
regulation of EU-Russia energy relations. 
                                                   





In view of that aim, from a legal perspective this chapter has outlined the international 
and internal legal framework existing between the EU and Russia which applies to the 
energy field. In this respect, we have seen that the PCA, the only bilateral agreement in 
force between the EU and Russia, is not an adequate means to address the complexities 
typical of the energy field. 
In this context, the analysis of the BITs in force between EU MSs and Russia as well as 
of the applicable customary rules has proven insufficient to shape EU-Russia energy 
relationships. Only WTO rules seemed to be a suitable international law tool which can 
be used for the case at hand, since the rules of the GATT and of the GATS are applicable 
to any kind of energy goods and services traded between the Member States of the 
organisation. This answers to the first question outlined in the introduction on the actual 
impact of the current international legal framework on the energy relationships between 
the EU and its suppliers.166 
Apart from the international law perspective, we have seen that both the EU and Russia 
have passed internal regulations which impact on third countries’ entities operations in 
their territories. In case of the EU, the pieces of legislation promulgated focused on the 
functioning of the internal market, through the issuance of so-called ‘energy packages’, 
all-encompassing sets of rules regulating the electricity and natural gas markets. For this 
reason, the EU external energy action has been characterised by bilateralism of EU 
members and inconsistencies which favoured a divide-and-rule approach by Russia. 
The disjunction in the EU between the ‘internal energy policy’ and the ‘external energy 
policy’, showed in the last sections of this chapter, reflects not only the decentralisation 
of the matter to MSs but also the absence of a common international legal framework 
                                                   




outlining the basic principles the parties have to comply with in their reciprocal energy 
relations. In this way, the security of supply of the Union is left to agreements between 
private entities subject to market-based mechanisms, which are influenced by the 
bargaining power of the parties involved. Overall, this approach has proven problematic 
and could put EU security of supply at risk. 
The scope of the next two chapters is the assessment of the main features of the Gas 





THE ANALYSIS OF THE MAIN FEATURES OF THE GAS DIRECTIVE  
Summary: 1. Introduction – 2. Outline of the Main Features of the Gas Directive – 3. 
The Impact of Article 11 of the Gas Directive on Foreign Investments in the EU – 4. 
Additional Considerations on Investment Incentives – 5. The Impact of the Gas Directive 
at the International Level – 6.  Interim Conclusion.  
 
1. Introduction 
In the previous chapter, we outlined the internal and international legal frameworks which 
impact on the EU-Russia energy relationship. We concluded that, to date, World Trade 
Organization (‘WTO’) rules are the only legal tools which at the international level could 
effectively affect the interdependence of the two countries in the energy sphere. Having 
said that, WTO rules can be invoked insofar WTO Members want to challenge an internal 
measure of another Member, which they think could violate WTO rules.  
This chapter outlines the main features of Directive 2009/73/EC (‘the Gas Directive’), 
part of the Third Energy Package. For the purposes of this work, we will pay attention to 
the provisions of the Gas Directive which impact on third countries’ undertakings 
operating in Europe. The Gas Directive is probably the most important natural gas 
regulation issued before the Lisbon Treaty and certainly the one that impacts the most on 
third countries’ energy interests in the Union. Its provisions, still in force, are the end 
point of a ten-year evolution of the EU natural gas market regulation. For this reason, we 
can maintain that the Gas Directive exemplifies the EU’s pre-2009 approach to energy 
which, as we will see in Chapter IV, radically changed with the adoption of the Lisbon 
Treaty. 
The overview presented in this chapter will be then used to open up several questions on 




will be analysed in the next chapter of this work, and answer to the second question 
outlined in the introduction of this work.1  
2. Outline of the Main Features of the Gas Directive  
The next sections give background information on the main concepts of the Gas Directive 
which impact on third countries’ companies operating in the EU: unbundling, third party 
access and the so-called ‘third country clause’. The following sections are not to be 
intended as a complete analysis of the issues described therein, but only as a framework 
to understand the next chapters of the thesis.     
2.1 Unbundling  
The word ‘unbundling’ is typically used in relation to the liberalisation of markets in 
which companies provide their services through a natural monopoly, which most 
commonly consists of a network of pipelines or cables.2 The term, meaning separation, is 
referred to the degree of independence granted to the sections of the supply chain dealing 
with the management and operation of a natural monopoly.3  
                                                   
1 The question outlined in the introduction is the following: Is the EU intervention in the natural gas field 
compliant with the international law rules binding the Union in the field? 
 
2 According to Court of Justice of the European Union’s case-law ‘the expression essential facility is used 
to describe a facility or infrastructure which is essential for reaching customers and/or enabling competitors 
to carry on their business and which cannot be replicated by any reasonable mean’ (notice on the application 
of the competition rules to access agreements in the telecommunication sector, OJ 1998 C265/2, para 68). 
 
3 Ernst von Weizsacker, Matthias Finger, Marianne Beisheim and Oran Young, Limits to Privatization 
(Routledge 2012). For a description of the traditional corporate structure of the undertakings operating in 
the energy sector, please refer to Mette Bjorndal, Energy, Natural Resources and Environmental Economics 
(Springer 2010) 434; Raffaele Fiocco, ‘The Desing of Industry Structure in a Vertically Related Market’ 
(2007) IEFE Working Paper 1/2007 <https://www.researchgate.net/publication/228268846_The_Design 
_of_Industry_Structure_in_a_Vertically_Related_Market> accessed 4 July 2014; and Edward Mitchell, 





A monopoly is ‘natural’ when, because of physical constraints, the construction and 
operation of a good or of a service cannot be carried out by more than a single entity.4 
The opposite solution would lead to three problems: the need to fund the enormous 
construction costs required to replicate the infrastructure; the decreasing effectiveness of 
its duplication; the sub-optimal utilisation of the assets built.5 There are examples of 
natural monopolies in several markets: telecommunication fixed networks, electricity 
networks, gas pipelines and railways.6  
In an unregulated scenario, a natural monopoly leads to the situation in which a single 
operator is present in the relevant market, no competition is established, and, because of 
that, the monopolistic operator could set prices and conditions of use of the natural 
monopoly at will, diminishing aggregate consumer welfare. In order to prevent these 
drawbacks, the European legislator introduced the concepts of unbundling and third party 
access (‘TPA’) and enhanced the role of national regulatory authorities (‘NRAs’).7  
In the Third Energy Package, unbundling relates to the transportation and distribution 
activities operated by players of the natural gas and electricity markets. Transportation 
and distribution in these fields are carried out either by means of long pipelines departing 
from the production countries to reach final customers (in the case of natural gas) or 
through a high voltage network (in case of electricity). Generally, transportation and 
                                                   
4 Baumol provided the definition of a ‘natural monopoly’: ‘[a]n industry in which multi-firm production is 
more expensive than production by a monopoly’. See William J Baumol, John C Panzar and Robert D 
Willig, Contestable Markets and the Theory of Industry Structure (Harcourt Brace 1982) 810. 
 
5 For a complete economic analysis of the reasons behind these issues, read the Nobel Prize winner Robert 
Solow, Monopolistic Competition and Macroeconomic Theory (CUP 2010). 
 
6 For the analysis of natural monopolies regulatory measures see Jose Gomez-Ibanez, Regulating 
Infrastructures (HUP 2003); Richard Posner, Natural Monopoly and Its Regulation (Cato Institute 1999); 
Stephen Davies, Nigel Driffield and Roger Clarke, Monopoly Policy in the UK: Assessing the Evidence (EE 
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distribution activities vary based on the characteristics which influence the power 
capacity of the pipeline or of the network concerned (such as the size and the pressure in 
case of gas, or voltage in case of electricity).8     
Historically, transportation and distribution activities were carried out by the same 
companies dealing with production (if any) and supply of natural gas or electricity to final 
customers. These market players – ‘incumbents’ – because of their operation in all the 
sections of the supply chain are also called ‘vertically integrated companies’ (see figure 
3 below as regards natural gas).9   
      Figure 3: Structure of the Natural Gas Industry (Source: DTE Energy) 
                                                   
8 Pursuant to Article 2 of the Gas Directive, ‘transmission’ means ‘the transport of natural gas through a 
network, which mainly contains high-pressure pipelines, other than an upstream pipeline network and other 
than the part of high-pressure pipelines primarily used in the context of local distribution of natural gas, 
with a view to its delivery to customers, but not including supply’.  Under the Gas Directive, ‘distribution’ 
is defined as the ‘transport of natural gas through local or regional pipeline networks with a view to its 
delivery to customers, but not including supply’. According to Investopedia, ‘midstream activities include 
the processing, storing, transporting and marketing of oil, natural gas and natural gas liquids’. ‘Downstream 
operations can include refining crude oil and distributing its byproducts — such as gasoline, natural gas 
liquids, diesel and a variety of other energy sources — down to the retail level. The closer an oil and gas 
company is to the process of providing consumers with petroleum products, the further downstream the 
company is said to be’. See <https://www.investopedia.com/terms/m/midstream.asp> and 
<https://www.investopedia.com/ terms/d/downstream.asp> accessed 15 April 2017. 
 
9 Pursuant to Article 2 of the Gas Directive, a vertically integrated undertaking ‘means a natural gas 
undertaking or a group of natural gas undertakings where the same person or the same persons are entitled, 
directly or indirectly, to exercise control, and where the undertaking or group of undertakings perform at 
least one of the functions of transmission, distribution, LNG or storage, and at least one of the functions of 




Over the years, the efforts put in place by the European Union to enhance competition, 
seen as the main tool to achieve an effective European energy market,10 led to the 
increasingly stronger application of unbundling rules. In fact, one of the purposes of the 
Gas Directive is to strengthen the separation models implemented by the Second Energy 
Package, which, in turn, were more effective than the mild provisions of Directive 
98/30/EC. To do so, the Gas Directive sets out three unbundling models from which EU 
Member States (‘MSs’) have to choose, that mainly differ in relation to the ownership 
and the management of the companies dealing with the natural monopoly.  
The three alternatives proposed by the European legislation are: (i) complete ownership 
unbundling; (ii) Independent Transmission Operator (‘ITO’); and (iii) Independent 
System Operator (‘ISO’).11 The Gas Directive applies these models only to the companies 
operating in the transportation sector. The Gas Directive sets out a lighter separation 
scheme for distribution activities, modelled on the basis of the ITO system, which allows 
the vertically integrated company to retain the property of the infrastructure, provided 
that certain minimum characteristics of independence are met.12 The distinction made 
between transportation and distribution is a consequence of the different number and 
importance of the operators present in the market, of the relative unbundling costs and of 
the possible impact of their anticompetitive activities.          
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of the single market is described as an ‘imperative’ of the EU institutions. Under Article 26 of the Lisbon 
Treaty ‘the Union shall adopt measures with the aim of establishing or ensuring the functioning of the 
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11 Gas Directive, Art 9 (ownership unbundling), Art 17 (ITO), Art 14 (ISO). See also Caroline Kuzemko, 
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Macmillan 2012) 233-234. 
 





2.1.1 Ownership Unbundling 
The first unbundling model, set out under Article 9 of the Gas Directive, provides for the 
complete separation of the ownership of transportation activities from production and 
supply. Ownership unbundling requires vertically integrated undertakings to sell the 
stakes they hold in the transportation companies (‘TSOs’) which operate in the countries 
that adopt this unbundling model.  
In the context of Article 9, the definition of ‘control’ is a key element. The Gas Directive 
does not prevent gas producers or suppliers from holding participations in European 
TSOs; it only requires that the participations held do not amount to a share allowing the 
‘control’ the relevant TSO.     
The definition of ‘control’ under the Gas Directive has to be interpreted broadly, in 
conformity with the EU Merger Regulation.13 This latter outlines that:  
control shall be constituted by rights, contracts or any other means which, 
either separately or in combination and having regard to the considerations of 
fact or law involved, confer the possibility of exercising decisive influence 
on an undertaking.14  
In particular, the Merger Regulation acknowledges the presence of a decisive influence 
on a company by way of ownership of assets (or right to use them) or in powers over the 
make-up or decision making of the board of directors or equivalent managing body.15 
                                                   
13 Gas Directive, recital 10. See Council Regulation 139/2004/EC on the Control of Concentrations between 
Undertakings [2004] OJ L24/1 (the ‘Merger Regulation’)  and European Commission, ‘Interpretative Note 
on Directive 2009/72/EC Concerning Common Rules for the Internal Market in Electricity and Directive 
2009/73/EC Concerning Common Rules for the Internal Market in Natural Gas: the Unbundling Regime’ 
(2009) 8 <http://ec.europa.eu/energy/gas_electricity/interpretative_notes/doc/implementation_notes/2010 
_01_21_the_unbundling_regime.pdf> accessed 6 January 2014. 
 





Remarkably, control means both in law and in fact, and also includes indirect control – 
through subsidiaries – and the so-called ‘negative control’, whereby minority 
shareholders enjoy veto rights on strategic decisions of the company concerning budget, 
appointment of management, investments and business planning.16  
Particularly noteworthy is the fact that ownership unbundling is extended throughout the 
whole EU common market. This means that, to take one example, a producer in the Dutch 
market cannot control a company dealing with transportation activities in France.    
Lastly, the ownership unbundling regime requires EU Members to ensure that neither 
commercially sensitive information held, nor the staff of a transmission system operator 
which was part of a vertically integrated undertaking is transferred to undertakings 
performing any of the functions of production and supply.17 
2.1.2 Independent Transmission Operator 
The second model proposed by the Gas Directive, ITO,18 has been defined by some 
commentators as a sort of potentiated functional unbundling, which was introduced in the 
Second Energy Package.19 This type of unbundling allows the vertically integrated 
                                                   
15 In this respect, Article 9(1)(c) specifies that ‘the same person or persons are not entitled to appoint 
members of the supervisory board, the administrative board or bodies legally representing the undertaking, 
of a transmission system operator or a transmission system, and directly or indirectly to exercise control or 
exercise any right over an undertaking performing any of the functions of production or supply’; and Article 
9(1)(d) outlines that ‘the same person is not entitled to be a member of the supervisory board, the 
administrative board or bodies legally representing the undertaking, of both an undertaking performing any 
of the functions of production or supply and a transmission system operator or a transmission system’. See 
also Linklaters LLP, ‘Europe’s Third Energy Package: Unbundling’ (2011) <http://www.linklaters.com/ 




17 Gas Directive, art 9(7). 
 
18 Gas Directive, art 17-23. 
 
19 See Michael Diathesopoulos, From Energy Sector Inquiry to Recent Antitrust Decisions in European 





company to retain the ownership of the TSO. However, it requires the adoption of specific 
corporate governance policies to guarantee TSO’s autonomy and independence.  
In particular, the ITO model requires a clear-cut distinction between the TSO activities 
and those of the rest of the group operating in the same market. The ITO must not generate 
confusion – not only in the eyes of NRAs, but also in the eyes of the end-consumers – 
with the rest of the vertically integrated undertaking in its corporate identity, 
communication, branding and premises.20  
Moreover, the Gas Directive dictates that the ITO shall own the network and any other 
asset necessary for the transportation activities, and that it is not allowed to share IT 
systems and equipment, physical premises or security access systems with any other part 
of the vertically integrated undertaking.21 These restrictions are reinforced with the 
prohibition of using the same consultants or external contractors for IT systems or 
equipment, security access systems or auditing.22  
Furthermore, to enhance the independence of the ITO and to guarantee the development 
of the network, the Gas Directive sets out that the ITO shall be funded with adequate 
financial resources by the incumbent.23 In any event, the ITO may also gather the financial 
resources needed directly on the market (e.g. through the issuance of corporate bonds).24 
In this way, the ITO model completely detaches the TSO from the investment and the 
budgetary decisions of the mother company.    
                                                   
20 Gas Directive, art 17(4). 
 
21 Ibid 17(5).  
 
22 Ibid 17(6).  
 
23 Ibid 17(1). 
 





Last but not least, to prevent any possible residual influence by the former incumbent, the 
Gas Directive mandates the adoption of a compliance plan and the setup of a supervisory 
body.25 The former, to be approved by the relevant NRA, contains specific provisions to 
preserve the independence of the ITO and prevent the risk of discrimination between final 
customers. The supervisory body, natural or juridical person appointed by the supervisory 
board of the TSO with the approval of the relevant NRA, is a subject provided with the 
vastest power of vigilance. The supervisory body proceeds independently to the 
verification of the correspondence of the ITO decisions to the compliance plan and refers 
the possible deviations to the relevant NRA.  
2.1.3 Independent System Operator 
The third model outlined in the Gas Directive, ISO,26 is a hybrid solution between the 
ITO and the ownership unbundling.27 On the one hand, as in the ITO model, the ISO 
allows the former incumbent to retain the property of the transportation activities. On the 
other hand, as in the ownership unbundling model, the ISO requires the management of 
the natural monopoly to be carried out by a different (and independent) entity to guarantee 
the non-discrimination between the users of the infrastructure.28   
The ISO has to be certified by the national regulatory authority and receive the approval 
of the European Commission.29 The appointed subject shall demonstrate, inter alia, 
                                                   
25 Ibid 18(4). 
 
26 Ibid Arts 13 and 14. 
 
27 Some commentators pointed out that, in reality, there is no difference between the ITO and the ISO 
models. See Biancardi, currently member of the Italian Authority for Electric Energy and Gas, in AREL – 
Agenzia di Ricerche e Legislazione, Il Recepimento del Terzo Pacchetto Comunitario: Un’Opportunità per 
il Settore del Gas Naturale Italiano? (AREL 2010). 
 
28 Gas Directive, art 14. 
 





adequate financial, technical, physical and human resources to carry out the management 
of the infrastructure, as well as the capacity to comply with the obligations placed upon 
it by the Gas Directive.30 Among the others, it is relevant to underline that the ISO is 
exclusively responsible for ensuring the long-term ability of the system to meet 
reasonable energy demand through investment planning.   
Within this framework, the owner of the infrastructure is compelled to operate in a way 
to ensure that the ISO can fulfil its duties. This requires the financing of the ISO’s network 
development plan and scheduled investments, as well as the compliance with the 
obligation to provide the necessary insurance policies to protect from damages unrelated 
to the management of the network.31   
2.1.4 Concluding Remarks on Unbundling  
EU Members have to choose one unbundling model out of the three options described 
above to implement the Gas Directive in their territory. That said, in any event, their 
choice could be limited by other applicable provisions of the Gas Directive.  
Pursuant to Article 9(8) of the Gas Directive, the applicability of the ITO and ISO models 
is limited to MSs’ companies which, on 3 September 2009, are part of a vertically-
integrated undertaking. After that moment, new TSOs have to apply the ownership 
unbundling regime.32 
                                                   
30 Ibid 14(5). 
 
31 Ibid 14(5).  
 
32 European Commission, ‘Interpretative Note on Directive 2009/72/EC Concerning Common Rules for 
the Internal Market in Electricity and Directive 2009/73/EC Concerning Common Rules for the Internal 
Market in Natural Gas: The Unbundling Regime’ (2010) Commission Staff Working Paper 
<http://ec.europa.eu/energy/gas_electricity/interpretative_notes/doc/implementation_notes/2010_01_21_ 




Article 9(8) reveals that, in the eyes of the European legislator, ITO and ISO are mere 
second-best options. This is evident also when analysing the Gas Directive’s preparatory 
works where, on the basis of the evidence provided by the Energy Sector Inquiry, the 
European Commission (‘EC’) strongly supported the adoption of the sole ownership 
unbundling model, in line with the solutions put forward in the antitrust cases opened 
between 2007 and 2010.33 The milder scheme adopted in the final text is the result of the 
                                                   
 
33 For an analysis of the preparatory works of the Gas Directive see Victor Von Hoorn, ‘’Unbundling’, 
‘Reciprocity’ and the European Internal Energy Market: WTO Consistency and Broader Implications for 
Europe’ (2009) 18 European Energy and Environmental Law Review 58; Spencer Gilbert, ‘Gas Politics in 
Russia and the EU’ (2009) <http://www.nyu.edu/clubs/jpia.club/PDF/S09_Gilbert.pdf> accessed 24 
November 2013. Between 2007 and 2010 the European Commission, through its Directorate General for 
Competition, opened up several proceedings against the major European natural gas incumbents for the 
breach of Articles 101 and 102 TFEU (former Articles 81 and 82 TEC): Commission v RWE (Case 
COMP/39.402) [2009] OJ C133; Commission v E-ON (Case COMP/39.388) [2009] OJ C36; Commission 
v Gaz de France (Case COMP/39.316) [2010] OJ C57; Commission v ENI (Case COMP/39.315) [2010] 
OJ C352. The behaviours put under investigation by the European officials in the course of EC’s three-year 
action can be classified in three main categories: exclusionary abuses, exploitative abuses and market 
partitioning. The European antitrust enforcement deeply influenced the structure of the undertakings 
involved. Among the others, the cases RWE Gas Foreclosure and ENI Gas Foreclosure exemplify the pro-
competitive attitude of the Commission during that period. These cases have been closed with the EC’s 
acceptance of burdensome commitments proposed by the undertakings under investigation, consisting in 
the sale of the pipelines concerned. The analysis of these commitments is relevant because they are 
examples of so-called ‘ownership unbundling’ remedies (see chapter II, section 2.1). Noteworthy, their 
adoption witnesses the EC’s preference for the separation of the ownership of the transportation activities 
from the other sections of the natural gas supply chain. This preference was reflected also in the preparatory 
works of the Gas Directive. Michael Diathesopoulos in ‘From Energy Sector Inquiry to Recent Antitrust 
Decisions in European Energy Markets, Competition Law as a Mean to Implement Sector Regulation’ 
(2010) 11 <https://ssrn.com/abstract=1639883> accessed 17 May 2017, reports the ways in which a gas 
transportation company could use the essential facility to take advantage for itself or its affiliated 
companies. In particular, the author lists: margin squeeze, inadequate capacity management, capacity 
hoarding and degradation, long-term capacity bookings by the incumbent shipper and strategic limitation 
of the investments. The CJEU identifies an abusive behaviour only in case of danger for the competition 
level existing inside the market or whenever the behaviour hampers the correct development of the market 
(See Case T41/96, Bayer v Commission [2000] ECR II3383 and Case C-241/91, Magill v Commission 
[1995] ECR I-743). This reasoning is valid also in case of the third party access discipline. In Oscar Bronner 
v Commission the Court has defined three cumulative criteria which are necessary to recognise the 
obligation to grant access to the facility. According to the Court, in order to be censored, the decision of 
the owner not to grant access to third parties to the natural monopoly should have the following 
characteristics: It should be adequate to completely eliminate the competition in the sector where the 
requesting undertaking operates; it should not be justified by objective reasons; and the requested utilisation 
should be indispensable for the requesting company to conduct its business operation. One of the hot topics 
of the Commission work along the years has been the analysis of the competition constraints due by the 
presence of long-term gas purchasing contracts. For a complete overview, please refer to Aldo Spanjer, 
‘Long-term Contracts and Competition on European Gas Markets – Has the Commission Struck the Right 





harsh debates that took place during the preparatory stages, where MSs, lobbied by their 
national champions, supported more conservative solutions.34  
Lastly, it is useful to make some remarks about the scope of the application of the 
unbundling rules. Article 9 obligations are wide enough to cover both the natural gas and 
the electricity sectors. Pursuant to Article 9(3), no natural gas company, public or private, 
dealing with production or supply of gas, can control other companies dealing with the 
transmission of electricity in the internal market. The opposite is also true: pursuant to 
Article 9 of Directive 2009/72/EC, part of the Third Energy Package and regulating the 
electricity market, this obligation applies also in respect to electricity producers or 
suppliers operating in the natural gas sector.35 This reflects the unitary approach of the 
European legislator vis-à-vis electricity and natural gas, considered to be parts of the same 
market.  
2.2 Third Party Access 
Third party access is, together with unbundling, the backbone of the European pro-
competitive regulation of the energy sector.36  
In brief, third party access is the obligation imposed upon the owner and/or manager of a 
natural monopoly to grant access on a non-discriminatory basis to all users requesting it. 
                                                   
34 Michael Hunt, ‘Ownership Unbundling: The Main Legal Issues in a Controversial Debate’ in 
Bram Delvaux, Michael Hunt and Kim Talus, EU Energy Law and Policy Issues (Intersentia 2014); Simon 
Taylor, ‘France and Germany Lead Unbundling Opposition’ (2007) European Voice 
<http://www.europeanvoice.com/article/imported/france-and-germany-lead-unbundling-opposition/58045 
.aspx> accessed 22 November 2013. 
 
35 European Parliament and European Council Directive 2009/72/EC of 13 July 2009 concerning common 
rules for the internal market in electricity and repealing Directive2003/54/EC [2009] OJ L211, Art 9(3). 
 
36 Third party access has been introduced in the EU legislation in the second energy package. See European 
Parliament and European Council Directive 2003/55/EC of 26 June 2003 concerning common rules for the 




This obligation has been progressively expanded in each energy package, and it is now 
included under Article 32 of the Gas Directive.  
The need to grant access on an equal footing to the infrastructure to any subject requesting 
it is fundamental to create a ‘level playing field’ which enables competitors to freely 
conduct their business all around Europe.37 This, in turn, is crucial to enhance the welfare 
of final customers who, as the economic theory of competitive markets suggests, benefit 
from lower prices and better quality of the service when competition is increased in the 
market.   
In particular, the Gas Directive requires Member States to guarantee the application of a 
TPA system based on regulated tariffs approved by NRAs, applied objectively and 
without discrimination between the users.38   
2.3 Third Country Clause  
Article 11 of the Gas Directive is one of the most important and, at the same time, also 
one of the most controversial provisions of the Third Energy Package. Its analysis is 
crucial when evaluating the position of foreign investors operating in the common market, 
as well as the intertwined geopolitical implications emerging from the relationships 
between the Union and third countries. 
                                                   
 
37 Alexander Kotlowsky, ‘Access Rights to European Energy Networks – a Construction Site Revisited’ in 
Delvaux, Hunt and Talus (n 34) underlines that ‘the third party access right should be considered to be a 
right that accompanies an energy contract. It should not be seen as a right that allows traders to reserve and 
trade ‘network capacity’ in the incumbent’s infrastructure without an underlying sales contract’. 
 
38 On third party access applied to storage sites see Anton Gao, ‘The Third European Energy Liberalisation 
Package: Does Functional Unbundling in the Gas Storage Sector Go Too Far?’ (2008) 





Essentially, this clause sets out the applicability of the unbundling provisions of the Gas 
Directive to third countries’ entities operating in Europe.39 This has significant 
implications for Gazprom (thus the provision has been famously dubbed ‘Gazprom 
clause’). In particular, Article 11 stipulates that NRAs shall refuse to issue the 
certification required to operate in the natural gas market whenever requested by an owner 
or a manager of a TSO which is controlled by one or more subjects of a third country. To 
avoid that, the requesting company should demonstrate that (i) it complies with the 
unbundling rules of Article 9; and (ii) the issuance of the certification would not 
jeopardize the security of supply of the Member State where the company operates − or 
is willing to operate − and the security of supply of the Union as a whole.40    
To evaluate the risks related to the security of supply, the NRA must analyse, inter alia, 
the rights and the obligations of the EU in relation to third countries arising from 
                                                   
39 Gas Directive, art 11(3). See Andrey Konoplyanik, ‘Energy Investment in the EU and Russia: Investment 
Regulation under the Third Energy Package and the Russian Law on Foreign Investments in Strategic 
Sectors’ (2013) First Groningen-Moscow Conference on EU-Russian Energy Law, 30-31 May 2013 
<http://www.konoplyanik.ru/speeches/130531-Konoplyanik-Groningen-investment.pdf> accessed 17 July 
2017; Andrey Konoplyanik, ‘The EU Versus Gazprom’ (2012) 372 Energy Economist 3; Andrey 
Konoplyanik, ‘The Third Energy Package and the Concerns of Non-EU Gas Producers: An Interview with 
Dr. Andrey Konoplyanik’ (2012) <http://www.eurasia-energy-observer.com/news/new/interview-with-
andrey-konoplyanik> accessed 27 October 2013; Philip Lowe, Ingrida Pucinskaite, William Webster and 
Patrick Lindberg, ‘Effective Unbundling of Energy Transmission Networks: Lessons from the Energy 
Sector Inquiry’ (2007) 1 Competition Policy Newsletter 23. 
  
40 In particular, Article 11(3) of the Gas Directive states that ‘The regulatory authority shall adopt a draft 
decision on the certification of a transmission system operator within four months from the date of 
notification by the transmission system operator. It shall refuse the certification if it has not been 
demonstrated: (a) that the entity concerned complies with the requirements of Article 9; and (b) to the 
regulatory authority or to another competent authority designated by the Member State that granting 
certification will not put at risk the security of energy supply of the Member State and the Community. In 
considering that question, the regulatory authority or other competent authority so designated shall take 
into account: (i) the rights and obligations of the Community with respect to that third country arising under 
international law, including any agreement concluded with one or more third countries to which the 
Community is a party and which addresses the issues of security of energy supply; (ii) the rights and 
obligations of the Member State with respect to that third country arising under agreements concluded with 
it, insofar as they are in compliance with Community law; and (iii) other specific facts and circumstances 





international law (first and foremost, the treaties in force between the Union and the home 
country of the requesting entity), as well as the specific circumstances of the case.41  
We can identify two aspects in the provision at hand. The first one relates to the corporate 
structure requirements of item (i) above, mandating the application of the unbundling 
rules of Article 9. These equally apply to each and every undertaking (EU and non-EU) 
and reflect the EU’s right to regulate the entities operating in the internal market. The 
second, and more problematic, aspect is the evaluation process to be carried out by the 
competent regulatory authority under item (ii). This seems to be an activity which could 
unjustly discriminate between competitors.   
Indeed, the first criterion to be taken into account under item (ii) (i.e. the international 
agreements in place between the EU and the home country of the undertakings concerned) 
de facto discriminates between third countries’ entities operating in the EU on the basis 
of something which is not under their control. In fact, the conclusion of international 
agreements depends only on the political will of the EU and the third country where the 
undertaking concerned originates. As for the second and last criterion to be used for the 
NRAs’ assessment, the circumstances of the case vary on the basis of the subject 
requesting the certification, the timing of the request and other possible contingencies.42 
                                                   
41 Gas Directive, art 11(3)(b). 
 
42 For example, in the context of Nord Stream construction, the OPAL pipeline (allowing natural gas to 
flow from Nord Stream to the Czech Republic via Germany) obtained a partial exemption of its capacity 
for 22 years. 50% of the capacity of OPAL is currently allocated on the basis of third party access rules, 
while the other 50% can be freely used according to the rules set out in sponsor’s private agreements. 
However, the exemption requested by the sponsors was for 80% of the total pipeline capacity. In the context 
of the Trans-Adriatic Pipeline exemption request, the unclear procedures adopted by the European 
Commission and the Italian NRA pushed the Italian Senate to ask formal clarification to the Ministry of 
Economic Development. See <http://www.senato.it/japp/bgt/showdoc/showText?tipodoc=Sindisp& 





Hence, Article 11 does not guarantee that the same approach would be used to evaluate 
different situations and subjects.  
The rules described above apply, and notification is required, whenever there is a change 
of control by which a non-EU entity takes the control of a European TSO.43 In any event, 
the NRA concerned must notify the European Commission of the change of control, as 
well as of the final decision it takes.44 When requested by the relevant NRA, the EC shall 
evaluate the circumstances of the case and formulate advice, which must be considered 
in the NRA’s assessment.45   
Notwithstanding to the above, the Member State where these companies are going to 
operate could in any event ‘refuse certification where granting certification puts at risk 
the Member State’s security of energy supply or the security of energy supply of another 
Member State’.46 This safeguard clause, which echoes the security exceptions under 
Article XIV-bis GATS (see chapter III, section 7), leaves a wide discretion open for a 
Member State to act. In fact, no indication is set about the limits and the modalities to 
exercise this power. Moreover, in case of third countries’ entities the Gas Directive 
expressly recalls the MSs right to ‘exercise, in compliance with Community law, national 
legal controls to protect legitimate public security interests’.47 This clause seems to 
further underline the autonomy granted to EU MSs towards foreign companies investing 
in their territories.  
                                                   
43 Ibid, art 9(3).  
 
44 Ibid, art 9(4).  
 









3. The Impact of Article 11 of the Gas Directive on Foreign Investments in 
the EU 
Article 11 is the cornerstone provision to evaluate the impact of the Gas Directive on 
foreign entities. As seen in the previous sections, this expands the unbundling obligations 
under Article 9 not directly to third States, but towards third countries’ companies 
operating in the European market.  
Chapter I showed that the EU relies to a considerable extent on third countries, namely 
Russia, Algeria, Libya, Norway and Qatar, to satisfy its internal natural gas demand.48 
These countries generally manage the supply of their natural resources through vertically 
integrated state-controlled entities which, over the years, have made considerable 
investments to cope with the European gas demand. This particularly holds true for 
Gazprom,49 which, also for historical reasons linked to the development of the first 
pipelines supplying Europe, maintains a tremendous market power in former Soviet 
Union countries.50  
By imposing on third countries’ controlled companies the compliance with the 
unbundling rules and the respect of additional certification requirements, Article 11 could 
have negative economic consequences on the undertakings concerned. Damage flowing 
from the loss of secured revenues (given the widespread application of standard prices 
for transportation services which lower the return on investment rates and extend the 
                                                   
48 See chapter I, section 2. 
 
49 For an in-depth description of the position of the company in the European market, refer to chapter I, 
section 3. To take an example, the cumulated costs for the construction of the Nord Stream and of the Nord 
Stream 2, both sponsored by Gazprom, amount to 19 billion Euros.    
 
50 To date Gazprom still owns shares in several EU TSOs: 25% of Gasum Oy (Finland); 34% of Latvijas 
Gaze (Latvia), 48% of EuRoPol (Lithuania and Poland), and extended its presence in other projects of 





amortisation periods of the single projects) and from the unbundling application, would 
be added to other harmful elements such as a transaction costs increase and possible trade 
volume variations.51  This could end up imposing a de facto roadblock to the public policy 
objectives of the affected States.52 
Article 9(12) of the Gas Directive states that undertakings operating in the production or 
supply of gas cannot ‘in any event be able to directly or indirectly take control over or 
exercise any right over unbundled transmission system operators in Member States which 
apply paragraph 1 [the ownership unbundling model]’. This means that third countries’ 
companies that produce and supply gas would no longer be permitted to be or to control 
a TSO in a Member State which adopts the ownership unbundling model.53 This 
obligation is particularly burdensome for investors that have already bought a stake in 
TSOs in the countries adopting the ownership unbundling. With ownership unbundling 
and third country clause, these companies will either need to sell their stakes in certain 
TSOs or take the risk that these TSOs will no longer be permitted to operate in the EU.54 
This is what happened in Lithuania where, following the decision of the government to 
adopt the ownership unbundling regime, Gazprom and E.ON, major stakeholders of the 
Lithuanian natural gas incumbent Lietuvos Dujos, were forced to sell at least the part of 
their stakes (37% and 39% respectively) which had allowed them to ‘control’ the 
Lithuanian undertaking.55 Pursuant to Article 9(8) of the Gas Directive, new TSOs and 
                                                   
51 See section 4. 
 
52 Think for example, the impact of Gazprom on Russia’s GDP, illustrated in chapter I, section 3. 
 
53 Arnoud Willems, Jung-ui Sul and Yohan Benizri, ‘Unbundling as a Defence Mechanism against Russia: 
Is the EU Missing the Point?’ (2009) 1 Oil Gas and Energy Law Journal. 
 
54 Ibid 2.  
 
55 Gazprom faced the same situation with Eesti Gaas, the Estonian incumbent, which was obliged to adopt 





networks built after the entry into force of the Gas Directive have to be separated from 
any company producing or supplying natural gas. This rule is particularly relevant in 
relation to interconnection projects with supplying countries, whose construction has 
been considered essential since the Energy Sector Inquiry.56  
Clearly, the measures described may have a negative impact on the promotion of 
transnational infrastructure investments, pushing potential investors to adopt different 
strategies aimed at the diversification of their investments in infrastructure in the long-
term.57 What is even more important is that, in the short-term, these legislative 
manoeuvres could even put at stake the security of supply of the EU,58 above all in 
countries which, for historic and geographical reasons, are more dependent on third 
countries’ gas. Remarkably, this attitude could in the end go against the policy objectives 
of the EU, because ensuring a long-term security of supply is one of the purposes of the 
European legislator, as well as one of the reasons for the adoption of the Gas Directive.  
                                                   
56 European Commission, ‘DG Competition Report on Energy Sector Inquiry’ SEC (2006) 1724, paras 16, 
58 and 84.  
 
57 For example, on May 21, 2014, Gazprom and China National Petroleum Corporation signed a purchase 
and sale agreement to supply Russian gas via the Eastern route. This is the biggest purchase and sale 
contract in the history of the global gas industry (delivering 38 bcm of natural gas annually to China). The 
partnership between Russia and China in the sphere of natural gas recently stepped up to a completely new 
level because of the Chinese will to use less polluting energy sources (see chapter I, section 2) and the 
Russian desire to diversify its demand-side. In 2019, the first volumes of Russian pipeline gas will 
be delivered to China. See also Andrey Konoplyanik, ‘How is Russia's Gas Export Strategy Evolving and 
Why Will It Work for Russia?’ (2016) Oil, Gas & Energy Law Journal, 4 <https://www.ogel.org/ 
article.asp?key=3653> accessed 27 December 2016. 
 
58 This was one of the reasons justifying the adoption of the liberalisation directives. In the Gas Directive 
this is underlined in considerandum No. 1, 21, 22 (where security of supply is described as ‘an essential 
element of public security and is therefore inherently connected to the efficient functioning of the internal 
market in gas and the integration of the isolated gas markets of Member States’) 40, 44, 47 and 55. The 
problems regarding investment incentives have been at the basis of some of the antitrust investigations led 
by the Commission in the 2007-2010 period. In particular, companies were charged by the EC of ‘strategic 
underinvestment’ as a way to create barriers to entry to new competitors in the market. For a deeper analysis 
of this topic, please refer to Ulrich Sholtz and Stephan Purps, ‘The Application of EC Competition Law in 





Furthermore, we must underline that it is not crystal-clear whether Article 11 is meant to 
extend the European unbundling rules inside third countries’ territory. Even though the 
Gas Directive does not explicitly state it, this eventuality has been supported by Professor 
Konoplyanik, former deputy secretary General of the Energy Charter Secretariat, and one 
of the most renowned Russian energy experts.59 Undoubtedly, that was the initial attitude 
of the EC, which, along with the support of the ownership unbundling model inside the 
single market, expressed the desire to ‘export’ the same scheme in third supplying 
countries.60 In this sense, Mr. Lowe, the former EC director general for energy, together 
with the Directorate General for Competition’s officials Mrs. Pucinskaite, Mr. Webster 
and Mr. Lindberg stated that:  
whilst there is considerable scope to reflect about options about how to best 
implement ownership unbundling, it should be clear from the outset that 
companies which are actual or potential suppliers in a given Member State 
could not acquire/maintain networks in this Member State. This also applies 
to companies located outside the EU.61  
                                                   
59 Andrey Konoplyanik, ‘The Third Energy Package and the Concerns of Non-EU Gas Producers: An 
Interview with Dr. Andrey Konoplyanik’ (2012) <http://www.eurasia-energy-observer.com/news/ 
new/interview-with-andrey-konoplyanik> accessed 27 October 2013; Andrey Konoplyanik, ‘Russia and 
the Third Energy Package: Regulatory Changes for Internal EU Energy Markets in Gas and Possible 
Consequences for Suppliers (Including Non-EU Suppliers) and Consumers’ (2011) 8 International Energy 
Law Review 24; Alexander Jouravlev, ‘The Effect of the European Union’s Unbundling Provisions on the 
EU-Russian Natural Gas Relationships and Russia’s Accession to the World Trade Organization’ (2011) 
17 <http://www.ssrn.com/abstract=196 9502>  accessed 20 October 2013. 
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This view is supported also by the preparatory works of the Gas Directive, which set out 
an express reciprocity clause aimed at the application of the European unbundling 
measures inside third countries.62 
In the opinion of the writer, we can still support the extraterritorial application of Art icle 
11 focusing on the definition of ‘vertically integrated undertaking’ of the Gas Directive.63 
This is wide enough to include all the companies that are part of the same group (covering 
also those incorporated under third countries’ law), by treating them as a single entity. 
This view reflects the traditional approach of the Court of Justice of the European Union 
case-law concerning competition matters, according to which the extensive interpretation 
of the word ‘undertaking’ and the concept of ‘group of companies’ overlap (so-called 
‘economic entity doctrine’).64 
Because of the all-encompassing definition of vertically-integrated undertaking under EU 
law, one could argue that the unbundling obligations of the Gas Directive should be 
extended not only in relation to companies operating in EU MSs, but also to all the other 
undertakings that are part of the same group, even if incorporated in third countries.  
This view seems to be reinforced by a Commission’s report,65 which outlines that, in the 
context of the analysis of the ITO model, the Commission:  
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David Bailey, Competition Law (8th edn, OUP 2015) 95. 
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is of the opinion that the rules of the ITO that relate to the vertically integrated 
undertaking [‘VIU’] are applicable to all the companies within the group the 
VIU, irrespective of whether they carry out themselves activities related to 
supply or generation of gas or electricity. 
In line with this aim, the EC ‘argues that the scope of the VIU should not be restricted 
geographically’.66 For the EC, the third country companies involved have to be 
‘considered part of the VIU and thus obliged to comply with the rules applicable to VIUs, 
as laid down in Chapter IV of the Gas Directive [on ITO implementation]’.67 
In principle, third countries could not rely on Article 9(8) (opt for an ISO or ITO model) 
to comply with unbundling obligations of the Gas Directive because, according to the 
same paragraph, ISO and ITO models can only be adopted by ‘the Member State 
concerned’.68 Therefore, as a logical consequence it would appear that ownership 
unbundling would be the only model applicable to comply with the provisions of the Gas 
Directive inside third states’ territories. 
4. Additional Considerations on Investment Incentives  
In the previous section, we have highlighted the legal constraints set out in the wording 
of the Gas Directive which impact on foreign investors. In addition to that, it is worth 
noting that the Gas Directive could also lead to practical consequences that could hamper 
foreign investments in the Union.  
                                                   
 








The unbundling requirements and the additional burdens put on third countries’ entities 
seen above could discourage investments from companies specialised in the international 
gas supply. These are entities with extensive experience and know-how in the sector. The 
progressive disinvestment of these companies could cause problems to the management 
of the infrastructure and worsen the coordination between the transmission manager and 
the market operators. In the end, this would increase the transaction costs for the supply 
of the good to the final consumers. Transactions costs are, in economic terms, the costs 
which have to be borne for capturing the gains from specialisation and the division of 
labour.69 Integrated companies (or companies part of the same group) which share the 
same management and pursue the same goals bear minor transaction costs and therefore 
operate more efficiently in the market.  
Besides, the unbundling weakens natural gas companies in relation to third country 
producers. This is because the independent management over the network, coupled with 
the presence of several competitors as a result of the liberalisation of the sector, lowers 
the quantities of natural gas transported by each unbundled undertaking.70 In addition, 
third countries’ producers are often vertically integrated state-controlled entities (this is 
the case for Russia, Norway, Libya, Algeria and Qatar, the main EU gas suppliers) with 
the complete control over the natural resources of their territory. In principle, this 
disparity impairs the bargaining power of European companies and is likely to increase 
the price negotiated with the producers. However, this gap is not fully reflected on natural 
gas prices because technical innovations (LNG, fracking), coupled with a smaller-than-
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expected EU consumption due to the economic crisis and the booming of US internal gas 
production,71 led to a global oversupply which impacted on the gas prices, dramatically 
increasing the gap between the price set in long-term agreements and the price set in the 
spot markets.72 Since 2008, gas prices plummeted in the spot markets (where gas is traded 
on a daily basis) and many long-term contracts tying buyers to suppliers were renegotiated 
or subjected to arbitration. In 2015, European hub prices fell to their lowest level since 
2009, as a combination of low oil prices, steady LNG supply, mild winter temperatures 
and robust pipeline imports put downward pressure on prices.73  
Big suppliers benefit from more cash resources and banks’ credit standing because of 
their bigger assets, know-how and revenues.74 For these reasons, a situation where 
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investment incentives are scarce could endanger the realisation of the interconnection 
projects which are essential for the development of the European pipelines network. The 
need for these infrastructures was already underlined in the 2007 Inquiry carried out by 
the European Commission,75 and was one of the main drivers for the adoption of the Gas 
Directive.76 The construction of interconnection projects can cost up to several billion 
Euros. To give one example, the total expenses for the construction of the Lithuanian-
Polish interconnectors amount to 558 Million Euros,77 and even smaller projects (e.g. the 
interconnector linking Greece to Bulgaria) require a significant funding.78 Even if these 
are projects of relevant public interest, because of the rigid rules on deficit spending put 
on EU countries (e.g. Maastricht parameters and Fiscal Compact) they are mainly funded 
by the private sector. However, private entities act in the economy following a mere 
profit-driven logic which significantly differs from the reasons underlying State 
interventions.   
When private entities decide to invest in infrastructure, they act on the basis of specific 
revenue models which allow them to amortise the cost of the projects over a certain period 
of time and guarantee a well-determined premium for their business initiative. Nowadays, 
the realisation of energy and infrastructure projects is often based on debt financing and 
project financing.79 In particular, from an investor perspective project financing 
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significantly lowers investment risks because it separates the single projects to be made 
from the overall activities and assets of the investing entity. Project financing requires the 
constitution of small capital companies (so-called ‘project companies’), aimed at the 
realisation of a single project at a time. These companies are financed by the lending 
banks on the basis of their projected revenues and in exchange of a whole bunch of 
securities.80 The stability and the predictability of future revenues are essential for a 
project to be financed.81 In the case of natural gas infrastructures, these requirements are 
satisfied by the projected revenues deriving from the application of the transportation 
prices set out by NRAs for each ‘regulatory period’.82  
As mentioned in section 2.1.4, the infrastructure projects built after 3 September 2009 
have to satisfy the ownership unbundling regime.83 This means that the project companies 
used to realise new infrastructure projects cannot be controlled by natural gas or 
electricity producers or sellers. In order to comply with the ownership unbundling regime, 
these latter entities must take part to project companies together with other subjects 
which, in turn, shall respect the ownership unbundling provisions.84 As a consequence, 
two non-EU companies which produce or supply natural gas in Europe cannot jointly 
participate to a project company, as one of them will always be in a position of control 
over the project company.   
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The unbundling also applies when the investing companies are more than two, as long as 
one supplier and/or seller controls the TSO. As noted in section 2.1.1, ‘control’ is defined 
very broadly under the Gas Directive,85 and includes indirect control – i.e. through 
subsidiaries – and the so-called ‘negative control’, whereby minority shareholders enjoy 
veto rights on strategic decisions of the company concerning budget, appointment of 
management, investments and business planning.86 Therefore, the possibility for a 
producer and/or supplier to participate to project companies shall be verified on a case-
by-case basis by the regulatory authority.87 The evaluation to be made shall consider the 
articles of incorporation and the statute of each project company to verify the powers 
granted to the relevant shareholders. Clearly, the more subjects participate to a project 
company’s incorporation, the more difficult is the coordination between them. Hence, gas 
producers and suppliers face a trade-off: invest in infrastructure development with third 
subjects without the possibility to control the relevant TSO and with a significant 
transaction costs increase or not participate at all. Evidently, these two solutions do not 
encourage foreign companies’ investments in the Union. 
Another issue for potential investors derives from the TPA obligations put on the 
infrastructure manager by Article 32 of the Gas Directive. As mentioned in section 2.2 of 
this chapter, TSOs are subject to strict requirements which are designed to guarantee the 
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impartial access to the natural monopoly. The reason behind that is evident. Without this 
obligation, TSOs could undertake actions aimed at discriminating between one or more 
users. The beneficiary of these actions could directly or indirectly be part of the same 
group of companies (in view of the group interest), or it could be a third company 
unrelated to the TSO (private interest reason).   
Access to the infrastructure is important to enable natural gas suppliers to compete in the 
downstream sector. There is a close relationship between the degree of access to the 
natural monopoly, the quantity of natural gas bought by domestic suppliers, the price paid 
to the producers, the price charged to final customers by domestic suppliers and the 
competitiveness of a company in the market. In principle, competitors damaged by 
unequal terms of access to the pipelines could suffer by paying higher prices to producers 
due to their relatively weak bargaining power. This could be the result of the limited 
amount of gas transported because of discriminatory capacity allocation mechanisms. The 
weaker companies might charge higher prices to their final customers to obtain the same 
profit per unit of the good transported. In a competitive context, this reduces the quantity 
of natural gas sold to final customers. The damaged suppliers would be compelled to 
reduce their profits per unit to lower the prices to final customers and compete in the retail 
market with the advantaged companies. However, this would still be an issue for the 
recovery of the investments done and the financial statements of the damaged companies. 
By definition, the sale of natural gas is the main source of revenues for a natural gas 
company. If revenues are too low, it is unlikely that a company could cover its liabilities, 




As seen, to prevent the drawbacks linked to the unfair management of the natural 
monopoly, the EU introduced TPA rules.88 However, it is exactly because of the TPA that 
the incentives for private parties to invest in European infrastructure projects have 
decreased. This is because TPA lowers the projected revenues of the investments in the 
infrastructure by imposing pro-competitive obligations on the market operators.89  
To prevent the underinvestment in ‘major and new’ natural gas pipelines, Article 36 of 
the Gas Directive provides for exemptions applying to unbundling and TPA rules. The 
requesting entity must meet five conditions to derogate from Articles 9 and 32 of the Gas 
Directive: (i) the new infrastructure has to enhance competition in the natural gas supply 
and secure the gas supply; (ii) the investment would not be made without the concession 
of a derogation to unbundling and third party access; (iii) the infrastructure must be owned 
by a natural or legal person which is separate, at least in terms of its legal form, from the 
system operators in whose systems that infrastructure will be built; (iv) charges must be 
levied on users of that infrastructure; and (v) the exemption must not be detrimental to 
competition or the effective functioning of the internal market in natural gas.90  
These are the only criteria which can be used by NRAs to evaluate an unbundling and/or 
a TPA exemption request. The general nature of the clauses above could open the door to 
a possible discretionary application of the exemptions. Article 36 does not refer to 
objective criteria such as measurement systems or quantitative parameters. Discretion 
could be used not only when deciding whether to grant an exemption, but also when 
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determining the duration of the derogation. In fact, pursuant to Article 36, exemptions 
can be also partial or temporary.91     
To summarise, the Gas Directive does not seem to give the right investment incentives to 
private energy companies for several reasons. The first one is the loss of domestic 
suppliers’ bargaining power due to the break-up of national markets and the introduction 
of the unbundling, which lowers the amounts of gas traded.92 The fact that to date the gas 
price on the spot market is unexpectedly low is not relevant, albeit in practice this counter-
balances the bargaining power loss. Secondly, companies operating in the production 
and/or supply of gas cannot exercise a decisive influence on European TSOs. Why do 
you have to invest in a sector if you know you will face strong limitations to your 
operation? Remarkably, these restrictions extend to the electricity market and to projects 
already in operation.93 Lastly, the uncertainty of getting an exemption under Article 36 
exponentially increases the risk assumption of the investing companies, which may not 
get their investments repaid. In the end, all of this could endanger the security of supply 
of the EU and its Member States.  
The possibility of benefitting from exemptions is key for new projects that want to be 
financed, since private investors need to evaluate in advance the likelihood of profitability 
of the investments to be made. One of the current priorities for EU policymakers is to 
accelerate final investment decisions on key gas infrastructure projects, so-called Projects 
of Common Interest (‘PCIs’), the majority of which relate to natural gas transportation.94 
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These are projects fulfilling the following characteristics: (i) impact significantly on at 
least two EU countries; (ii) enhance market integration and contribute to the integration 
of EU countries' networks; (iii) increase competition on energy markets by offering 
alternatives to consumers; (iv) enhance security of supply; and (v) contribute to the 
EU's energy and climate goals.95 Candidate projects are proposed by their promoters and 
are evaluated by Regional Groups that include representatives from EU countries, the 
Commission, TSOs, project promoters, regulatory authorities and the Agency for the 
Cooperation of the Energy Regulators (‘ACER’). After this assessment, the Commission 
adopts the list of approved PCIs via a delegated act procedure and then submits the list of 
projects to the Parliament and the Council.96 These institutions have two months to reject 
the list, or they may ask for an extension of two months to finalise their position. If neither 
the Parliament nor the Council rejects the list, it enters into force.97 The list of PCIs is 
updated every two years to integrate newly needed projects and remove obsolete 
ones. PCIs are provided with accelerated permit granting procedures and a faster 
environmental assessment process.98  
The transition towards a more secure and sustainable energy system will require major 
investments in energy generation, networks and energy efficiency, estimated at some 200 
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billion Euros annually in the next decade.99 For this reason, while the private sector will 
bear the costs of most of these investments, right investment incentives and access to 
financial support will be key factors to support the expected growth.  
5. The Impact of the Gas Directive at the International Level  
As mentioned in the introduction of this work, the analysis of the economic dependency 
relations is key to evaluate the position of a country towards all the others in a well-
determined sector. Dependency relations ultimately depend on the amount of goods and 
services traded from one country to another. For this reason, trade relationships between 
market operators, especially when monopolists, shape the geopolitical relations of their 
countries of origin. This is all the more true when dealing with the energy sector, due to 
its strategic importance and the pervasive role of the State in the field.  
Hence, the impact of the Gas Directive on international trade, especially with regard to 
the ‘third country clause’, is relevant to understand the position of the EU in the energy 
relationship with Russia. International trade is ruled by WTO agreements, which, as seen 
in chapter I, have been ratified by both the EU and Russia and are the only effective means 
of redress which currently bind both countries at the international level. Therefore, the 
analysis of the Gas Directive impact on the EU-Russia energy relationship cannot do 
without an assessment of compliance of the Gas Directive with the WTO rules. This 
enquiry is particularly significant also in light of the request for consultation before the 
WTO Dispute Settlement Body which has been filed by Russia against the EU on the 
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same topic, and considering the impact of the Gas Directive on the investment incentives 
of private entities analysed in the previous sections of this chapter.100   
The outcome of this investigation could be key to determining the possible resolution of 
the tensions which currently permeate the EU-Russia energy relationship. Indeed, in 
principle, it could trigger major changes in the European gas supply, either leading 
towards a more pro-EU (e.g. a progressive diversification both of the suppliers and of the 
energy sources) or pro-Russia (e.g. strengthening the position of Gazprom in the EU 
midstream and downstream markets) energy future. Moreover, a manifest illegality of the 
Gas Directive would considerably influence the investment incentives put on the 
undertakings concerned by the Third Energy Package.  
6. Interim Conclusion 
This chapter outlined the main features of the Gas Directive (unbundling, third party 
access, third country clause) which could impact on the EU-Russia balance of power.  
In particular, we have seen that Article 11 of the Gas Directive imposes burdensome 
requirements on foreign undertakings willing to operate as TSOs in the EU. The criteria 
set out under Article 11 hide a potential discrimination between undertakings of different 
countries of origin which could affect the operation and the investment opportunities of 
non-EU countries’ entities in the EU energy market. Notably, this could negatively impact 
on the amount of goods and services traded and, in the end, even go against EU security 
interests.  
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The third country clause has been at the centre of the public debate since the preparatory 
works of the Gas Directive and still it is a hot topic of discussion. The negative impact of 
Article 11 on Russia’s interests in Europe cannot be summarised better than in the words 
of President Putin, who defined it as a ‘robbery’.101   
EU pieces of energy legislation, such as the Gas Directive, must comply with international 
law rules binding the EU in the energy field. For this reason, in the next chapter we will 
analyse the Gas Directive vis-à-vis WTO rules which, as seen in chapter I, are the most 
suitable international legal tool that can be used to assess an internal measure which 
impacts on the EU-Russia energy relations.  
Our research will focus on the non-discrimination and the market access provisions of the 
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade and of the General Agreement on Trade in 
Services since those are the main rules invoked by Russia in the request for consultation 
filed to the WTO DSB.  
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THE ASSESSMENT OF THE GAS DIRECTIVE AGAINST WTO RULES 
Summary: 1. Introduction – 2. Most Favoured Nation – 3. National Treatment – 4. 
Quantitative Restrictions – 5. Market Access Barriers to Services – 6. General Exceptions 
– 7. Security Exceptions – 8.  Interim Conclusion.  
 
1. Introduction 
In the previous chapters, we have outlined the basic economic, geopolitical and regulatory 
features characterising the EU natural gas market. This gave us the necessary background 
knowledge to begin the legal investigation aimed at assessing the compliance of Directive 
2009/73/EC (‘the Gas Directive’) with international trade rules.  
This chapter will assess the Gas Directive vis-à-vis the rules of the World Trade 
Organization (‘WTO’). The prohibition for natural gas producers and retailers to hold a 
quota amounting to the control of European gas transportation companies (‘TSOs’), seen 
in the previous chapter, could bear consequences on the production and sale of natural 
gas in the European market. By the same token, third party access to pipelines and energy 
network management rules could affect third country gas companies. Therefore, the 
analysis of the compliance of the Gas Directive with the provisions included under the 
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (‘GATT’) and the General Agreement on Trade 
in Services (‘GATS’) is highly relevant.  
Even though the two agreements regulate different matters – the GATT deals with the 




they are not mutually exclusive and, therefore, they can be applied to assess the same 
regulation.1  
The legal analysis will be made by testing the relevant provisions of the Gas Directive 
against the antidiscrimination and market access rules of the GATT and the GATS, in 
light of the applicable case law. We will conclude that the Gas Directive does not seem 
to comply with some of the rules analysed and that the EU could not rely on the 
application of the general and security exceptions laid down under the GATT and the 
GATS to justify the breach of WTO rules. This answers to the second question set out in 
the introduction of this work.2  
The scenario depicted will empower Russia with a remedy, the enforcement of which 
could impact on its energy relationship with the EU, mandating a change of EU legislation 
to the advantage of Gazprom’s operations in the EU internal market. 
2. Most Favoured Nation  
One of the backbones of international trade is known as ‘most favoured nation’ (hereafter, 
‘MFN’). This principle, whose origin dates back at the early stages of multilateral trade 
negotiations,3 is present both under the GATT (Article I) and under the GATS (Article 
II).  
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2 In the introduction we posed the following question: ‘Is the EU intervention in the natural gas field 
compliant with the international law rules binding the Union in the field?’. See page 11.  
 
3 The origin of the MFN clause dates back to the Holy Roman Empire. The drafters of the WTO 






The main obligation imposed by MFN is that any advantage granted from one WTO 
member to a State, irrespective of whether this latter is a WTO member or not,4 must be 
granted ‘immediately and unconditionally’ to all the other WTO members.       
MFN covers not only de jure discriminatory behaviours but also de facto discrimination.5  
Hence, measures that appear to be origin-neutral could fall within the scope of application 
of the MFN principle. 
Object of this section is the assessment of the Gas Directive as regards its compatibility 
with the MFN clauses of the GATT and the GATS. 
2.1 Most Favoured Nation under the GATT  
Pursuant to Article I(1) of the GATT:  
any advantage, favour, privilege or immunity granted by any Member to any 
product originating in or destined for any other country shall be accorded 
immediately and unconditionally to the like product originating in or destined 
for the territories of all other Members.  
WTO case-law developed a three-fold assessment to verify the consistency of a measure 
with the MFN clause of the GATT.6 In particular, we shall assess: 1) whether the measure 
adopted by a WTO Member confers a ‘trade advantage’ in the meaning of Article I; 2) 
                                                   
4 Petros Mavroidis, Trade in Goods (OUP 2012) 129. 
 
5 Canada – Certain Measures Affecting the Automotive Industry – Report of the Appellate Body (31 May 
2000) WT/DS139/AB/R [78] with reference to the GATT and European Communities – Regime for the 
Importation, Sale and Distribution of Bananas – Report of the Appellate Body (9 September 1997) 
WT/DS27/AB/R [233] with reference to the GATS. 
 
6 UNCTAD, ‘Dispute Settlement: World Trade Organization 3.5 GATT 1994’ (2003) 14 
<http://unctad.org/en/docs/edmmisc232add33_en.pdf> accessed 3 March 2015; Peter Van Den Bossche, 





whether the products concerned can be considered as ‘like products’; and 3) whether the 
advantage is granted ‘immediately and unconditionally’ to all like products of the other 
WTO Member States (‘MSs’). An affirmative answer to the first two questions and a 
negative answer to the third one entail a breach of the MFN obligation by the WTO 
Member which adopted the measure under investigation.   
2.1.1 The Definition of ‘Trade Advantage’ 
The first element of the test demands that the trade advantage granted by the contested 
measure to one or more Countries can be included under the ones covered by Article I 
GATT. Accordingly, the relevant advantage shall relate, inter alia, to ‘all rules and 
formalities in connection with importation and exportation [of a product] and with respect 
to all matters referred to in paragraphs 2 and 4 of Article III’.7 Article III GATT will be 
analysed in depth below, in section 3 of this chapter. For the time being, it is sufficient to 
note that its fourth paragraph focuses on the regulatory measures adopted by WTO 
Members which could impact, inter alia, on the transportation of a product.  
The Gas Directive could fall both under Article III(4) and among the ‘all rules and 
formalities connected with importation’ of Article I. In the absence of any definition of 
the expression in the GATT, we shall refer to the rules of customary international law for 
the interpretation of the treaties set out in the Vienna Convention on the Law of the 
Treaties.8 Accordingly, the interpretation of an international treaty shall be made having 
                                                   
7 Article I(1) GATT. 
 
8 As regards the interpretation of WTO covered agreements, Article 3(2) of the WTO Dispute Settlement 
Understanding explicitly refers to ‘customary rules of interpretation of public international law’, which 
has been consistently interpreted by the Panels and the Appellate Body to refer to the Vienna Convention 
on the Law of the Treaties. In particular, the Appellate Body acknowledged the importance of the Vienna 
Convention on the Law of the Treaties for the interpretation of WTO rules in US-Gasoline and interprets 
WTO law with reference to it ever since. See: Danae Azaria, Treaties on Transit of Energy Via Pipelines 
and Countermeasures (OUP 2015) 14; Lars Albath, Trade and Energy: Investment in the Gas and 





regard to the ordinary meaning of the wording used, in accordance with the object and 
purpose of the treaty.9 In this respect, the Gas Directive could fall within the ordinary 
meaning of the expression ‘rules and formalities connected to importation’.10   
Remarkably, the scope of application of the MFN clause is very broad, as it covers both 
actual and potential discrimination.11 This means that MFN does not require that an 
‘advantage’ is actually granted by the Gas Directive to a third country, it being enough 
that the regulation could potentially discriminate between entities.  
As seen in the previous chapter,12 the certification procedure laid down under Article 11 
of the Gas Directive could be discretionary, being based on the circumstances of the case 
and on the international agreements in place between the EU and the motherland of the 
undertakings concerned. In this respect, the fact that there are different (or indeed no) 
                                                   
 
9 Article 31 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of the Treaties states that ‘A treaty shall be interpreted 
in good faith in accordance with the ordinary meaning to be given to the terms of the treaty in their context 
and in the light of its object and purpose’. We may have recourse to supplementary means of interpretation 
in accordance with Article 32 of the Vienna Convention to confirm the meaning resulting from the 
application of Article 31, or to determine the meaning of the terms if we conclude that the interpretation 
according to Article 31 leaves the meaning ambiguous or obscure or leads to a result that is manifestly 
absurd or unreasonable. See Martin Dixon, International Law (6th edn, OUP 2007) 59; Malgosia 
Fitzmaurice, Olufemi A Elias, Panos Merkouris, Treaty Interpretation and the Vienna Convention on the 
Law of Treaties: 30 Years On (2010 Martinus Nijhoff Publishers).  
 
10 Pursuant to the Oxford Dictionary, ‘rule’ is defined as: ‘one of a set of explicit or 
understood regulations or principles governing conduct or procedure within a particular area of activity’. 
The same dictionary defines ‘formality’ as ‘the rigid observance of convention or etiquette’. ‘Connected’ 
is defined as ‘associated or related in some respect’. ‘Importation’ means ‘the bringing of goods or 
services into a country from abroad for sale’. Therefore, to be covered by Article I, the Gas Directive 
should set out explicit regulations or principles related to the bringing of gas in the EU from abroad. 
Notwithstanding the fact the Vienna Convention on the Law of the Treaties uses the expression ‘object 
and purpose’ eight times, it does not define it. However, the International Court of Justice has consistently 
interpreted that expression as referred to the title of the treaties, their preamble, the preparatory works, a 
programmatic provision, and an article showing the major concerns of the parties. See Danae Azaria, 
Treaties on Transit of Energy Via Pipelines and Countermeasures (OUP 2015) 112. 
 
11 Peter Van den Bossche and Werner Zdouk, The Law and Policy of the World Trade Organization (3rd 
edn, CUP 2013) 378.  
 





international treaties between the EU and non-EU Members may mean that there are 
different ‘treatments’ in the meaning of Article I GATT.   
2.1.2 The Likeness Test 
The second element required by the MFN test under Article I(1) GATT is the assessment 
over the ‘likeness’ of the products concerned. There is no reference to the definition of 
‘likeness’ in the WTO agreements.13 That is why it is accepted that the concept of ‘like 
product’ has a different meaning in the different contexts in which it is used.14 In the 
absence of a clear definition, we could apply to Article I the jurisprudence on ‘likeness’ 
of Article III GATT.15   
Accordingly, two products are ‘like’ when they share the same physical properties, end-
uses, consumer tastes and habits, and tariff classification.16 These criteria are neither 
exclusive nor cumulative. Nothing shall prevent the adjudicative body from considering 
only some of the criteria listed or from referring to other indicators, provided that they 
                                                   





15 For Van den Bossche ‘it is reasonable to expect that this case law regarding Article III will inform the 
concept of ‘like products’ under Article I’. On this line, the Panel in Indonesia-Autos stated that ‘we have 
found in our discussion of like products under Article III:2 that certain imported motor vehicles are like 
the national cars. The same considerations justify a finding that such imported vehicles can be considered 
like national cars imported from Korea for the purpose of Article I’. Despite this apparent connection, 
Trebilcock and Howse underline that it is still unclear whether the same principles underlying ‘likeness’ 
under Art III are applicable also in case of Art I. See Michael Trebilcock, Robert Howse and Antonia 
Eliason, The Regulation of International Trade (6th edn, Routledge 2013) 75. 
 
16 The four-digit test has been adopted in several WTO cases and it is now accepted as the most relevant 
method to determine the likeness of the products concerned. See Spain – Tariff Treatment on Unroasted 
Coffee – Report of the Panel (11 June 1981) BISD 28S/102; Canada I Japan – Tariff on Imports of Spruce, 
Pine. Fir (SPF) Dimension Lumber – Report of the Panel (19 July 1989) BISD 36S/167; United States – 






reveal the competitive relationship between different products.17 If two products are not 
considered as like, they can be subjected to disparate treatment.   
In case of natural gas, the likeness test seems to be satisfied.18 Natural gas is a substance 
with neither colour nor smell, and its gaseous form prevents the user from distinguishing 
between the countries of origin. Despite this, it is true that gases coming from different 
basins can have different caloric power and therefore be more appealing for certain end-
uses rather than others. In addition, it is also true that natural gas can have different origins 
– apart from the subsoil extraction, it is produced from renewable sources (so-called 
‘biogas’) – or it can be subject to transformational processes which impact on its natural 
state before its supply to the final customer (e.g. liquefied natural gas).  
The jurisprudence of the WTO does not clearly state whether the processes and 
production methods may have an impact on the assessment on the ‘likeness’ of two 
products.19 Arguably, if this is the case, one could say that ‘grey’ natural gas, products 
such as biogas and liquefied natural gas (‘LNG’) are not like products and therefore a 
different treatment of them could be justified.  
However, whether LNG and biogas can be considered as different products from ‘grey’ 
natural gas or whether a difference should be made between gases with different caloric 
                                                   
17 In this sense go the following cases:  European Communities – Measures Affecting Asbestos and 
Products Containing Asbestos – Report of the Appellate Body (12 March 2001) WT/DS135/AB/R [109]; 
United States – Measures Affecting the Production and Sale of Clove Cigarettes – Report of the Appellate 
Body (4 April 2012) WT/DS406/AB/R [119 – 121] and Philippines – Taxes on Distilled Spirits – Report 
of the Appellate Body (21 December 2011) WT/DS396/AB/R [122; 170-183]. 
 
18 Lars Albath Trade and Energy: Investment in the Gas and Electricity Sectors (Cameron May 2004) 
100. 
 
19 Thomas Cottier, ‘Renewable Energy and Process and Production Methods’ (2015) E15 Initiative. 
Geneva: International Centre for Trade and Sustainable Development (ICTSD) and World Economic 
Forum 7 <http://e15initiative.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/09/E15-Climate-Change-Cottier-Final.pdf> 





powers does not seem to have any direct consequence on the evaluation of the likeness in 
relation to the MFN clause. This is because the Gas Directive does not set out any 
distinction between the different types of gas. Instead, it generally applies to ‘natural gas’, 
irrespective of its origin or natural state.20 This leads us to consider that all third countries’ 
gas and all European-produced gas are ‘like products’ for the purposes of our research. 
2.1.3 The Non-Discrimination Test 
The third element of the three-tier assessment under Article I(1) GATT is the so-called 
‘non-discrimination test’, pursuant to which any advantage granted to the products of one 
State shall be given ‘immediately and unconditionally’ to the like products of all the other 
WTO Members.     
According to the Panel in Canada-Autos ‘whether conditions attached to an advantage 
granted in connection with importation of a product offend Article I(1) depends upon 
whether or not such conditions discriminate with respect to the origin of products’.21 For 
that Panel, ‘unconditionally’ entails that the extension of an advantage to third countries 
may not be made subject to conditions in relation to the situation or conduct of those 
countries.22 As a consequence, the imposition of conditions would breach the WTO rules 
only if it became a way to discriminate between countries.  
Notwithstanding the above, the Panel in EC – Tariff Preferences adopted a stricter 
interpretation and saw ‘no reason not to give that term its ordinary meaning under Article 
                                                   
20 Gas Directive, art 1(1). Accordingly, ‘this Directive establishes common rules for the transmission, 
distribution, supply and storage of natural gas. It lays down the rules relating to the organisation and 
functioning of the natural gas sector, access to the market, the criteria and procedures applicable to the 
granting of authorisations for transmission, distribution, supply and storage of natural gas and the 
operation of systems’. 
 







I(1) that is, ‘not limited by or subject to any conditions’’.23 Clearly, the adoption of this 
interpretation would preclude the introduction of any condition in the measures adopted 
by WTO Members.  
The Appellate Body newly intervened on the matter in the 2014 EC-Seal case, giving a 
broader interpretation of the matter, underlining that ‘the non-discrimination test prohibits 
only those conditions that have a detrimental impact on the competitive opportunities for 
like imported products from any member’. 24  
However, even leaving aside the ‘conditionality test’, in our case it seems indisputable 
that Article 11 does not satisfy the ‘immediateness’ required by Article I GATT. In fact, 
even though the terms ‘immediately’ and ‘unconditionally’ are usually assessed 
simultaneously,25 this does not mean that they cannot be analysed separately. This is 
justified by the fact that Article I uses the conjunction ‘and’, meaning that both 
requirements have to be cumulatively satisfied. According to Mavroidis, ‘the term 
‘automatically’ suggests the absence of time lapse between granting an advantage to one 
country and extending it to all WTO Members’.26 In the Gas Directive, the certification 
process under Articles 10 and 11 takes several months and, even when a certification is 
                                                   
23 European Communities – Conditions for the Granting of Tariff Preferences to Developing Countries – 
Report of the Panel (1 December 2003) WT/DS246/R [7.59]. 
 
24 European Communities – Measures Prohibiting the Importation and Marketing of Seal Products – 
Report of the Appellate Body (22 May 2014) WT/DS400/AB/R [5.88]. See Andrea K Bjorklund, 
Yearbook on International Investment Law & Policy 2014-2015 (OUP 2016) 136. Mavroidis casts a 
shadow on the reasoning made by the Appellate Body in Petros Mavroidis, The Regulation of 
International Trade (MIT Press 2016) 214. 
 







granted to one undertaking of an advantaged third-country, it cannot be instantly extended 
to the companies of the other WTO Members.27  
2.1.4 Impact of the Gas Directive on Natural Gas Flows 
So far, we have concluded that the Gas Directive does not immediately extend to all third 
countries the advantages which it grants to some of them. This is at odds with the MFN 
principle. However, before upholding the existence of a breach, one aspect is still to be 
assessed.  
We applied the MFN test of the GATT without questioning the effective impact of the 
Gas Directive on natural gas as a good. Indeed, the wording of the Gas Directive does not 
seem to affect gas as a product. Pursuant to its Article 1, the Gas Directive:  
establishes common rules for the transmission, distribution, supply and 
storage of natural gas. It lays down the rules relating to the organisation and 
functioning of the natural gas sector, access to the market, the criteria and 
procedures applicable to the granting of authorisations for transmission, 
distribution, supply and storage of natural gas and the operation of systems.  
According to WTO case law, the impact on natural gas can derive not only from the ‘face’ 
of a regulation, but also from its application.28 Nothing in the Gas Directive seems to 
                                                   
27 In case of third countries’ controlled companies, the timing for the authorisation can reach up to 10 
months. After the notification of the controlled company, the NRA takes a draft decision within the 
following 4 months and notifies it to the European Commission. The European Commission gives an 
opinion on whether (i) the company at issue complies with the requirements of Art 9; and (b) the 
authorisation will not put at risk the security of energy supply to the Community. The European 
Commission will deliver its opinion to the relevant NRA within 2 months, extended by other 2 whether 
it requests the views of the Agency for the Cooperation of Energy Regulators, the Member State 
concerned, and the interested parties. Once received the opinion of the EC, the NRA takes a final decision 
within two months. In taking the final decision, the NRA shall take utmost account of the Commission’s 
opinion. See Gas Directive, Arts 10 – 11. 
 
28 The possibility of including not only de jure but also de facto discriminatory actions under Article I 




prevent or hamper companies operating in Europe from buying gas from third countries 
which are put at a disadvantage by Article 11 (e.g. Russia) and competitively supplying 
it to their final customers. In fact, the Gas Directive does not apply any charges or levies 
of any type and does not seem to impact on the conditions of supply of the imported good.  
However, we have to bear in mind that Article I GATT has to be interpreted broadly and 
covers also potential discrimination,29 so that there is no need to prove an actual 
discriminatory effect. Under this perspective, by preventing TSOs controlled by third 
country suppliers to operate, in theory Article 11 could block the gas flow in the importing 
country, in violation of Article I GATT. This situation finds a case in point when there is 
only one TSO operating in a EU Member. For instance, this happens in Latvia, Lithuania, 
Luxembourg, Belgium, Bulgaria, Finland and Denmark.30 
2.2 Most Favoured Nation under the GATS  
The MFN principle under the GATS is laid down under Article II(1). This provides that:  
With respect to any measure covered by this Agreement, each Member shall 
accord immediately and unconditionally to services and service suppliers of 
any other Member treatment no less favourable than that it accords to like 
services and service suppliers of any other country.  
While the MFN clause under the GATT lists several types of measures and incorporates 
regulations and internal taxes only by reference to the NT principle under Article III, the 
                                                   
that Article II GATS prohibits both types of discrimination, noted that Article I GATT applies also to de 
facto discriminatory measures. The same view was reiterated in Canada-Autos.  
 
29 Van Den Bossche and Zdouk (n 11). 
 
30 For the complete list of EU Members with one TSO only, see European Commission, ‘Country 
Factsheet’ (2013) <https://ec.europa.eu/energy/sites/ener/files/documents/201307-entry-exit-regimes-in-





wording of Article II GATS seems to be broader, applying to ‘any measure’ adopted by 
a WTO MS. Focusing on the MFN discrimination aspect, the GATT obliges WTO MSs 
to extend any advantage, favour, privilege and immunity which is granted to one country 
to all the other WTO MSs. The GATS instead, prohibits the less favourite treatment of 
any WTO Member, an expression which echoes the broad formulation of the NT clause.31 
However, while the term ‘treatment’ seems to be wider than the words ‘advantage’, 
‘favour’, ‘privilege’ and ‘immunity’, a broad interpretation of these latter expressions 
leads to the absence of a significant difference between them.32    
As a preliminary consideration, the applicability of the exception laid down under Article 
I(3)(b) GATS cannot be supported in the case at issue. This clause prevents the 
application of the GATS in case of services supplied in the exercise of governmental 
authority.33 This refers to services which are supplied neither on a commercial basis nor 
in competition with one or more other service suppliers. At first glance, gas transportation 
services which are provided at regulated prices by natural monopolists could fall within 
this category. However, Article VIII GATS derogates to Article I and sets out the 
obligation of the ‘monopoly supplier of a service’ – in our case, the TSO manager – to 
comply with the Member State's obligations under Article II and its specific 
commitments, including MFN.34  
                                                   
31 Pursuant to Article XVII(1) GATS ‘In the sectors inscribed in its Schedule, and subject to any 
conditions and qualifications set out therein, each Member shall accord to services and service suppliers 
of any other Member, in respect of all measures affecting the supply of services, treatment no less 
favourable than that it accords to its own like services and service suppliers’. See the analysis of the 
provision in sub-section 3.2. 
 
32 Nicholas Diebold, Non-Discrimination in International Trade in Services: ‘Likeness’ in WTO/GATS 
(CUP 2010) 136. 
 
33 Pursuant to Art I(3)(b) GATS: For the purposes of this agreement […] ‘services’ includes any service 
in any sector except services supplied in the exercise of governmental authority. 
 
34 This provision applies also ‘where a Member's monopoly supplier competes, either directly or through 





The WTO Dispute Settlement Body (‘DSB’) formulated a three-fold assessment to detect 
a breach of the MFN under the GATS.35 Accordingly, we shall evaluate 1) whether the 
measure adopted by a WTO Member is a measure within the scope of the GATS; 2) 
whether the services or the service suppliers concerned satisfy the ‘likeness test’; and 3) 
whether there is a ‘less favourable treatment’ of the services or of the service suppliers of 
a WTO Member in relation to any other country - not only de jure, but also de facto.36    
2.2.1 The Definition of ‘Measure under the GATS’ 
The assessment on whether the Gas Directive is a measure within the scope of the GATS 
is rather straightforward, considering the broad definition of ‘measure’ included under 
Article XXVIII GATS (Definitions),37 and the fact that, as seen in Chapter I,38 ‘trade in 
service’ related to natural gas falls within the categories of cross-border supply and 
commercial presence of Article I GATS.   
2.2.2 The Likeness Test 
The second element of the MFN test is the ‘likeness’ of the services or of the service 
providers concerned. There is little case-law on the interpretation of those expressions 
under the GATS. As we have seen in chapter I, there is no definition of ‘service’ under 
the GATS.39 However, the same agreement explains the meaning of ‘service supplier’ in 
                                                   
 
35 Thailand – Customs and Fiscal Measures on Cigarettes from the Philippines – Report of the Appellate 
Body (17 June 2011) WT/DS371/AB/R [127].  
  
36 European Communities – Regime for the Importation, Sale and Distribution of Bananas – Report of 
the Appellate Body (9 September 1997) WT/DS27/AB/R [234]. 
 
37 Pursuant to Article XXVIII(a) GATS, a ‘measure’ in the meaning of the GATS is ‘any measure by a 
Member, whether in the form of a law, regulation, rule, procedure, decision, administrative action, or any 
other form’. See also section 2.1.2 above. 
 
38 Chapter I, section 5.2.2. 
 





Article XXVIII GATS (Definitions), according to which a ‘service supplier’ is ‘any 
person that supplies a service’. This broad definition can certainly be applied to the 
undertakings operating in natural gas transportation.  
The unbundling rules set out under Article 9 of the Gas Directive apply to companies 
working in the transportation sector – ‘service providers’ in the meaning of the GATS. 
This is a relatively small environment because of the small number and the similar 
characteristics of the operators working therein. These are natural monopolist companies 
that manage the high-pressure pipelines constituting the spine of the natural gas delivery 
to final customers. In principle, each country has one main company operating in the 
transportation sector. 
Transportation companies share the same characteristics and satisfy the same basic need 
- the safe transportation of natural gas through the pipelines they manage. For these 
reasons, it is unlikely that a customer would perceive the difference of switching from 
one TSO to another governing the same pipelines. This is also because transportation 
tariffs in Europe are set at standard prices by the national regulatory authorities. For these 
reasons, the transportation companies targeted by the Gas Directive can be considered 
‘like service suppliers’ under Article II GATS.  
2.2.3 The Non-Discrimination Test and the Exception under Article II(2) GATS 
The last element of the three-tier MFN test is the ‘non-discrimination’ assessment. 
Pursuant to Article II, WTO members shall accord ‘immediately and unconditionally’ to 
services and to service suppliers of other WTO members no less favoured treatment than 
the one granted to the like services and the like service suppliers of any other country. 




treatment’. However, the same periphrasis is used also under Article XVII(3) GATS, 
pursuant to which:  
Formally identical or formally different treatment shall be considered to be 
less favourable if it modifies the conditions of competition in favour of 
services or service suppliers of the Member compared to like services or 
service suppliers of any other Member.40  
Article XVII sets out the NT obligations under the GATS. The definition of less 
favourable treatment under Article XVII seems to be applicable to Article II since both 
MFN and NT underlie the same non-discrimination principle, which necessarily excludes 
any contradiction.     
Hence, the non-discrimination test is the assessment upon the modification of the 
conditions of competition in favour of one or more countries due to the adoption of a 
certain measure. In principle, pursuant to the Gas Directive all third countries operators 
are banned from controlling European TSOs.41 This seems to be coherent with the concept 
in which a member that bans trade with all foreign suppliers does not violate the MFN. 
However, even though no distinction is formally – de jure – made by the Gas Directive, 
its wording could hide a de facto discrimination.  
Indeed, as soon as a third country enters into an agreement in the energy field with the 
EU, its undertakings are eligible to obtain a waiver amounting to a more favourable 
treatment. Pursuant to Article II GATS, the favourable treatment towards the companies 
of one or more countries must be granted ‘unconditionally and immediately’ to the 
                                                   
40 Art XVII(3) GATS.  
 
41 Article 11 of the Gas Directive does not expressly make any distinction between the TSOs operating in 





undertakings of the other WTO Members. However, the Gas Directive dictates this could 
not be done because the steps to grant the certification to third countries’ companies last 
up to 10 months – irrespective of the immediateness requirement – and the process to go 
through is in any event subject to the conditions set out under Article 11, which, as seen, 
depend on the international relations between the relevant third country and the EU. 
A less favourite treatment could primarily arise in respect to the members of the European 
Energy Community, non-EU States which decided to liberalise their energy markets in 
accordance to the European unbundling rules. In case the certification required by the Gas 
Directive would be issued to any undertaking of these third States, Russia – which has no 
specific agreement in place with the EU on energy – or any other third country in the 
same position would be entitled to claim a breach of the MFN.  
In addition to the international agreements in place, the evaluation to be made by the 
competent national regulatory authority considers also the ‘circumstances of the case’. 
No rule has been set out to interpret this periphrasis, thus it is not guaranteed that the same 
balance will be used by the different national regulators throughout the Union. Hence, the 
two criteria laid down under Article 11 of the Gas Directive de facto result in a less 
favourable treatment of some WTO Member States.  
Moreover, even if there are no DSB precedents, it is reasonable to assume that Article II 
GATS also covers potential discrimination. This hypothesis analogically applies the same 
considerations seen above in case of MFN under the GATT.42 In this way, Russia and 
other ‘potentially disadvantaged’ countries could uphold the existence of a breach of the 
MFN by relying only on the wording of the Gas Directive.       
                                                   





In case of breach of Article II(1), the Member State concerned could rely on the provision 
of Article II(2) providing that ‘A Member may maintain a measure inconsistent with 
paragraph 1 provided that such a measure is listed in, and meets the conditions of, the 
Annex on Article II Exemptions’.43 This clause lays down an express derogation to MFN 
which applies also when the exceptions under Article XIV and XIV-bis are not 
applicable.44 However, since the EU has not listed any exception with regard to transport 
services via pipeline of petroleum and natural gas and services incidental to energy 
distribution in its WTO access schedules, it cannot rely on the application of Article II(2).  
3. National Treatment  
National Treatment (hereafter, ‘NT’) is with MFN one of the most important anti-
discrimination principles of WTO, present both under the GATT (Article III) and the 
GATS (Article XVII). What distinguishes NT from MFN is that while the latter focuses 
on the relationships between trading partners, the former prohibits discriminatory 
behaviours with domestic goods or services.45 Not only to de jure and actual 
                                                   
43 Article II(2) GATS. 
 
44 These are the general and security exceptions of the GATS, which we will analyse in sections 6 and 7 
below. Pursuant to the Annex on Exemptions, ‘The Council for Trade in Services shall review all 
exemptions granted for a period of more than 5 years. The first such review shall take place no more than 
5 years after the entry into force of the WTO Agreement. The Council for Trade in Services in a review 
shall: (a) examine whether the conditions which created the need for the exemption still prevail; and (b) 
determine the date of any further review. The exemption of a Member from its obligations under 
paragraph 1 of Article II of the Agreement with respect to a particular measure terminates on the date 
provided for in the exemption. In principle, such exemptions should not exceed a period of 10 years. In 
any event, they shall be subject to negotiation in subsequent trade liberalizing rounds. A Member shall 
notify the Council for Trade in Services at the termination of the exemption period that the inconsistent 
measure has been brought into conformity with paragraph 1 of Article II of the Agreement’.   
 
45 United States – Section 337 of the Tariff Act of 1930 and Amendments thereto – Report of the Panel 





discriminatory conducts, but also de facto and potential discrimination is prohibited under 
the NT principle.46  
Differently from the GATT, NT commitments under the GATS are applicable only 
insofar WTO members have positively accepted them for a well-determined sector or 
sub-sector of activity of their Schedules of Specific Commitments.47  
Object of this section is the assessment of the Gas Directive vis-à-vis the NT clauses of 
the GATT and of the GATS. 
3.1 National Treatment under the GATT  
Pursuant to Article III(1) GATT:  
The contracting parties recognize that internal taxes and other internal 
charges, and laws, regulations and requirements affecting the internal sale, 
offering for sale, purchase, transportation, distribution or use of products, and 
internal quantitative regulations requiring the mixture, processing or use of 
products in specified amounts or proportions should not be applied to 
                                                   
46 Dominican Republic – Measures Affecting the Importation and Internal Sale of Cigarettes – Report of 
the Appellate Body (25 April 2005) WT/DS302/AB/R [96]; United States – Measures Affecting the 
Production and Sale of Clove Cigarettes – Report of the Panel (2 September 2011) WT/DS406/R [7.261]. 
See Mitsuo Matsushita, Thomas J Schoenbaum and Petros C Mavroidis, The World Trade Organization: 
Law, Practice and Policy (OUP 2006) 157. 
 
47 The ‘specific commitments’ are included into tables published on the WTO website where MSs specify 
the limitations and the notes they have in relation to each sector and subsector of the W/120 classification. 
See Thomas Cottier, Sofya Matteotti-Berkutova and Olga Nartova, ‘Third Country Relations in EU 
Unbundling of Natural Gas Markets: The ‘Gazprom Clause’ of Directive 2009/73/EC and WTO Law’ 
(2010) NCCR Working Paper 6/2010, 10 <http://www.nccr-trade.org/publication/third-country-
relations-in-eu-unbundling-of-natural-gas-markets-the-gazprom-clause-of-directi/> last accessed 26 
August 2014. For an exhaustive explanation of the functioning of the Schedules of Specific Commitments 
see Simon Lester and Bryan Mercurio, World Trade Law: Text, Materials and Commentary (Hart 





imported or domestic products so as to afford protection to domestic 
production.48  
The content of paragraph 1 is developed in the following paragraphs of Article III. For 
the purpose of this thesis, we will analyse only NT in relation to regulations. Accordingly, 
Article III(4) reads:  
The products of the territory of any contracting party imported into the 
territory of any other contracting party shall be accorded treatment no less 
favourable than that accorded to like products of national origin in respect of 
all laws, regulations and requirements affecting their internal sale, offering 
for sale, purchase, transportation, distribution or use.  
WTO case-law has developed a three-fold test to assess the consistency of internal 
regulations with the NT clause of the GATT.49 According to the DSB it shall be assessed: 
1) whether the measure adopted by a WTO member can be considered as a law, regulation 
or requirement covered by Article III(4); 2) whether the imported and the domestic goods 
are ‘like products’; and 3) whether the adoption of the measure under investigation entails 
a ‘less favourable treatment’ of the imported products.50 
3.1.1 The Definition of Measure Covered by Article III GATT 
The first assessment of the test is rather straightforward. Article III(4) refers to ‘all laws, 
regulations and requirements affecting their internal sale, offering for sale, purchase, 
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49 Korea – Measures Affecting Imports of Fresh, Chilled and Frozen Beef – Report of the Appellate Body 
(11 December 2000) WT/DS161/AB/R [133]. 
 





transportation, distribution or use’.51 The broad interpretation of the wording of the clause 
made by the DSB,52 and the findings of the previous sections of this chapter,53 satisfy the 
first element of the test in case of the Gas Directive.  
3.1.2 The Likeness Test 
The likeness test echoes the one made above in case of MFN and it is based on the same 
criteria.54 An internal regulation affords protection to domestic production only if it 
addresses domestic and imported products that are in a competitive relationship. The 
evaluation upon likeness does not depend only on empirical evidence but also takes into 
account the hypothetical reactions of a reasonable consumer.55  
For the same reasoning made in paragraph 2.1.2 above, the likeness test of Article III 
GATT seems to be satisfied in case of the Gas Directive.56 All in all, we should bear in 
mind that the concept of ‘like product’ under Article III(4) has a ‘relatively broad scope’ 
and shall be extensively interpreted.57    
3.1.3 The Non-Discrimination Element 
                                                   
51 See also Italian Discrimination against Imported Agricultural Machineries – Report of the Panel (23 
October 1958) BISD 7S/60 [12]. 
 
52 United States — Tax Treatment for ‘Foreign Sales Corporations’ – Report of the Panel (8 October 
1999) WT/DS108/R [10.376]; Argentina — Measures Relating to Trade in Goods and Services – Report 
of the Panel (9 May 2016) WT/DS453/R [7.1015]. See also Gene Grossman, Henrik Horn and Petros 
Mavroidis, ‘The Legal and Economic Principles of World Trade Law’ (2012) IFN Working Paper 
917/2012, 70. 
 
53 See sections 2.1.1 and 2.1.4, where we analysed the text of the Gas Directive concerning transportation 
and distribution services. 
 
54 See section 2.1.2. 
 
55 Grossman, Horn and Mavroidis (n 52) 73. 
 
56 Petros Mavroidis, The General Agreement on Tariff and Trade: A Commentary (OUP 2005) 119. 
 





The third element of the NT test is the non-discrimination assessment of the imported 
products in comparison to the like domestic ones. In Korea-Various Measures of Beef the 
Appellate Body stated that, although formally non-discriminatory, a measure can still 
discriminate between like products when it modifies the conditions of competition to the 
detriment of the imported products.58  
The Appellate Body subsequently modified its opinion in Dominican Republic – Import 
and Sale of Cigarettes, upholding that:  
The existence of a detrimental effect … resulting from a measure does not 
necessarily imply that this measure accords less favourable treatment to 
imports if the detrimental effect is explained by factors or circumstances 
unrelated to the foreign origin of the product, such as the market share of the 
importer.59  
The two reports above adopted a radically different view on the matter. In Korea-Various 
Measures of Beef the Appellate Body stated that a measure that operates to the detriment 
of imported goods is always in breach of Article III(4).60 This is not necessarily the case 
                                                   
58  In the opinion of the Appellate Body: ‘A formal difference in treatment between imported and like 
domestic products is thus neither necessary, nor sufficient, to show a violation of Article III(4). Whether 
or not imported products are treated ‘less favourably’ than like domestic products should be assessed 
instead by examining whether a measure modifies the conditions of competition in the relevant market to 
the detriment of imported products’. See Korea – Measures Affecting Imports of Fresh, Chilled and 
Frozen Beef (n 49) [137]. In that case, the Appellate Body reversed the Panel decision whereby ‘any 
regulatory distinction that is based exclusively on criteria relating to the nationality or the origin of the 
products is incompatible with Article III(4) of the GATT 1994’. See Korea – Measures Affecting Imports 
of Fresh, Chilled and Frozen Beef – Report of the Panel (31 July 2001) WT/DS161/R [627].  
 
59 Dominican Republic – Measures Affecting the Importation and Internal Sale of Cigarettes – Report of 
the Appellate Body (25 April 2005) WT/DS302/AB/R [96]. 
 





adopting the Dominican Republic – Import and Sale of Cigarettes approach, whereby a 
measure is illegal only if it discriminates on the basis of the origin of the products.61  
More recent rulings show that the DSB has not taken a definitive position on the matter. 
For example, in Thailand-Cigarettes, the Appellate Body relied on the precedent Korea-
Various Measures of Beef, rejecting the complaint of Thailand which, in accordance to 
the principle underlying Dominican Republic - Import and Sale of Cigarettes, argued that 
the measures at issue were not origin-based and therefore were consistent with Article 
III(4) GATT.62 Only one month later, in US-Clove Cigarettes the Panel took a step back 
and interpreted Article III(4) in reference to the view expressed in Dominican Republic – 
Import and Sale of Cigarettes.63  
In 2014, the Appellate Body intervened again on the matter in the EC – Seal Products 
case, dealing with a legislative scheme adopted by the EU to prohibit the importation and 
marketing of seal products. In this case, the Appellate Body supported the view of Korea-
Various Measures of Beef, upholding that under Articles I and III GATT the key issue is 
whether a measure has a detrimental impact on the competitive opportunities of the 
imported products.64    
In sum, it seems that Article III(4) GATT allows distinctions to be drawn, provided that 
such distinctions do not modify the conditions of competition between imported and like 
domestic products, irrespective of whether the measure under investigation has actually 
                                                   
61 Grossman, Horn and Mavroidis (n 52) 70. 
 
62 Thailand – Customs and Fiscal Measures on Cigarettes from the Philippines (n 35). 
 
63 United States – Measures Affecting the Production and Sale of Clove Cigarettes – Report of the Panel 
(2 September 2011) WT/DS406/R [7.268 - 7.269].  
 
64 European Communities – Seal Products (n 24) [5.94; 5.105; 5.110]. See Michael Ming Du, ‘‘Treatment 
No Less Favorable’ and the Future of National Treatment Obligation in GATT Article III:4 after EC–





produced a harmful trade effect on the imported goods.65 We can start from this 
assumption to assess the Gas Directive vis-à-vis Article III GATT. 
For our purposes, the analysis of the Panel findings in Canada – Wheat Exports and Grain 
Imports is relevant because the measure under investigation had some points in common 
with the Gas Directive.66 The decision of the Panel on Article III(4) has not been appealed, 
and therefore we can consider it as accepted by the parties. The case was about a Canadian 
act (the ‘Canada Grain Act’) requiring an authorisation by a national agency (the ‘CGC’) 
as a condition to import foreign grain into the country. Section 57(c) of the Canada Grain 
Act distinguished between Canadian grain and foreign grain, but it did not impose any 
less favourable treatment on foreign grain. Moreover, Section 57(c) did not set out neither 
the criteria to be used by the CGC for granting the authorisation (leaving full discretion 
to the agency), nor the rules to be followed for foreign companies’ application.  
In Canada – Wheat Exports and Grain Imports, the Panel followed the Korea – Various 
Measures of Beef approach stating that ‘by imposing a requirement on foreign grain which 
is not applicable to like domestic grain, Section 57(c), on its face, treats imported grain 
less favourably than like domestic grain’.67  
The Panel adopted a strict view on the less favourable treatment issue, arguing that the 
simple request for an extra requirement is sufficient to discriminate between domestic 
and imported products, even though ‘the requirement in question may not be very onerous 
                                                   
65 Grossman, Horn and Mavroidis (n 52) 80. Japan – Taxes on Alcoholic Beverages – Report of the 
Appellate Body (4 October 1996) WT/DS8/AB/R [16] and United States – Tax Treatment for ‘Foreign 
Sales Corporations’ – Report of the Appellate Body (14 January 2002) WT/DS108/AB/R [215]. 
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in commercial and/or practical terms’.68 In the opinion of the Panel, the past attitude of 
the issuing authority and the simplicity of the application are not sufficient grounds to 
avoid discrimination.69 In fact, the Panel did not ‘consider that the less favourable 
treatment […] is removed merely because authorisation under that section may have been 
consistently granted’.70 
In our case, the Gas Directive does not exempt European TSOs from being certified under 
Article 10 to operate in the internal market. However, Article 11 sets out a more 
burdensome certification process for the TSOs controlled by third country companies 
which could amount to a less favourable treatment of foreign undertakings in the meaning 
of Canada – Wheat Exports and Grain Imports.  
3.2 National Treatment under the GATS  
Pursuant to Article XVII(1) GATS: 
In the sectors inscribed in its Schedule, and subject to any conditions and 
qualifications set out therein, each Member shall accord to services and 
service suppliers of any other Member, in respect of all measures affecting 
the supply of services, treatment no less favourable than that it accords to its 
own like services and service suppliers. 
In addition to that, paragraph 3 specifies that:  
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formally identical or formally different treatment shall be considered to be 
less favourable if it modifies the conditions of competition in favour of 
services or service suppliers of the Member compared to like services or 
service suppliers of any other Member. 
In EC-Bananas III the dispute settlement body formulated a three-tier test to assess a 
breach of the NT under the GATS.71 Accordingly, we should evaluate 1) whether a 
country has undertaken specific commitments in the relevant sector or mode of supply; 
2) whether the measure at issue is a measure affecting trade in the relevant sector or mode 
of supply; and 3) whether the measure adopted accords to the services or to the service 
suppliers of any other Member a less favourable treatment than it accords to the national 
‘like services’ or ‘like service suppliers’.72 This last point requires the analysis both of 
the ‘likeness’ and of the ‘less favourable treatment’ elements. 
3.2.1 Specific Commitments under the GATS 
Turning to point 1 of the three-tier test, the EU’s schedules do not include any service 
related to gas transmission into the ‘positive list’ of commitments.73 This should support 
the non-applicability of the NT principle to the case at issue. However, the position of 
three EU countries is likely to cause problems.74  
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73 See World Trade Organization, ‘The European Union and the WTO’ (2017) 
<https://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/countries_e/european_communities_e.htm> accessed 31 July 
2017. 
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Hungary, Lithuania and Croatia made specific commitments in their WTO access 
schedules in relation to transport services via pipeline or petroleum and natural gas and 
services incidental to energy distribution.75 The difference between the commitments 
made by these countries and the ones made by the EU could be problematic. On the one 
hand, these countries are obliged to implement the Gas Directive in their territory in 
accordance with EU law, as they already did.76 On the other hand, they have to abide by 
the rules of the WTO, because EU Members are parties to the WTO both separately and 
together with the EU. Therefore, Hungary, Lithuania and Croatia could be held 
responsible before a WTO Panel for the breach of NT under the GATS. In view of that, 
it is useful to carry on our analysis and determine whether the provisions of the Gas 
Directive comply with NT under the GATS.   
3.2.2 The Definition of ‘Measure Affecting Trade in Services’ 
The second element required by the DSB test is the analysis of whether the measure under 
investigation affects trade in services. For the reasons mentioned in paragraph 2.2.1 
above, the Gas Directive satisfies this requirement. 
3.2.3 Likeness and Non-Discrimination Tests   
                                                   
75 See World Trade Organization, ‘Hungary – Schedule of Specific Commitments, GATS/SC/40’ (1994) 
<http://www.esf.be/pdfs/GATS%20UR%20Commitments/Hungary%20-%20UR%20Schedule%20of% 
20commitment.pdf> accessed 31 July 2017; World Trade Organization, ‘Lithuania – Schedule of Specific 
Commitments, GATS/SC/133’ (2001) <https://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/countries_e/lithuania_e. 
htm> accessed 31 July 2017; World Trade Organization, ‘Croatia – Schedule of Specific Commitments, 
GATS/SC/130’ (2000) <https://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/countries_e/croatia_e.htm> accessed 31 
July 2017. 
 
76 According to the European Commission’s website, Hungary, Croatia and Lithuania have implemented 
the Gas Directive. See European Commission, ‘National Transposition’ (2017) <https://eur-





The last element of the NT test requires the analysis of the ‘likeness’ of the service or of 
the service suppliers concerned and the investigation upon discrimination.  
In China-Electronic Payment the Appellate Body established that the ‘core’ of ‘likeness’ 
analysis is ‘the competitive relationship of the services being compared’.77 In this respect, 
as seen for Article II GATS, it is likely that the gas transportation companies targeted by 
the Gas Directive can be considered as like entities.78  
As mentioned above, ‘less favourable treatment’ is defined under Article XVII GATS as 
the different treatment derived from the modification of the conditions of competitions in 
favour of services or service suppliers of a WTO Member in comparison of services or 
service suppliers of the other WTO Members. The less favourable treatment can derive 
from de facto discriminatory conducts.79 The jurisprudence on Canada – Wheat Exports 
and Grain Imports, described in section 3.1 above, can be used in this context.80 
Accordingly, the simple request for an extra requirement to be certified and operate in a 
market, in our case the European energy market, would influence the conditions of 
competition of the services or of the service providers concerned. In our case, even if the 
Gas Directive requires all undertakings willing to operate as TSOs in the EU to be 
authorised by the relevant national regulatory authority (‘NRA’), this path is more 
‘onerous in commercial and/or practical terms’ for third countries’ entities.81  
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78 See section 2.2.2. 
 
79 See section 3.2. 
 
80 See section 3.1.2. 
 





In the light of the above, it seems that the Gas Directive leads to the less favourable 
treatment of foreign service suppliers in comparison to domestic ones.  
4. Quantitative Restrictions    
Quantitative restrictions (hereafter, ‘QR’) are dealt with by Article XI GATT. The 
prohibition of quantitative restrictions differs from national treatment, because this latter 
focuses only on the internal requirements that apply to products once they have cleared 
customs.82  
Article XI(1) GATT lists four types of quantitative restrictions. First, a quantitative 
restriction is detected whenever a measure adopted by a WTO member entails a 
prohibition or a ban of a product. This could be absolute, applying in any circumstance, 
or conditional, triggered only when certain conditions are fulfilled.83 Second, GATT 
prohibits measures imposing a quota on the importation or on the exportation of certain 
products. This type of restriction can be global (i.e. towards every country), limited to 
certain geographical areas, or even bilateral, towards one State only. Third, quantitative 
restrictions could derive from the application of an import/export licensing system. Last, 
Article XI GATT lays down a catch-all clause which includes all the ‘other measures’ 
whose application restricts trade. 
As for the other provisions of the GATT, Article XI should be interpreted broadly and 
extends to all measures ‘irrespective of their legal status’.84 The scope of the term 
‘restriction’ is also broad, meaning ‘a limitation on action, a limiting condition or 
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regulation’,85 which can be both de jure and de facto.86 It is sufficient that a measure 
affects the opportunities for importation of a good to breach Article XI.87  
The prohibition of QR set out under paragraph 1 is not absolute. WTO Members can 
derogate from it in the cases outlined in paragraph 2.88 In any event, the eventual 
quantitative restrictions set out shall be administered in a non-discriminative manner.89  
In India – Measures Affecting the Automotive Sector, the Panel set out a three-tier test to 
assess the compliance of a regulation with Article XI(1) GATT. Accordingly, it shall be 
verified whether the measure under investigation: (i) is a government ‘measure’; (ii) is 
different from a ‘duty, tax or other charge’ and falls within the definition of quotas, 
licences or other measures; and (iii) ‘restricts’ the importation of a good.90   
As for the first element of the test set out in India – Measures Affecting the Automotive 
Sector, the Gas Directive certainly falls within the scope of the term ‘measure’.91 Besides, 
                                                   
85 World Trade Organization, Dispute Settlement Reports 2009: Volume 6, Pages 2533-2908 (CUP 2009) 
2731. 
 
86 European Economic Community – Payments and Subsidies Paid to Processors and Producers of 
Oilseeds and Related Animal-Feed Proteins – Report of the Panel (25 January 1990) BISD 37S/86 [150]; 
Argentina – Measures Affecting the Export of Bovine Hides and the Import of Finished Leather – Report 
of the Panel (19 December 2000) WT/DS155/R [11.17]. 
 
87 Dominican Republic – Sale of Cigarettes (n 59) [7.261]. 
 
88  These cases are: (a) export prohibitions or restrictions temporarily applied to prevent or relieve critical 
shortages of foodstuffs or other products essential to the exporting contracting party; (b) import and export 
prohibitions or restrictions necessary to the application of standards or regulations for the classification, 
grading or marketing of commodities in international trade; (c) import restrictions on any agricultural or 
fisheries product, imported in any form, necessary to the enforcement of governmental measures which 
operate. The Gas Directive does not fall within any of the cases above.  
 
89 Simon Lester, Bryan Mercurio and Arwel Davies, World Trade Law: Text, Materials and Commentary 
(2nd edn, Hart Publishing 2012).  
 
90 India – Measures Affecting the Automotive Sector – Report of the Panel (21 December 2001) 
WT/DS146/R [4.119]. In India – Automotive Sector the Panel summarised in three points the test 
previously set out in Japan – Trade in Semi-Conductors – Report of the Panel (24 May 1988) BISD 
35S/116 [104-123]. 
 





as regards item (ii), the Gas Directive does not ‘take the form of duties, taxes or other 
charges’.    
Focusing on the positive list of measures referred to under the second element of the test, 
quantitative restrictions shall be made effective through quotas, import/export licences or 
other measures which potentially affect the opportunities for importation of natural gas.   
There are few WTO cases dealing with import quotas.92 These refer to measures 
expressed quantitatively that differ from the Gas Directive since they impose direct or 
indirect caps on the importation of a product.  
As regards to import-licenses (the only type of licence which could be applied to the case 
at issue), these are defined under Article 1 of the Agreement on Import Licensing 
Procedures as: ‘administrative procedure[s] requiring the submission of an application 
[…] to the relevant administrative body as a prior condition for importation in the customs 
territory of the importing member’. As seen above, even though the Gas Directive does 
not directly regulate natural gas as a good, it could have a potential impact on its 
importation from non-EU countries.93 Therefore, the certification process set out under 
the Gas Directive could fall within the import-licence category. 
The ‘other measures’ of Article XI have been interpreted in Colombia – Ports of Entry as 
a residual category that may take any form.94 These measures have been identified in case 
                                                   
92 France - Import restrictions - Report of the Panel (14 November 1962) BISD 11S/94; Japan —
Restrictions on Imports of Certain Agricultural Products – Report of the Panel (2 March 1988) 
BISD 35S/163; United States - Restrictions on Imports of Sugar United – Report of the Panel (22 June 
1989) BISD 36S/331. 
 
93 See section 2.1.4. 
 
94 Colombia - Indicative Prices and Restrictions on Ports of Entry – Report of the Panel (27 April 2009) 
WT/DS366/R [7.227]. The same interpretation of the expression ‘other measures’ has been reiterated in 
Argentina-Measures Affecting the Importation of Goods. See Argentina – Measures Affecting the 
Importation of Goods – Report of the Panel (22 August 2014) WT/DS438/R [6.248]. See also Trebilcock, 




of import or export prohibitions,95 import/export minimum price systems,96 state-trading 
operations,97 and import/export restrictions.98 Considering the broad interpretation of the 
expression adopted by the DSB and its all-encompassing nature, the Gas Directive could 
also fall within the ‘other measures’ of Article XI GATT.   
The third element of the test outlined in India – Measures Affecting the Automotive Sector 
requires the investigation over the existence of an import restriction. This could be actual 
as well as potential, both de jure and de facto.99 In Colombia – Ports of Entry the Panel 
stated that the design, the structure and the architecture of a measure are sufficient to 
breach Article XI.100 In the Panel’s view, ‘measures which create uncertainties and affect 
investment plans, restrict market access for imports or make importation prohibitively 
costly’ fall under the scope of Article XI.101 This confirmed the views expressed by 
previous Panels which outlawed measures having implications on the competitive 
situation of an importer.102 In particular, in India-Automotive the Panel identified a 
quantitative restriction in the case of products allowed into the market under certain 
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conditions which made the importation more onerous, generating a disincentive to invest, 
without the need to set a cap on imports.103 The same Panel, recalling the Japan-
Semiconductors ruling, stated that a non-automatic licensing procedure – such as the Gas 
Directive – constitutes a restriction on the importation prohibited under Article XI.104  
In light of the foregoing, the Gas Directive could restrict natural gas trade in the meaning 
of Article XI GATT.   
5. Market Access Barriers to Services   
Market access barriers to services are dealt with under Article XVI(1) GATS. 
Accordingly:  
With respect to market access through the modes of supply identified in 
Article I, each Member shall accord services and service suppliers of any 
other Member treatment no less favourable than that provided for under the 
terms, limitations and conditions agreed and specified in its Schedule. 
WTO case-law did not set out any test applicable in the case of Article XVI. Therefore, 
we can apply by analogy the criteria outlined by the DSB to similar circumstances.105  
As for the NT obligations, market access rules under the GATS depend only on the 
commitments made by the single countries in their Schedules of Specific 
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Commitments.106 These represent a minimum standard of openness WTO members have 
to guarantee. However, unlike NT, market access prohibits only a limited number of 
conducts listed under Article XVI(2).107 
Market access under the GATS covers both discriminatory and non-discriminatory 
conducts that restrict trade in services.108 Differently from Article XI GATT, not every 
limitation listed under Article XVI is quantitative.109 However, as for quantitative 
limitations, market access barriers do not only refer to measures that set out numerical 
quotas but also to those that cover actions that have a similar effect to a numerical quota.   
As for NT under the GATS, the European Union did not set out any market access 
commitment in relation to (i) services incidental to mining, rendered on a fee or contract 
basis at oil and gas fields; (ii) services incidental to energy distribution; or (iii) 
transportation via pipeline of crude or refined petroleum and petroleum products and of 
natural gas.110 These are the only schedules of the GATS dealing with energy 
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transportation. Therefore, in principle the EU does not have the obligation to guarantee 
any market access standard to third countries’ undertakings willing to invest in European 
TSOs. However, for the same reasons outlined in the NT section, the position of Hungary, 
Lithuania and Croatia is likely to cause problems. These countries made commitments 
under items (ii) and (iii) above. If the Gas Directive was in breach of the market access 
rules, its implementation in Hungary, Lithuania and Croatia would violate the three 
countries’ obligations under the GATS. For this reason, we will assess the Gas Directive 
vis-à-vis Article XVI GATS, in particular against letters a), e) and f) of Article XVI(2). 
These are the most relevant clauses applicable to the case at hand.  
5.1 Article XVI(2)(a) 
As mentioned in previous sections, the Gas Directive impacts on ‘service suppliers’ 
within the meaning of the GATS.111 Pursuant to Article XVI(2) a service suppliers’ 
limitation could be achieved in different ways. Letter (a) indicates the adoption of 
numerical quotas, monopolies, the presence of exclusive service suppliers and the request 
for an economic needs test.112 For our purposes, the most relevant option to be 
investigated is numerical quotas.   
In China – Electronic Payment Services the Panel stressed that, when assessing the 
consistency of a measure with Article XVI(2)(a) of the GATS, the focus must be on 
whether the measure at issue ‘constitute[s] a limitation that is numerical and quantitative 
                                                   
 
111 See sections 2.2 (on MFN) and 3.2 (on NT). 
 
112 United Nations Conference on Trade and Development, ‘Lists of Economic Needs Tests in the GATS 
Schedules of Specific Commitments’ (1999) <http://unctad.org/en/docs/poitcdtsbd8.pdf> accessed 31 





in nature’ or acts ‘as a quota would do’, and not on whether it ‘formally or explicitly 
institute[s] a monopoly or an exclusive service supplier’.113  
Similarly, in US-Gambling the Panel stated that ‘a measure that is not expressed in the 
form of a numerical quota or economic needs test may still fall within the scope of Article 
XVI(2)(a)’.114 The case dealt with a US government’s provision which prohibited the 
cross-border supply of gambling services. This was interpreted by the Appellate Body as 
de facto being a quantitative restriction – leading to a zero quota – and thus numerical in 
nature, even if the American legislator did not set out any express limitation in number 
or percentage.115   
In principle, the Gas Directive seems to have different characteristics from those outlined 
in US-Gambling. In fact, it neither imposes a blank prohibition nor it sets out a well-
determined number of foreign service suppliers authorised to operate in Europe. 
Therefore, it leads neither to a zero quota nor to a precise numerical limitation of the 
service suppliers. A different interpretation would stretch the wording of the clause 
beyond recognition.  
Similarly, the possibility of choosing one out of three different unbundling models is not 
an issue under the GATS. No WTO rule sanctions the disadvantage put on undertakings 
due to the adoption of an internal measure that does not discriminate between the 
regulated subjects. In the light of the above, the Gas Directive seems to comply with 
Article XVI(2)(a) of the GATS.   
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5.2 Article XVI(2)(e) 
As regards letter e),116 the Gas Directive does not impose the adoption of any kind of legal 
entities to operate in the internal market,117 nor it expressly requires the setup of joint 
ventures to provide transportation services. However, as seen in chapter II, Article 11 of 
the Gas Directive de facto demands third countries’ suppliers and producers to participate 
with other entities in EU TSOs to comply with the EU unbundling rules.118 A previous 
experience in the natural gas field is not a mandatory requirement to participate in 
European TSOs: even institutional or private investors could set up transportation 
companies with third countries’ entities.  
The GATS does not outline any definition of ‘joint venture’. This can be defined as ‘a 
business arrangement in which two or more parties agree to pool their resources for the 
purpose of accomplishing a specific task. This task can be a new project or any other 
business activity’. 119 Accordingly, the construction and/or the management of a TSO 
could fall within the definition of joint venture, since Article 11 requires the agreement 
of the third country supplier/producer with at least another company which could control 
                                                   
116 For the text of the provision refer to footnote 107.  
 
117 The term ‘legal entity’ is not defined in the GATS. According to the Oxford English Dictionary, an 
‘entity’ is defined as ‘[e]xistence, being, as opposed to non-existence; the existence of a thing as opposed 
to its qualities or relations’ or ‘an organisation (as a business or governmental unit) that has an identity 
separate from those of its members’.  The term ‘legal’ means ‘[o]f or pertaining to law; falling within the 
province of law’. Continuing our textual analysis with the phrase ‘specific types of’ which precedes the 
phrase ‘legal entity’, the adjective ‘specific’ means ‘[c]learly or explicitly defined; precise, exact; 
definite’. The noun ‘type’ is defined as ‘[a] class of people or things distinguished by common essential 
characteristics; a kind, a sort’. Hence, based on the ordinary meaning of relevant terms, Article XVI(2)(e) 
appears to cover measures which restrict or require clearly defined kinds of organisation falling within 
the province of law. 
 
118 See chapter II, section 4. 
 
119 Investopedia defines a Joint Venture as a business arrangement in which two or more parties agree to 
pool their resources for the purpose of accomplishing a specific task. This task can be a new project or 
any other business activity. In a joint venture, each of the participants is responsible for profits, losses and 
costs associated with it. However, the venture is its own entity, separate and apart from the participants' 
other business interests’. Source: Investopedia, ‘Joint Venture’ (2015) <https://www.investopedia.com/ 





the relevant TSO in the meaning of the EU Merger Regulation.120 Under the Gas 
Directive, a joint venture can refer to a new project, for example the construction of new 
interconnectors (for which ownership unbundling is mandatory),121 or to ‘any other 
business activity’ (for which States can choose one of three unbundling models).  
The interpretation of the Gas Directive as de facto requiring non-EU entities to set up a 
joint venture is in line with the broad meaning WTO case-law tends to give to the clauses 
of WTO agreements.122 Normally, the requirement to set up a joint venture to enter a 
market reflects the need of the regulatory authority to foster the transfer of technology 
and know-how to domestic companies.123 This is not the case under the Gas Directive. 
The reason to impose the adoption of a joint venture is the need to enhance competition 
in the internal market by decreasing the negative effects caused by the dominance of third 
countries’ suppliers. Article XVI does not outline any exception to the prohibition to 
invest through joint ventures. Hence, the Gas Directive seems to breach Article XVI(2)(e) 
GATS.       
5.3 Article XVI(2)(f) 
Article XVI(2)(f) GATS prohibits limitations on the participation of foreign capital in 
terms of maximum percentage limits on foreign shareholding or of the total value of 
individual or aggregate foreign investments.124 As an example of the measures covered 
                                                   
120 Council Regulation (EC) 139/2004 on the Control of Concentrations between Undertakings (Merger 
Regulation) [2004] OJ L24/1, Article 3(1). 
 
121 See chapter II, section 2. 
 
122 We have already seen in sections 3.1.2 and 4 of this chapter that the WTO adjudicative body tends to 
interpret the wording of the WTO agreements very broadly.   
 
123 Rüdiger Wolfrum and Peter-Tobias Stoll, WTO – Trade in Services (2008 Martinus Nijhoff Publishers) 
388. 
 
124 China – Measures Affecting Trading Rights and Distribution Services for Certain Publications and 




under letter f), the 2001 Scheduling Guidelines include provisions imposing a percentage 
cap on the corporate capital of the invested company.125 No other indication is given about 
the other forms of limitation on foreign equity participation and no Panel has ever tackled 
this issue so far.  
The Gas Directive uses the definition of control under the Merger Regulation to regulate 
the application of the unbundling rules. Accordingly, ‘control’ generally relates to the 
exercise of a decisive influence on the decisions of a company.126 This is not always 
expressed in terms of equity percentage and it could derive also from what has been 
agreed on in the articles of incorporation and in the by-laws of the company. Even if 
control can derive from situations which do not relate to equity participation, this is the 
first index to be examined. Indeed, no majority shareholder would leave its company in 
the hands of the administrators representing the minority, relinquishing its property rights 
over the company owned. The possibility to exercise a decisive influence through means 
other than equity participation, such as veto rights, is usually limited to well-determined 
issues to be agreed on by the shareholders – e.g. decisions exceeding the ordinary 
administration – and can derive from the participation of State-controlled entities to the 
corporate capital of the invested company.127  
On the basis of the definition laid down under the Merger Regulation, there can be more 
than one entity exercising the control over a company at the same time. For example, 
company A could exercise control over Company B through veto rights, while company 
                                                   
 
125 World Trade Organization, ‘Guidelines for the Scheduling of Specific Commitments under the General 
Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS)’ (2001) 5 <https://i-tip.wto.org/services/> last access 9 April 
2015. 
 
126 Merger Regulation (n 120) 3. 
 
127 See Case C-58/99 Commission of the European Communities v Italian Republic. - Privatisation of 





C could control B by virtue of equity participation.128 Notably, in case of public 
companies – a category which typically includes natural gas TSOs – a small equity 
participation can lead to the control when the rest of the shares are spread over a great 
number of small shareholders.  
Hence, we cannot refer to predetermined caps in relation to the whole corporate capital 
of the undertakings concerned to identify a limitation on foreign equity participation 
under the Gas Directive. However, despite the DSB did not expressly rule on the matter, 
Article XVI(2)(f) GATS should be applicable also to this case. This is justified by 
reasoning made by the Appellate Body in US-Gambling, where it found that a measure 
not expressed in numerical form could de facto lead to practical results similar to the ones 
covered by Article XVI.129  
Turning to the text of Article XVI(2)(f) we observe that the ‘capital’, the participation of 
which is subject to a limitation is preceded by the word ‘foreign’. Moreover, the two 
forms which a measure falling under this provision may take are also qualified by the 
word ‘foreign’ (‘foreign share-holding’ and ‘foreign investment’). Consistent with the 
principle of effective treaty interpretation, the word ‘foreign’, which is used three times 
in Article XVI(2)(f), must be given meaning and effect. 
The ordinary meaning of ‘foreign’ is ‘[b]elonging to, coming from, or characteristic of, 
another country or nation’.130 The ordinary meaning of the word ‘foreign’ indicates that 
                                                   
128 According to the European Commission ‘Article 3(1)(b) provides that a concentration occurs in the 
case of an acquisition of control. Such control may be acquired by one undertaking acting alone or by 
several undertakings acting jointly’. See: European Commission, ‘Commission Consolidated 
Jurisdictional Notice under Council Regulation (EC) No 139/2004 on the Control of Concentrations 
Between Undertakings’ (2008) 5 <http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri 
=OJ:C:2008:095:0001:0048:EN:PDF> last access 9 April 2017. 
 
129 US – Gambling (n 108) [238-251]. In para 227 of the same decision, the Appellate Body extended the 
applicability of Article XVI to de facto measures. 
 




Article XVI(2)(f) covers limitations on the participation of capital ‘belonging to’, or 
‘coming from’ another country or nation. Similarly, the share-holding whose maximum 
percentage level may be limited, as well as the individual or aggregate investment whose 
total value may also be limited within the meaning of Article XVI:2(f) ‘belongs to’ or 
‘comes from’ another country or nation.  
Hence, Article XVI(2)(f) does not cover origin-neutral limitations, i.e. those measures 
applying without distinction to foreign and domestic capital participation are not covered 
by this provision. Under this perspective, the unbundling provisions of Article 9 of the 
Gas Directive equally apply to domestic and foreign undertakings, prohibiting both EU 
and extra-EU producers and suppliers from controlling EU TSOs. Once a Member States 
transposes the Gas Directive in its territory, the unbundling regime chosen equally applies 
to domestic and foreign companies operating in the country.  
For the reasons above, the Gas Directive does not seem to breach Article XVI(2)(f) 
GATS.  
6. General Exceptions    
This section addresses the possibility to apply the ‘general exceptions’ included under the 
GATT (Article XX) and the GATS (Article XIV) to justify the breaches of the WTO rules 
made by the Gas Directive we outlined in the previous sections of this chapter. We will 
assess letter d) to Article XX and letters a) and c) to Article XIV, since these are the only 
clauses which could be relevant for our purposes.131  
                                                   
131 Pursuant to Article XX GATT: ‘Subject to the requirement that such measures are not applied in a 
manner which would constitute a means of arbitrary or unjustifiable discrimination between countries 
where the same conditions prevail, or a disguised restriction on international trade, nothing in this 
Agreement shall be construed to prevent the adoption or enforcement by any contracting party of 
measures: (d) necessary to secure compliance with laws or regulations which are not inconsistent with 




The Appellate Body determined the applicability of Article XX case-law for the 
interpretation of Article XIV GATS because of the ‘similar language used in both 
provisions, notably the term ‘necessary’ and the requirements set out in their respective 
chapeau’.132 The chapeau comes into play only when a measure inconsistent with one of 
the two agreements falls within one of the cases listed under the general exceptions.133  
We will start with the analysis of Article XIV(a) GATS. Afterwards, Article XX(d) 
GATT and Article XIV(c) GATS will be analysed jointly, because of their similar 
wording.134 
6.1 Compliance with Article XIV(a) GATS  
Article XIV(a) demands that the measure under investigation shall be necessary for the 
protection of the public morals or the maintenance of public order.135 The necessity of the 
                                                   
monopolies operated under paragraph 4 of Article II and Article XVII, the protection of patents, 
trademarks and copyrights, and the prevention of deceptive practices’. Pursuant to article XIV GATS:’ 
Subject to the requirement that such measures are not applied in a manner which would constitute a means 
of arbitrary or unjustifiable discrimination between countries where like conditions prevail, or a disguised 
restriction on trade in services, nothing in this Agreement shall be construed to prevent the adoption or 
enforcement by any Member of measures: (a)  necessary to protect public morals or to maintain public 
order; (c) necessary to secure compliance with laws or regulations which are not inconsistent with the 
provisions of this Agreement including those relating to: (i) the prevention of deceptive and fraudulent 
practices or to deal with the effects of a default on services contracts; (ii) the protection of the privacy of 
individuals in relation to the processing and dissemination of personal data and the protection of 
confidentiality of individual records and accounts; (iii) safety. 
 
132 US — Gambling (n 108) [291], pursuant to which ‘Both of these provisions [Articles XX GATT and 
XIV GATS] affirm the right of Members to pursue objectives identified in the paragraphs of these 
provisions even if, in doing so, Members act inconsistently with obligations set out in other provisions of 
the respective agreements, provided that all of the conditions set out therein are satisfied. Similar language 
is used in both provisions, notably the term ‘necessary’ and the requirements set out in their respective 
chapeaux. Accordingly, like the Panel, we find previous decisions under Article XX of the GATT 1994 
relevant for our analysis under Article XIV of the GATS’. 
 
133 United States — Standards for Reformulated and Conventional Gasoline – Report of the Appellate 
Body (29 April 1996) WT/DS2/AB/R [22]. 
 
134 Both agreements allow contracting parties to adopt measures ‘necessary to secure compliance with 
laws or regulations which are not inconsistent with the provisions of this Agreement [at issue]’. 
 
135 United States – Measures Affecting the Cross-Border Supply of Gambling and Betting Services – 





measure taken, element in common with Articles XIV(c) GATS and XX(d) GATT, will 
be analysed in section 6.3 below. In this section, we will focus on the other aspects of 
Article XIV(a) and, specifically, on the definition of ‘public order’. We will leave apart 
the expression ‘public moral’, which does not seem to be a pertinent element in the case 
at hand. 
The Appellate Body in US — Gambling took the same view of the Panel, which concluded 
that the expression ‘public order’, combined with footnote 5 of Article XIV(a) ‘refers to 
the preservation of the fundamental interests of a society, as reflected in public policy and 
law. These fundamental interests can relate, inter alia, to standards of law, security and 
morality’.136 
In the case under consideration, the first element to be assessed is whether the provisions 
of the Gas Directive breaching the GATS can be justified on the basis of a social interest 
and, in particular, under a ‘standard of security’. This is quite an ambiguous formulation. 
However, considering the strategic importance of the field, it is likely that the notion of 
public order as a security standard includes the safeguard of EU security of supply.137 
Moreover, the Appellate Body used the periphrasis ‘inter alia’, meaning that the 
fundamental interests of the society reported are not to be intended as an exclusive list. 
For these reasons, we can conclude that the EU could easily justify the application of the 
Gas Directive as a measure aimed at maintaining the public order. In the legal doctrine, 
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only where a genuine and sufficiently serious threat is posed to one of the fundamental interests of 
society’.  
  
137 Please refer to Section 7 of this chapter where we illustrate the security reasons underlying the adoption 





the interpretation of ‘public order’ as potentially covering the access to essential facilities 
– such as gas pipelines – is supported by Cottier.138  
In addition to the above, we shall examine whether trade in transportation services impairs 
or jeopardizes the achievement of the policy objective at stake, in compliance with 
footnote 5 which requires to identify a ‘genuine and sufficiently serious threat’.139 This 
shall be distinguished from the Member’s right to determine its own level of protection 
(e.g. zero-risk level), which primarily relates to the adequacy of a given measure in 
relation to the level of protection chosen by the WTO Member adopting it.140 
The standard for determining whether a threat is ‘genuine and sufficiently serious’ has 
not been explicitly addressed so far. In light of this, we consider it useful to begin with 
some general considerations regarding the interpretation of these terms, following the 
principles of treaty interpretation in Article 31 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of 
Treaties. We begin by noting that the term ‘threat’ is defined in the Shorter Oxford 
English Dictionary as ‘an indication of the approach of something unwelcome or 
undesirable; a person or thing regarded as a likely cause of harm’.141 With respect to the 
meaning of a ‘sufficiently serious’ threat, we note that the term ‘sufficiently’ is defined 
in the Shorter Oxford English Dictionary as ‘in a sufficient manner; adequately, 
satisfactory, enough’,142 whereas the term ‘serious’ is defined as ‘[i]mportant, grave; 
having (potentially) important, esp. undesired, consequences; giving cause for concern; 
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of significant degree or amount; worthy of consideration’.143 In this light, for a threat to 
be considered sufficiently serious within the meaning of footnote 5, the potential 
consequences or effects on the fundamental interest of society must be of a certain 
magnitude or gravity. As for the meaning of a ‘genuine’ threat, we note that the term 
‘genuine’ is defined in the Shorter Oxford English Dictionary as ‘[h]aving the character 
claimed for it; real, true, not counterfeit’.144 
In light of the above, a literal interpretation of footnote 5 seems to require the presence of 
two elements to satisfy Article XVI(a): the degree of threat (i.e. the measure adopted must 
contrast a substantial negative effect of the trade in service) and the timing (i.e. the threat 
must be present at the time in which the measure was adopted). These two conditions do 
not seem to be present in the case of the Gas Directive. Focusing on the second element 
of footnote 5, the Gas Directive was adopted two years after the Energy Sector Inquiry.145 
This latter was completed one year after the first gas war between Russia and Ukraine, 
which took place in 2006. The fact that the second gas war took place in 2009, the same 
year of the adoption of the Gas Directive, is not a pertinent argument. The Gas Directive 
had been under discussion since 2007 and its adoption was not related to the second gas 
shortage. In this light, the second requirement of footnote 5 is not met. Furthermore, as 
regards the first element of footnote 5, it is arguable that the situation in which the most 
important supplier of natural gas to the EU owns several EU pipelines constitutes a 
‘genuine and sufficiently serious threat’ to the internal security of supply of the Union.146 
In addition to that, the measures included under the Gas Directive breaching the GATS 
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may eventually improve competition in the energy market, but they do not seem to be 
directly applicable on their own to face a sudden gas scarcity. In particular, Article 11 of 
the Gas Directive, setting out discretionary procedures for foreign companies’ 
certification, does not seem to be able to contrast a substantial negative effect of trade as 
required by Article XIV(a). For the reasons above, the Gas Directive does not seem to 
comply with Article XIV(a) GATS. 
6.2. Compliance with Article XIV(c) GATS and Article XX(d) GATT 
Article XIV(c) GATS and Article XX(d) GATT demand the assessment of a three-tier 
test.147 Pursuant to the Panel in US-Gambling, the WTO Member invoking these 
justifications shall demonstrate that (i) the measure under investigation is designed to 
secure compliance with national laws or regulations; (ii) the national laws or regulations 
referred to are not inconsistent with the agreement invoked; (iii) the necessity test is 
satisfied.148 This last element, in common with Article XIV(a) GATS, will be analysed in 
section 6.3 below.     
                                                   
147 Pursuant to Article XX GATT: ‘Subject to the requirement that such measures are not applied in a 
manner which would constitute a means of arbitrary or unjustifiable discrimination between countries 
where the same conditions prevail, or a disguised restriction on international trade, nothing in this 
Agreement shall be construed to prevent the adoption or enforcement by any contracting party of 
measures: (d) necessary to secure compliance with laws or regulations which are not inconsistent with 
the provisions of this Agreement, including those relating to customs enforcement, the enforcement of 
monopolies operated under paragraph 4 of Article II and Article XVII, the protection of patents, 
trademarks and copyrights, and the prevention of deceptive practices’. Pursuant to article XIV GATS:’ 
Subject to the requirement that such measures are not applied in a manner which would constitute a means 
of arbitrary or unjustifiable discrimination between countries where like conditions prevail, or a disguised 
restriction on trade in services, nothing in this Agreement shall be construed to prevent the adoption or 
enforcement by any Member of measures: (c) necessary to secure compliance with laws or regulations 
which are not inconsistent with the provisions of this Agreement including those relating to: (i) the 
prevention of deceptive and fraudulent practices or to deal with the effects of a default on services 
contracts; (ii) the protection of the privacy of individuals in relation to the processing and dissemination 
of personal data and the protection of confidentiality of individual records and accounts; (iii) safety. 
 





The terms ‘laws’ and ‘regulations’ refer not only to rules that form part of the domestic 
legal system of a WTO Member,149 but also to international law rules which apply 
domestically by virtue of implementation or through direct effect.150 National competition 
laws may be covered by this paragraph, provided that they are per se GATT/GATS 
consistent.151 
In the case at hand, the EU could argue that the Gas Directive has been adopted to achieve 
the objectives set out in Articles 101 and 102 of the TFEU in a market characterised by 
several anticompetitive practices. These articles prohibit antitrust restrictive practices and 
the abuse of dominant position in the internal market. From the EU perspective, there is 
no doubt that these are ‘rules that form part of the domestic legal system of a WTO 
Member’,152 since Articles 101 – 102 are two founding principles of European 
competition law. The Gas Directive clearly reflects the scope of those two articles and 
their aim of enhancing competition in view of finalising the internal market, one of the 
objectives of the EU itself.153 Reference to competition law is made several times in the 
Gas Directive, since its preparatory works and the first recitals, and it is clear that from a 
competition law perspective the Gas Directive pursues the final objectives of the 
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150 Ibid [69]. 
 
151 Cottier, Delimatsis and Diebold (n 138). 
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Treaty.154 Enhancing competition is also in line, and thus not inconsistent, with the final 
aims underlying GATT and GATS.155  
In Mexico — Tax Measures, the Appellate Body underlined that a measure [e.g. the Gas 
Directive] ‘secures compliance’ with another [e.g. Articles 101  – 102 TFEU] even if it 
‘cannot be guaranteed to achieve its result with absolute certainty’.156 Hence, measures 
which contribute to securing compliance with laws or regulations that are not inconsistent 
with the WTO rules fall within the application of Articles XIV(c) GATS and XX(d) 
GATT.157 However, in US-Gambling the Appellate Body specified that the measure for 
which justification is sought has to ‘enforce obligations’ contained in the laws and 
regulations to which reference is made and not merely ‘ensure achievement of the goals’ 
underlying those laws and regulations.158 Under this perspective, it seems difficult to 
maintain that the Gas Directive ‘secures compliance’ with Articles 101 and 102 TFEU. 
Indeed, the provisions of the Gas Directive breaching the GATT and the GATS do not 
seem to directly enforce the rules of the Treaty (Articles 101 and 102 prohibit certain 
types of anticompetitive conducts and the abuse of dominant position of the undertakings 
operating in the EU market). Instead, by imposing rules on impartial access to the natural 
monopoly and on the independence of the transmission operators (i.e. unbundling), the 
Gas Directive modifies the energy market structure and the business structure of the 
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undertakings concerned in a way to prevent the possible abuse of dominant position by 
former incumbents.  
The same reasoning above applies to Article 95 of Treaty of the European Community 
(‘Approximation of Laws’), expressly mentioned as the legal basis for the adoption of the 
Gas Directive.159 
6.3 The Necessity Test 
The analysis of the ‘necessity’ of the measure taken, a common element to the articles 
analysed in the previous sub-sections, requires the study of Article XX GATT case-
law,160 and, in particular, of the ‘weighing and balancing’ process described in Korea – 
Various Measures on Beef and subsequently reaffirmed in several cases, among which is 
EC – Asbestos.161 
This process begins with an assessment of the ‘relative importance’ of the interests or 
values furthered by the challenged measure. Having ascertained the importance of the 
interests at stake, a panel should then turn to the other factors that are to be ‘weighed and 
balanced’. The Appellate Body has pointed out two factors that, in most cases, will be 
relevant for this exercise. One factor is the restrictive impact of the measure on 
                                                   
159 This is outlined in the first lines of the Gas Directives. As we will see in chapter IV, the legislation 
issued after the Lisbon Treaty with impact on the energy field is justified on the basis of the new Article 
194 TFEU.  
 
160 US — Gambling (n 108) [556]. 
 
161 Korea – Measures Affecting Imports of Fresh, Chilled and Frozen Beef (n 49) [178] and EC – Asbestos 
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are: Dominican Republic –Import and Sale of Cigarettes (n 59), Colombia Ports of Entry (n 99) and 
United States — Import Prohibition of Certain Shrimp and Shrimp Products – Report of the Appellate 





international commerce; the other factor is the contribution of the measure to the 
realisation of the ends it pursues.162  
After the weighing and balancing, a comparison between the challenged measure and the 
possible alternatives should then be undertaken, and the results of such comparison should 
be considered in light of the importance of the interests pursued.163 It is on this basis that 
a panel determines whether a measure is ‘necessary’ or, alternatively, whether another 
WTO-consistent measure is ‘reasonably available’.164 
In this respect, the alternative measure should be an appropriate means to achieve the 
desired level of protection which a Member has unilaterally defined.165 The Appellate 
Body underlined that ‘an alternative measure may be found not to be ‘reasonably 
available’ […] where it is merely theoretical in nature, imposes prohibitive costs or 
substantial technical difficulties’.166  
Necessity is a flexible concept.167 In Mexico – Taxes on Soft Drinks, the Appellate Body 
underlined that a measure can still be regarded as necessary even if it does not guarantee 
the achievement of the ends sought with absolute certainty.168  The fact that the general 
design of the challenged measure contributes to the achievement of the ends pursued 
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would suffice.169 In the case of a high level of protection chosen by the respondent, an 
outright prohibition may be considered as a measure ‘clearly designed and apt to achieve’ 
the level of protection desired.170 
In case of a WTO dispute, the EU should put forward all the elements which would define 
the Gas Directive – and in particular Articles 9 and 11 – as ‘necessary’ for the defence of 
its public order (Article XIV(a) GATS, analysed in section 6.1 above) or to comply with 
internal competition rules (Articles XIV(c) GATS, XX(d) GATT, analysed in section 6.2 
above).171 Eventually, the EU could even underline the reasons why the alternative 
measures would not be viable or would not achieve the same results. However, it would 
be under no obligation to do so. This would be the case only if Russia could demonstrate 
the existence of less restrictive alternative measures against its undertakings.   
The possibility of engaging in bilateral or multilateral consultations would not be per se 
sufficient to demonstrate the existence of alternative measures available. In fact, 
consultations are ‘a process, the results of which are uncertain and therefore not capable 
of comparison with the measures at issue’.172 Failure to identify an alternative reasonable 
measure by the claimant would qualify as ‘necessary’ the action taken by the respondent.  
To contest the applicability of Article XIV GATS and Article XX GATT to the case at 
issue, Russia should propose a reasonably available alternative measure to the adoption 
of the third country clause. This does not seem to be a difficult exercise, above all when 
considering the ‘restrictive impact of the measure on international commerce’ and the 
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‘contribution of the measure to the realisation of the ends it pursues’ elements of the 
weighing and balancing process. Indeed, as shown above in this chapter, the Gas 
Directive significantly endangers trade of goods and services between the EU and Russia 
mandating the modification of the business structure of the undertakings concerned in 
breach of several GATT and GATS clauses. Moreover, as underlined in Chapter II, the 
Gas Directive does not seem to be the best way to contribute to the realisation of the 
security interests pursued by the EU.173  
So far, the Gas Directive does not seem to comply with the elements required by Article 
XIV(a) and (c) GATS and Article XX(d) GATT. In any event, even assuming that it does, 
the Gas Directive should comply with the chapeau of the two Articles to be justified under 
the general exceptions of the GATS and of the GATT.  
6.4 Compliance with the Chapeau  
The first paragraph of Article XIV GATS and of Article XX GATT –  so-called chapeau 
– sets out that a measure in breach of the agreements which falls within the application 
of Article XIV or of Article XX, shall not be in any case adopted as ‘a means of arbitrary 
or unjustifiable discrimination between countries where like conditions prevail, or as a 
disguised restriction on trade’.  
The wording of the provision may suggest that some discrimination may be tolerated, as 
long as that cannot be labelled as ‘unjustifiable’ or ‘arbitrary’.174 In US – Shrimp, the 
combination of several factors led the Appellate Body to conclude that there was 
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‘unjustifiable’ discrimination.175 First, the United States unilaterally applied its import 
prohibition without engaging in negotiations with some Members, while it did negotiate 
with others.176 Moreover, the fact that different countries were accorded different periods 
of time for phasing in compliance with the measure in question also constituted 
differential treatment among the various countries seeking certification.177 Furthermore, 
the United States discriminated with regard to the different effort needed to transfer the 
technology necessary to achieve compliance with its measure.178 In Brazil - Tyres, the 
Appellate Body went one step further, and held that rather than the effect, it is the rationale 
of the discrimination that should determine the chapeau analysis.179 This new criterion 
hinges on the policy objective of the measure, rather than looking at whether the measure 
is applied in a ‘rigid’ or ‘unilateral’ manner, standard applied by the Appellate Body in 
US–Shrimp that is largely devoiced from the policy objective of the general exceptions.180 
For the same reasons seen in the previous sections of this chapter, it seems reasonable to 
uphold that the certification requirements of Article 11 could constitute an unjustifiable 
discrimination. 
The certification process of the third-country clause could also hide a potential ‘arbitrary 
discrimination’. By way of example, this has been identified when there is a demonstrable 
lack of (i) transparency and predictability; (ii) a formal opportunity for an applicant 
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country to be heard; (iii) a procedure for the review of the refusal of an application.181 As 
for this latter point, the Gas Directive does not set out any specific appeal procedure, but 
instead requires EU members to provide for an appeal mechanism.182 This reflects the 
characteristics of the legislative instrument used – a directive, for which the EU sets the 
objectives and MSs implement it with the necessary national laws and regulations – and 
seems to be compatible with the chapeau, since EU MSs are bound to fully transpose EU 
law in their territory. Contrastingly, the certification process set out under the Gas 
Directive seems not to be as transparent and predictable in its outcome for the 
undertakings concerned, as required by point (i) above. 
The alleged arbitrary discrimination is limited by the chapeau to cases where ‘like 
conditions prevail’.183 In US – Shrimp, the Appellate Body criticised the United States 
because the regulation under investigation did not consider the existing differences 
between the affected Members when it imposed an embargo on the products of third 
countries which did not comply with the US shrimp regulation.184  In principle, the 
existing differences are not limited to exporting countries and may refer also to importing 
Members. Given that, in practice conditions will almost always differ from the theory; it 
appears that, in order to be consistent with the chapeau, a measure should be fairly 
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flexible to take into account the specific conditions prevailing in any WTO Member.185 
In this respect, the Gas Directive does not seem to meet this requirement. Indeed, it seems 
equivalent to the measure banned in US – Shrimp, which, in its application, imposed an 
economic embargo requiring all exporting Members, if they wished to exercise their 
GATT rights, to adopt essentially the same policy as that applied to United States 
domestic shrimp trawlers.186 The same holds true for the Gas Directive, which bans 
foreign undertakings which are not unbundled from operating in the EU and does not 
adapt this requirement to the conditions present in the different States.  
The third element of the chapeau – i.e. the measure should not constitute a disguised trade 
restriction – has not yet been the object of an extensive analysis by the Appellate Body. 
Looking at Article XX GATT case-law, the expression ‘disguised trade restriction’ 
encompasses both arbitrary and unjustifiable discrimination, but covers other measures 
as well.187 To date, the meaning of the expression remains a bit elusive.188 The Appellate 
body in US-Shrimp and Brazil Retreated Tyres focused on the discriminatory aspect of 
the measures under analysis rather than on developing a proper definition of the 
expression.189 Given the uncertainties on the matter, for our purposes we don’t need to 
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concern ourselves with this complication considering this additional element should 
include both discrimination and arbitrariness, which have already been assessed above. 
In light of the foregoing discussion, the Gas Directive does not seem to satisfy the 
requirements for the application of the chapeau. Therefore, the EU cannot invoke the 
application of the general exceptions to justify the breaches of the WTO rules described 
in the previous sections of this chapter.    
7. Security Exceptions   
Article XXI GATT and Article XIV-bis GATS set out the ‘security exceptions’ that are 
applicable in case of breach of other provisions of the two agreements. We will focus 
only on letter(b)(iii) to those articles, since that is the only clause which is relevant for 
our purposes. We will assess the two provisions simultaneously as their wordings are 
almost identical.190 Pursuant to Article XXI GATT and Article XIV-bis GATS: 
Nothing in this Agreement shall be construed: 
(b) to prevent any contracting party from taking any action which it considers 
necessary for the protection of its essential security interests 
    … 
 (iii) taken in time of war or other emergency in international relations 
WTO MSs have seldom invoked the security exception above, which allows WTO 
Members to take any measure they consider necessary to guarantee their security. The 
broad wording of the provision reflects the period in which it was written. Immediately 
                                                   





after WWII, the founders of the GATT did not want to be bound to trade with their former 
enemies, as they feared this could later cause problems for their internal security. 
The security exceptions set forth under the GATT and the GATS allow States to restrict 
trade in order to protect strategic domestic production capabilities from import 
competition.191 The definition of strategic good/service is left to the individual State 
concerned. However, there is little doubt that WTO Members would consider energy 
production as strategic. This is likely to occur as historically energy production has been 
closely intertwined to the principle of ownership over natural resources of the territory 
under the sovereignty of a State.192  
The literal meaning of the expression ‘any action which it considers necessary’ is 
incredibly broad, and seems to impose no restrictions on WTO Members’ discretion. 
Even though WTO case-law did not address the issue, it seems reasonable to say that 
there must be the possibility of a DSB’s review over the reasonableness of the measures 
taken by WTO Members.193  
As underlined by Nicaragua in US-Nicaraguan Trade, the application of the exception 
under letter b(iii) requires two conditions: (i) the measure under investigation shall be 
necessary for the protection of the security interest of the country invoking it; and (ii) it 
shall be taken in time of war or other emergency in international relations.194 The 
application of both conditions to the case at issue seems to be questionable.  
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The first condition requires that the Gas Directive is necessary to protect a security 
interest of the Union. The security of natural gas supply is one of the reasons underlying 
the adoption of the Gas Directive. This is evident since the first recitals of the document, 
where security of supply is defined as ‘an essential element of public security and is 
therefore inherently connected to the efficient functioning of the internal market in gas 
and the integration of the isolated gas markets of Member States’.195 In this context, the 
gas transmission system is considered ‘of high importance to the Community’.196 For this 
reason, the EU legislator states that ‘additional safeguards are necessary regarding the 
preservation of the security of supply of energy to the Community to avoid any threats to 
public order and public security in the Community and the welfare of the citizens’.197  
The Gas Directive identifies three elements to evaluate the security of energy supply level 
achieved in the Union. These are (i) the assessment of the independence of network 
operation; (ii) the level of the Community’s and individual Member States’ dependence 
on energy supply from third countries; and (iii) the treatment of both domestic and foreign 
trade and investment in energy in a particular third country.198 In relation to point (i) 
above, according to the EU legislator ‘ownership unbundling … is clearly an effective 
and stable way to solve the inherent conflict of interests and to ensure security of 
supply’.199 From the EU perspective, security of supply importance is demonstrated also 
by the fact that derogations from unbundling and third party access (‘TPA’) obligations 
                                                   
 













are possible only for ‘security of supply reasons’200 and, in particular, are conceived for 
‘new pipelines within the Community transporting gas from third countries into the 
Community’.201  
In sum, it is clear that for the EU the adoption of the Gas Directive is justified on the basis 
of security reasons. In this respect, States can determine the extent of their security 
interests. However, protective measures should be reasonable – in application of the 
principle of good faith – and necessary to achieve the security objective set.202 In case of 
the Gas Directive, the ownership unbundling model for new pipelines does not seem to 
be the most suitable way to guarantee the security interests of the EU for four reasons. 
First, apart from the empirical evidence criticising the application of the ownership 
unbundling model,203 TPA obligations enforced upon the manager of the grids, coupled 
with an invasive NRA supervision, seem to be sufficient alone to achieve the expected 
security results.204 Second, the post-2007 international energy scene is characterised by a 
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natural gas oversupply due to the massive production of shale gas and the increased 
possibility of importing LNG from long-distance producers.205 This enhances supply 
diversification and, consequently, the security of supply of the importing countries. This 
is evident in case of the EU, which experienced also a huge contraction in gas 
consumption in the last decade compared to mid-2000s forecasts, due to the 2007 
recession and the huge investments in renewable energies.206 Third, gas spot markets have 
decoupled importers from long-term agreements which historically bounded them to 
producers with take-or-pay clauses.207 This development enables supplied countries to 
face sudden gas shortages by purchasing the extra gas required on a daily basis.208 With 
specific focus on Russia, Gazprom accepted to renegotiate long-term agreements with EU 
suppliers signed years before.209 In this respect, as mentioned in chapter I, Europe is the 
first market for Gazprom and the company is highly dependent from European 
consumption. It is a vital interest both for Gazprom and for Russia to keep the EU supplied 
with gas (given the impact of the company on Russia’s GDP).  Therefore, it is not 
reasonable to consider Gazprom as a danger for the European security of supply. Fourth, 
Member States have progressively increased their strategic natural gas stocks as a backup 
tool in case of unexpected shortages.210  
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Hence, ownership unbundling – the only unbundling model which can be chosen for new 
infrastructure projects – does not seem to be ‘necessary’ to protect EU security interest 
both when considering the time of the adoption of the Gas Directive and when looking at 
today’s situation.  
Moreover, with reference to Article 11, the EU does not explain why security needs would 
require foreign undertakings to be treated less favourably than domestic ones. The recitals 
of the Gas Directive, outlining the reasons underlying its adoption, take into account third 
countries dependency only to evaluate the security of supply of the EU and of its 
members.211 With the same purpose, ‘foreign trade and investment in energy in a 
particular third country’ are taken into account.212 Both these considerations do not seem 
to justify a different approach in the certification process towards third countries 
undertakings in comparison to domestic companies. By upholding a security reason 
behind Article 11, the EU would implicitly mean that it felt an actual need to secure its 
gas supply against all third countries, irrespective of the specific situation of these latter. 
This does not seem to be a reasonable justification to breach WTO rules.   
When carefully analysed, things have changed since the mid-2000s, when the first 
preparatory works of the Gas Directive were drafted. The rise of the security of supply 
issue was strictly linked to the eastward enlargement of the European Union − when the 
new EU countries were highly or even fully dependent on Russian gas − and natural gas 
consumption forecasts showed a steady growth in the subsequent years.213 Today’s 
situation is markedly different, and not only from an economic perspective. Even in 
                                                   









Eastern European countries, supply diversification helped to lower the need for Russian 
gas. The fact that single EU Member States still import a substantial amount of the 
commodity from Russia does not necessarily mean that they are vulnerable to supply 
disruptions, arbitrary pricing and so on.214 For example, despite being highly reliant on 
Russian gas, the construction of interconnectors allowed Czech Republic to be connected 
to the German market and to be supplied with German gas. The fact that Germany, in 
turn, is supplied by Russia does not impact on the possibility for Czech Republic to access 
Norwegian and Dutch gas, as well as LNG through the interconnectors built.215 Poland is 
another example which corroborates the same reasoning.216 Besides, a reciprocal 
assistance in case of supply disruptions derives from Article 122 TFEU, whereby, in case 
of natural gas shortages, Member States shall act in a spirit of solidarity.217  
In sum, in case of WTO litigation, the DSB could find that the measures adopted under 
the Gas Directive are not necessary to achieve the security of supply of the EU and, 
therefore, that they do not satisfy the first requirement of letter b(iii) to Articles XXI 
GATT and XIV-bis GATS. 
Even assuming the contrary, the other element required under letter b(iii) is that the 
measure under investigation is taken in time of war or during an emergency in 
international relations. This does not seem to be the case with the Gas Directive. Even if 
the gas shortages due to the 2006 Russian-Ukrainian crisis triggered the 2007 Energy 
Sector Inquiry and, consequently, the Gas Directive in 2009, letter b) to Articles XXI 
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GATT and XIV-bis GATS needs that the measure under investigation is taken in and 
because of the emergency occurred. The Gas Directive was adopted three years after the 
first Ukrainian crisis. This is enough per se to exclude the existence of the link required 
by letter b). In addition to that, the EU was not party to the 2006 gas dispute, even if, 
because of that, it experienced some gas shortages.  
8. Interim Conclusion 
In this chapter, we analysed the Gas Directive vis-à-vis the anti-discrimination and the 
market access obligations laid down under the GATT and the GATS.  
We found out that the Gas Directive is likely to cause problems under all the WTO 
provisions analysed. This answers to the second question we outlined in the introduction 
of this work.218 In particular, both de jure and de facto the Gas Directive could 
negatively impact on the possibility for extra-EU companies to operate and import their 
natural gas in the Union. In case of a WTO decision on the topic, still pending at the 
time of writing,219 the EU could not take advantage of the application of the general or 
of the security exceptions provided for under both WTO agreements. This is likely to 
cause the panel to condemn the EU for breaching the WTO rules and to request the EU 
to alter the provisions of the Gas Directive.  
The consequences of such a ruling would be likely to give Russia a powerful tool to 
regulate its energy relationship with the EU. As we have seen, WTO rules are the only 
international instrument capable of redefining from a legal perspective the EU-Russia 
relationship, and, for this reason, they could have a dramatic impact on the 
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interdependence between the two parties. Moreover, by forcing a change of the Gas 
Directive, Gazprom would be likely to have a bigger market power in the EU midstream 
and downstream sectors, reinforcing its dominant position in the EU gas supply.  
The EU approach to energy significantly changed with the adoption of the Lisbon Treaty. 
This did not impact on the Gas Directive and on the internal natural gas market as such. 
However, the exploitation of the tools made available under the Lisbon Treaty could 
deeply modify the EU-Russia future energy relationship. For this reason, in Chapter I we 
defined the Lisbon Treaty as a turning point of the European energy action.  
In the next chapter, we will analyse the novelties brought by the Lisbon Treaty in the EU 
energy sector and their impact on the EU-Russia energy relationship. In particular, we 
will try to find out whether the new legislative measures adopted could help to solve some 








THE EMERGENCE OF A NEW APPROACH AFTER LISBON 
Summary: 1. Introduction – 2. The Novelties of the Lisbon Treaty with Impact on the 
Energy Field – 3. The European Energy Union – 4. Post Energy Union Regulatory 
Measures – 5. The Characteristics of the New EU Approach – 6. Interim Conclusion.  
1. Introduction 
In the introduction, we outlined that this thesis explores the international and national 
legal tools binding the EU and Russia in the energy field and how they impact on the EU-
Russia geopolitical relationship. 
In Chapter I, we explained that the EU approach was characterised internally by a 
pervasive regulation of the market aimed at enhancing competition and externally by 
bilateralism as a default approach of engagement with third countries, which ultimately 
favoured the adoption by Russia of a divide-and-rule policy towards single EU Members.  
In the following chapters, we have underlined that the provisions of Directive 2009/73/EC 
(‘the Gas Directive’), the most important piece of legislation governing the EU gas 
market, could be illegal and potentially contrast with international trade rules binding the 
EU. Moreover, we have seen the Gas Directive does not seem to provide enough 
investment incentives to the undertakings operating – or willing to operate – in the 
European natural gas market.  
This chapter outlines an emerging ‘new’ approach of the EU in the gas sector, which 
started to take shape with the adoption of the Lisbon Treaty in 2009, after the issuance of 
the Gas Directive, and that is still ‘under construction’. This approach significantly differs 
from the previous one; it is characterised by the progressive centralisation of the energy 




energy issues of European relevance, the focus on the security of supply of the Union and 
a push for technological innovation.  
The new approach could help solving some of the issues underlined in Chapter I and 
Chapter III. In particular, by promoting a united European stance towards third country 
suppliers, the post-Lisbon approach could overcome the lack of coherence which 
characterised the EU energy policy towards Russia before. Overall, the legislation 
adopted post-Lisbon will enhance the EU security of supply through the possibility to 
conclude specific bilateral energy agreements and the scrutiny of the commercial 
agreements between undertakings, and empowers the EU with new legal tools to 
rebalance its energy relationships with Russia. All of this verifies the hypothesis made in 
the conceptual framework, i.e. that the introduction of a specific section related to energy 
in the TFEU effectively impacts on the energy relationship between the EU and its 
suppliers. 
In the next sections, we will outline the characteristics of the post-Lisbon energy 
approach, starting from the new competence allocation between the EU and its Member 
States regarding energy and foreign direct investments.  
2. The Novelties of the Lisbon Treaty with Impact on the Energy Field  
2.1 Energy and Solidarity  
The Treaty of Lisbon first introduced the energy field in a specific section of the Treaty 
(Title XXI),1 and listed it among the competences shared between Member States and the 
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Union.2 Before Lisbon, the EU could intervene in the energy sector only indirectly, by 
means of Article 175 TEC (on environmental protection), Article 95 (approximation of 
laws, such as in the case of the Gas Directive), Articles 155 and 156 (trans-European 
networks), and Article 100 (difficulties in supply).3 These articles typically required 
burdensome procedures (qualified majorities or, in some cases under Article 175, 
unanimity), whereas, under the Lisbon Treaty, energy follows the faster ordinary 
legislative procedure.4 
Article 194(1) TFEU states that,  
In the context of the establishment and functioning of the internal market […] 
Union policy on energy shall aim, in a spirit of solidarity between Member 
States, to: 
(a) ensure the functioning of the energy market; (b) ensure security of energy 
supply in the Union; (c) promote energy efficiency and energy saving and the 
development of new and renewable forms of energy; and (d) promote the 
interconnection of energy networks.  
The TFEU outlines that Article 194(1) refers to internal measures only.5 Any form of 
external action by the EU will have to be implied from its internal rules, in compliance 
with the ERTA jurisprudence.6 In a landmark preliminary reference case about green 
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energy, the Court of Justice of the European Union confirmed the Union’s external 
competence in the field of energy based on ERTA case-law.7   
Significantly, Article 194 stipulates that the aims of the Union’s energy policy shall be 
pursued ‘in a spirit of solidarity’ between Member States. In this respect, as chapter I 
explains,8 the signing of bilateral deals with suppliers such as Gazprom, were repeatedly 
seen as undermining the development of a coherent external energy policy.9 Several 
Eastern European Member States have been keen on the Commission playing a more 
active role when it comes to energy which other Member States have been quick to shut 
down on the grounds that the EU lacked competence and that foreign policy was a 
Member State responsibility.10  
In addition to the ‘solidarity spirit’ of Article 194, one feature of the Lisbon Treaty that 
warrants attention with specific reference to energy is the solidarity mechanism of Article 
122(1) TFEU: 
without prejudice to any other procedures provided for in the Treaties, the 
Council, on a proposal from the Commission, may decide, in a spirit of 
solidarity between Member States, upon the measures appropriate to the 
economic situation, in particular if severe difficulties arise in the supply of 
certain products, notably in the area of energy. 
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The Council made repeated references to solidarity during the 2009 gas crisis and 
therefore this mechanism can be seen as a test of Member State dedication to the Lisbon 
Treaty’s solidarity provision based on the level of implementation thereof.11 However, 
given the fact that solidarity is not a quantitative concept, it is therefore subject to Member 
States’ interpretation and support in times of crisis.12 Nevertheless, the specific mention 
of energy in relation to supply included under Article 122 creates a legal basis whereby 
the Union can intervene to the extent that there are any supply disruptions.13 In this 
respect, the solidarity principle sets a legal base for the measures to be taken in a time of 
crisis to ensure security of supply.14  
2.2 Foreign Direct Investment 
With the adoption of the Lisbon Treaty, foreign direct investment (‘FDI’) has become an 
exclusive EU competence, integrated into the Common Commercial Policy (‘CCP’). This 
results from the combined reading of Article 3(1)(e) (setting out the exclusive EU 
competence for CCP), and Article 207 TFEU (on FDIs), and could have an impact on the 
EU-Russia energy relationship.   
The expression ‘foreign direct investment’ is not defined in the Treaty.15 
Notwithstanding, the relationship between Article 207 on one side and the bilateral 
                                                   
11 Sijbren De Jong, Jan Wouters and Steven Sterk, ‘The 2009 Russian-Ukrainian Gas Dispute: Lessons for 
European Energy Crisis Management after Lisbon’ (2010) 15(4) European Foreign Affairs Review 525. 
 
12 Sijbren De Jong and Jan Wouters, ‘European Energy Security Governance: Key-Challenges and 
Opportunities in EU-Russia Energy Relations’ (2011) Leuven Centre for Global Governance Studies 41. 
 
13 Ibid.  
 
14 Ibid.  
 
15 Kevin Kazimirek, ‘The New EU Competence over Foreign Direct Investment and its Impact on the EU´s 
Role as a Global Player’ Jean Monnet Centre for Europeanisation and Transnational Regulations Oldenburg 
(2012) 23 <http://www.cetro.uni-oldenburg.de/download/CETRO_Selected_Theses-_Kazimirek.pdf> 





investment treaties (‘BITs’) signed by the Member States (‘MSs’) with third countries on 
the other side immediately became a contentious issue. What was missing in the Lisbon 
Treaty, and also became an issue in practice, were any transitional provisions clarifying 
the status of existing extra-EU BITs.16 It was only in 2012 that Regulation 1219/2012 
confirmed that extra-EU BITs remain binding on the MSs under public international law, 
putting an end to controversies regarding the legal effect of BITs between EU Member 
States and non-EU countries.17 Accordingly, international agreements concluded before 
the State accession to the EU find application even in case of clash with EU law.18 
However, as the regulation explains, these treaties will be progressively replaced by 
investment agreements signed by the EU and third states on the basis of the new EU 
competence.19 When such agreements are signed, Member States will be required to 
withdraw their authorisation of the respective existing BITs. 
To date, about half of the BITs world-wide have at least one EU Member State as a 
party.20 These include also intra-EU BITs, which the EU is trying to root out because of 
the possible conflicts with the internal market rules. With its exclusive competence on 
foreign direct investments, the EU will progressively take a primary role in the treaty 
making processes of global investment law. This trend is evidenced by the negotiations 
of the Comprehensive Economic and Trade Agreement (CETA) and the Transatlantic 
                                                   
16 European Parliament and Council Regulation 1219/2012 of 12 December 2012 establishing transitional 
arrangements for bilateral investment agreements between Member States and third countries’ [2012] OJ 
L351, Recital 4. At the time of the entry into force of the Treaty of Lisbon, Member States maintained a 
significant number of bilateral investment agreements with third countries. The TFEU does not contain any 
explicit transitional provisions for such agreements which have now come under the Union’s exclusive 
competence. This led to interpretative lacunae regarding the new EU competence on FDIs. 
 




19 Regulation (EU) No 1219/2012, Arts 5-6. 
 






Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP), two of the most important multilateral 
investment treaties of the last years, which the European Commission (‘EC’) negotiated 
in the name of the whole Union.  
In the context of the negotiations of investment chapter of the EU-Singapore free trade 
agreement (EUSFTA), aiming at superseding the existing BITs between Singapore and 
EU MSs, the EC requested a preliminary opinion to the Court of Justice of the European 
Union (‘CJEU’) on the extent and nature of the EU CCP competence to conclude the 
trade agreement, ‘since differences of opinion became apparent in consultations within 
Trade Policy Committee’.21 In May 2017, the CJEU issued its opinion, which clarifies 
the impact of the new competence on the power allocation between the EU and its 
Members.  
According to the CJEU, in relation to the EUSFTA the EU has the exclusive competence 
to regulate goods and services market access, public procurement, non-fossil fuel energy 
generation, foreign direct investment protections, IP rights, competition rules, sustainable 
development, exchanging information in areas requiring mediation, cooperation and 
disputes.22 Under the EUSFTA, two areas would specifically need the approval from 
national parliaments before they can be applied, namely non-direct foreign investments 
(e.g. portfolio investments) and the regime governing dispute settlement between 
investors and States (ISDS provisions).23  
                                                   
21 Court of Justice of the European Union, ‘OPINION 2/15 OF THE COURT (Full Court)’ (16 May 2017) 
ECLI:EU:C:2017:376 <http://curia.europa.eu/juris/document/document_print.jsf?doclang=EN&text=&pa 
geIndex=0&part =1& mode=req&docid=190727&occ=first&dir=&cid=441679> accessed 20 May 2017.  
 







The opinion of the CJEU shed light on the question of ‘mixity’, which created conflicts 
between the EU and MSs also with regards to TTIP and CETA, with national 
governments claiming a primary role in the negotiation process after several protests 
spread around Europe for a more conservative approach to trade liberalisation in defence 
of national goods and services.  
In sum, the CJEU made clear that the scope of the CCP competences transferred to the 
Union by the Lisbon Treaty, albeit strengthened,24 is not sufficiently broad to cover all 
the aspects which are usually included under a BIT.25 Therefore, the adoption of an all-
encompassing investment agreement necessarily requires the intervention of national 
parliaments. One way around this, which could help avoid delays and complications, 
would be for the EU to reconsider the content of its trade agreements and avoid the 
inclusion of non-direct investment or ISDS provisions, to facilitate their conclusion by 
the EU alone. This would be a major change of EU current policy and it is not clear 
whether it would be contemplated. Another viable option for the EU might be to adopt 
ISDS as a standalone protocol, subject to separate conclusion and approval, but this could 
leave investors without any protection in the interim.26  
In addition to the new position on FDI, which could allow the conclusion of an EU-Russia 
agreement substituting the BITs signed by individual MSs, a more assertive EU approach 
appears to be emerging within the energy sphere with the Commission undertaking a 
                                                   
24 With the Lisbon Treaty, the Common Commercial Policy now covers trade in services, the commercial 
aspects of intellectual property as well as foreign direct investments. This greatly expands the EU’s 
exclusive competence in the field. See Paul Craig and Gráinne de Búrca, EU Law: Text, Cases and 
Materials (5th edn, CUP 2011) 322. 
 
25 Kazimirek (n 15). 
 
26 Herbert Smith Freehills LLP, ‘The European Court of Justice Renders its Opinion on the EU-Singapore 
Free Trade Agreement: Investment Chapter Is Not within EU’s Exclusive Competence’ 
(2017) <http://www.lexology.com/library/detail.aspx?g=e2568c28-1a23-47fa-874d-8959bd2f8b97> 





mandate to bolster European energy security. The impetus for this assertive stance was 
triggered by the progressive shift of competences from Member States to the EU. The 
progressive centralisation of energy decision-making could have an impact on the 
geopolitical relations of the EU with third countries, by increasing the efficiency of the 
internal market as a single block and reinforcing the overall bargaining power of EU 
Members. The last step towards the centralisation of energy competences at the European 
level was the publication of the Energy Union plan.  
3. The European Energy Union  
3.1 Introduction 
The long awaited Sustainable Energy Security Package which was announced on 12 
February 2016, is the latest step undertaken by the EU towards the creation of the 
European Energy Union.27 Even though the idea of a new common energy policy has 
been advocated for since 2010 by former European Commission President Jacques Delors 
and the then European Parliament Polish President Jerzy Buzek,28 the idea of a proper 
Energy Union first materialised in spring 2014, after the concerns about a potential 
politically motivated disruption of all EU gas supplies from Russia due to the Crimea 
crisis.29    
                                                   
27 European Commission, ‘Press Release: Towards Energy Union: The Commission Presents Sustainable 
Energy Security Package’ (2016) <http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-16-307_en.htm> accessed 20 
August 2016. 
 
28 Sami Andoura, Leigh Hancher and Marc Van Der Woude, 'Towards a European Energy Community' 
(2009) <http://www.notre-europe.eu/media/etud76-energy-en.pdf?pdf=ok> accessed 20 August 2016. 
 
29 The 2014 natural gas interruptions have been the third part of the ‘gas wars’ involving Russia and 





The current president of the European Commission Jean-Claude Juncker made the Energy 
Union a top priority of his mandate during his 2014 presidential campaign.30 The reason 
behind this is simple and had been mentioned already in chapter I: Many EU Member 
States rely heavily on a limited number of energy suppliers.31 Some of them, especially 
in the Eastern part of Europe, have one supplier only, which leaves those countries very 
vulnerable in the event of any unexpected energy supply disruptions.32  
Improving energy interconnections between new Member States, especially in those 
countries which once were part of the former Soviet Union, and modernising their 
infrastructure would help to minimise disruptions and energy dependency. In addition, 
the completion of the internal energy market would allow easier access to energy markets 
across national borders and improve the affordability of energy and 
the competitiveness of energy prices for citizens and businesses. 
In November 2014, Maroš Šefčovič, the EU Vice-President in charge of the Energy 
Union project, announced the five key pillars of the Energy Union strategy, which were 
then fleshed out on 25 February 2015, when Commissioner Šefčovič officially presented 
the Energy Union package.33 These are:  
1) stronger emphasis on security of supply, solidarity and trust;  
                                                   
30 Jean-Claude Juncker, ‘A New Start for Europe: My Agenda for Jobs, Growth, Fairness and Democratic 
Change’ (2014) <http://ec.europa.eu/priorities/sites/beta-political/files/juncker-political-guidelines_ 
en.pdf> accessed 26 August 2016. 
 
31 See Chapter I, section 3. 
 
32 European Commission, ‘Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, 
the European Economic and Social Committee, the Committee of Regions, and the European Investment 
Bank: A Framework Strategy for a Resilient Energy Union with a Forward-Looking Climate Change 
Policy’ COM (2015) 080 final, 2. 
 
33 European Commission, ‘Energy Union: Secure, Sustainable, Competitive, Affordable Energy for Every 





2) the finalisation of the internal energy market; 
3) the moderation of demand for security through energy efficiency; 
4) the decarbonisation of the energy mix; 
5) improved efforts in research, innovation and competitiveness.34 
The five pillars above fully reflect the content of Article 194(1) TFEU and sum up the 
most important steps of the European energy policy for years to come.35  
3.2 Outline of the Energy Union’s Pillars 
The first point of the Energy Union strategy stresses the importance of the security of 
energy supply. With this in mind, the Commission strives for the consolidation of joint 
approaches aimed at strengthening solidarity between Member States, in particular in 
times of crisis, so that members could be assured that in situations of tight supply they 
can rely on their neighbours.36 The list of the actors involved in this cooperative project 
extends to Member States, transmission system operators, the energy industry and all 
other stakeholders, which will have to work closely together to ensure a high-level of 
energy security for European citizens and companies.37 A closer integration of the EU, 
                                                   
34 Maroš Šefčovič, ‘Opening Speech - EU Energy Policy and Competitiveness’ (2014) 
<http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_SPEECH-14-1883_en.htm> accessed 28 August 2016. The five 
pillars of the Energy Union are based on the three long-established objectives of EU energy policy: security 
of supply, sustainability and competitiveness. 
 
35 Urbán Rusnak, Secretary General of the Energy Charter Treaty, highlighted the relevance of the Energy 
Charter Treaty to each of the five dimensions of the Energy Union. Rusnak emphasised that ‘the foundation 
for the external policy of an Energy Union has already been laid by the establishment of the Energy Charter 
Treaty’. See Energy Charter Secretariat, ‘The Energy Union Conference ‘The Five Dimensions of the 
European Energy Union Session’’ (2015) <https://eu2015.lv/images/notikumi/2015_02_06_SGs_ 
address_in_Riga.pdf> accessed 18 June 2017. 
   
36 To ensure the diversification of the gas supply, work on the Southern Gas Corridor must be intensified 
to enable Central Asian countries to export their gas to Europe. In Northern Europe, the recent establishment 
of liquid gas hubs with multiple suppliers is greatly enhancing supply differentiation. See European 
Commission, ‘Quarterly Report on European Gas Markets’ (2014) <https://ec.europa.eu/energy/ 
sites/ener/files/documents/quarterly-gas_q3_2014_final_0.pdf> accessed 18 June 2017. 
 





the Energy Community and their third partners is also relevant,38 so that the European 
reforms and incentives are extended to neighbour energy transit countries. This action is 
complementary to the diversification of supply, which is to be pursued through the 
funding and construction of Projects of Common Interest.39   
In relation to third supplying countries, such as Russia, the EU plan is to speak with one 
voice, improving its ability to project its weight on a global scale. From this perspective, 
EU trade policy is key in contributing towards greater security and diversification through 
the inclusion of energy-related provisions in trade agreements with its partners. When the 
EU negotiates agreements with countries that are important for its security of supply, the 
Commission shall seek to negotiate energy specific provisions contributing to the energy 
security and sustainable energy goals of the Energy Union.  
As an additional tool, the European plan mentions the possibility of setting up voluntary 
demand aggregation mechanisms to collectively purchase gas during a crisis and also 
where Member States are dependent on a single supplier. This reshaped the single buyer 
                                                   
38 The Energy Community Treaty is an international agreement signed in Athens on 25 October 2005, 
through which State parties, all non-EU countries, committed themselves to liberalise their energy markets 
according to the EU aquis. To date, the members of the Energy Community are the following: Albania, 
Bosnia and Herzegovina, Montenegro, Ukraine, Kosovo, Moldova, Serbia, Macedonia (as parties); 
Georgia, Armenia, Norway, Turkey (as observers). 
 
39 Projects of Common Interest (‘PCIs’) are identified by the European Commission as essential for 
completing the European internal energy market and for reaching the EU's energy policy objectives. To 
become a PCI, a project must have a significant impact on the energy markets and market integration of at 
least two EU countries, boost competition and the EU's energy security by diversifying sources, contribute 
to the EU's climate and energy goals by integrating renewables. PCIs may benefit from accelerated planning 
and permit granting, improved regulatory conditions, lower administrative costs due to streamlined 
environmental assessment processes, increased public participation via consultations, increased visibility 
to investors and access to financial support. To date, support under the Connecting Europe Facility (CEF) 
is provided in two forms – grants and financial instruments. PCI promoters are encouraged to use financial 
instruments before applying for grants. Grants and financial instruments are subject to different application 
procedures, different EU parties are involved, and different implementation plans apply. Grants should be 
seen as a funding resource of last resort. However, the limited amount of EU support (the CEF has €5.3 
billion for all energy projects from 2014-20) and the rather political choice of where to allocate funds have 
prevented outright success. See: Simone Tagliapietra and Georg Zachmann, ‘Rethinking the Security of the 
European Union’s Gas Supply’ (2016) Bruegel Policy Contributions 
<http://bruegel.org/2016/01/rethinking-the-security-of-the-european-unions-gas-supply/> accessed 8 





option, one of the ideas which came up at the first stages of the reform process to lower 
suppliers’ bargaining power.40 In any event, it is recognised that these demand 
aggregation mechanisms would need to comply with World Trade Organization (‘WTO’) 
law and EU competition rules, in particular with the Commission’s guidelines on 
horizontal cooperation agreements.41 
As for the second point – the finalisation of the internal energy market – Commissioner 
Šefčovič underlined that ‘the current market design does not lead to sufficient 
investments, market concentration and weak competition remain an issue and the 
European energy landscape is still too fragmented’.42   
The Commission’s plan aims at achieving Member States’ full implementation and 
enforcement of the Third Energy Package, in particular as regards to unbundling and to 
the independence of national regulators.43 This goes together with the continuous antitrust 
enforcement, ensuring a free energy flow by addressing territorial restrictions in supply 
contracts as well as upstream/downstream and network foreclosure.  
In addition to that, the push for a better integration of the transmission operators, starting 
from a regional level, and the development of both short and long-term markets through 
                                                   
40 Donald Tusk, ‘A United Europe Can End Russia’s Energy Stranglehold’ (2014) 
<http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/91508464-c661-11e3-ba0e-00144feabdc0.html#axzz3XSpZt4OX> accessed 
16 August 2016. 
 
41 European Commission Regulation (EU) No 1217/2010 of 14 December 2010 on the application of Article 
101(3) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union to certain categories of research and 
development agreements’ [2010] OJ L285/46. The best-known example of demand aggregation mechanism 
proposed in the past is the Caspian Development Corporation. This was a reply to Turkmenistan’s offer to 
sell the EU 30 bcm of gas per year. Turkmenistan wanted a single buyer (it sells 60 bcm to China every 
year), but no single buyer in the EU could take more than 5 bcm. So, aggregation was almost mandatory, 
even if it was heavily criticised by EU companies.  
 







the exploitation of the full potential of liquefied natural gas (‘LNG’) will influence gas 
price formation and its stabilisation to the benefit of final users.  
All these activities will entail further powers vested in the European regulators, in 
particular the European Networks of Transmission System Operators for Electricity and 
Gas (ENTSOs) and the Agency for Cooperation of Energy Regulators (ACER),44 the 
setup of regional operational centres to effectively plan and manage cross-border gas 
flows, the fine-tuning of the network codes already in place, the adoption of facilitated 
permit procedures.  
The third point of the Energy Union strategy pinpoints the utmost importance of energy 
efficiency for the security of supply of the Union. In 2014, the European Council set an 
indicative target of at least 27% of energy efficiency improvement by 2030 in comparison 
to the business-as-usual scenario.45 This objective will be reviewed by 2020, with the goal 
being a level of 30%.46 The Energy Union strategy highlights that most of the work to 
achieve the efficiency objectives set has to be done at the national level. In this context, 
the role of the Commission is to create the appropriate framework for the application of 
national policies.  
Huge efficiency gains are to be captured with regard to district heating and cooling, the 
largest single sources of energy demand in Europe.47 Moreover, the Energy Union 
strategy urges a ‘comprehensive road transport package’ with measures aimed at 
                                                   
44 To date, ACER benefits of limited decision-making rights. It can only take decisions at the request of the 
national regulators or if these latter fail to take a decision within a certain timeframe. 
 
45 European Council, ‘European Council (23 and 24 October 2014) Conclusions on 2030 Climate and 
Energy Policy Framework’ 5 <http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_Data/docs/pressdata 
/en/ec/145356.pdf> accessed 28 August 2016.  
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improving the efficiency of vehicles, road use, alternative fuels and their infrastructure, 
and public procurement of clean vehicles.48 Considerable fuel savings could also be 
realised by removing barriers to less greenhouse gas intensive modes of transport, such 
as rail, maritime transport and inland waterways, and by making these modes more 
attractive. All these initiatives will contribute to lower the European energy needs and 
therefore decrease energy imports from outside the EU. 
As regards the decarbonisation of the European economy, the fourth pillar of the 
European plan, the Energy Union strategy recalls the content of the agreement on the 
2030 climate and energy framework, which has set the EU commitment of at least 40% 
of domestic reduction in greenhouse gas emissions compared to 1990.49 This makes an 
ambitious contribution to the international climate negotiations, which has been 
reinforced at a global scale by the signing of the Paris Agreement in late 2015.  
The cornerstone of Europe’s climate policy is a well-functioning EU Emissions Trading 
System, stimulating cost-efficient greenhouse gas emission reductions. This is coupled 
with the EU objective of becoming the world leader in renewables by developing the next 
generation of technically advanced and competitive green energies. With this aim, 
existing legislation and new market rules need to be fully implemented, enabling the roll-
out of new technologies and allowing for an efficient energy transition. This process will 
necessarily be guided by the Commission, which will promote cooperation and 
convergence of national support schemes leading to more cross-border opening.  
Lastly, the Energy Union strategy puts research and innovation at the very heart of the 
EU project. In this respect, the European plan sets out four key priorities: (i) develop the 
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next generation of renewable energy technologies, including environment-friendly 
production and use of biomass and biofuels, together with energy storage; (ii) facilitate 
the participation of consumers in the energy transition through smart grids, smart home 
appliances, smart cities, and home automation systems; (iii) provide efficient energy 
systems, and harnessing technology to make the building stock energy neutral; and (iv) 
incentivise sustainable transport systems that develop and deploy at large scale innovative 
technologies and services to increase energy efficiency and reduce greenhouse gas 
emissions.50 In this context, public procurement is seen as a potential catalyst for 
industrial and business innovation and green growth, both within the EU and beyond its 
borders, supporting other countries in their efforts to establish modern and sustainable 
energy systems.51  
3.3 Security of Supply: The First Pillar of the Energy Union  
Considering the content of the previous sections, it is worth outlining some general 
considerations about the relationship between security of the energy supply and the other 
four pillars of the Energy Union package. Indeed, with the Eastern enlargement of the EU 
and the gas wars with Russia, security of supply came under the spotlight and became the 
main objective of the EU energy policy. This trend is now reflected in the Energy Union 
strategy.  
In principle, the progressive improvement of the internal gas market contributes to 
lowering the barriers to trade and to allowing a more efficient resource allocation between 
EU Member States. Overall, this decreases the amount of energy imported from third 
countries. The same holds true for energy efficiency. Indeed, the adoption of techniques 
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improving the efficiency of the energy processes increases the amount of energy saved 
and, consequently, lowers energy importation. By the same token, green energy 
production is of utmost importance to secure the energy supply and to enhance the 
diversification of the energy mix. Energy from renewable sources is produced locally, by 
the natural sources of the territory. Hence, in a system dependent from third countries, 
renewable energies help to lower energy importation. Lastly, research activities and 
innovation help the development of new and more efficient energy production systems 
which accelerate the energy saving process described above. Remarkably, energy 
efficiency and green energy incentive policies are determined at the national level. States 
actively influence the national energy diversification by giving private parties the 
incentives to invest in the sector and help the diffusion of more efficient green energy 
productions.52 This can have a spill-over effect in national job markets.  
The strategic importance of the security of supply reflects one of the fundamental aims 
of nation States since their creation, which is now one of the key dimensions of the EU.53 
As the Council of the EU stated: 
completion of the internal energy market is a pre-requisite to achieve, in the 
most cost-effective way, the main objectives of the EU energy policy: 
sustainability, competitiveness and security of energy supply.54   
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53 This concept has been outlined also in the first section of the introduction of this thesis.  
 
54 Council of the European Union, ‘Completion of the Internal Energy Market’ (2014) 
<www.consilium.europa.eu/en/workarea/downloadasset.aspx?id...> access 21 August 2016. 




Over the last six decades, EU energy policy has been characterised by a continuing search 
for a balance among security of supply, environmental goals and market liberalisation 
goals, which constitute the three pillars of the EU energy policy.55  
The good start of the Commission’s plan was confirmed on 18 November 2015 in the first 
State of the Energy Union report.56 Thereafter, on 16 February 2016 the Sustainable 
Energy Security Package proposed the amendment of two important pieces of legislation: 
Decision 994/2012/EU and Regulation 2012/994/EU. The proposals included a shift of 
competence from Member States to the EU as regards to the negotiation of 
intergovernmental agreements (‘IGAs’) in the field of energy between Member States 
and third suppliers and provided mechanisms to prevent security of supply disruptions. 
In addition to that, the Sustainable Energy Security Package set out a communication 
focused on LNG and gas storage, and proposed, for the first time, a heating and cooling 
strategy focused on removing barriers to decarbonisation in buildings and industry.57 
Notwithstanding the possible impact of the last two proposals on EU-Russia energy 
relations – in principle, LNG increases supply diversification, whereas the 
implementation of environmental-friendly policies decreases the dependency from 
imported ‘grey’ sources – the analysis of the first two measures is particularly relevant 
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Liquefied Natural Gas and Gas Storage’ COM (2016) 49 final, and European Commission, 
‘Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the European Economic 
and Social Committee and the Committee of Regions: An EU Strategy on Heating and Cooling’ COM 





for the purposes of this thesis since they directly target third countries’ energy policies 
and extra-EU companies operating in the Union. This shapes the international energy 
relationships of the Union with its suppliers.  
In light of the above, the next section of this chapter analyses the proposals to amend 
Decision 994/2012/EU and Regulation 2012/994/EU. 
4. Post Energy Union Regulatory Measures 
4.1 Treaty Negotiation with Third Countries: A Change in Perspective  
In 2012, the European institutions issued Decision 994/2012/EU (the ‘IGA Decision’), 
establishing an information exchange mechanism with regard to IGAs signed between 
Member States and third countries in the field of energy.58 This was the first attempt made 
by the EU to control the content of the energy agreements concluded by its members with 
countries which are not bound by EU law. IGAs are, usually, bilateral agreements that 
form the basis of private commercial contracts and investments.59 Their purpose is to 
provide legal certainty for the construction of import and export infrastructure, to 
facilitate the purchase of oil and gas, or to establish a more general framework for energy 
cooperation.60 Since EU energy market rules may not always be in the commercial 
interests of non-EU energy suppliers, single Member States may be pushed by their 
                                                   
58 European Parliament and Council Decision 994/2012/EU establishing an information exchange 
mechanism with regard to intergovernmental agreements between Member States and third countries in the 
field of energy [2012] OJ L299/13. 
 
59 Pursuant to Article 2 of the IGA Decision, an ‘intergovernmental agreement’ means ‘any legally binding 
agreement between one or more Member States and one or more third countries having an impact on the 
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supplying countries to include in their IGAs clauses that hinder the functioning of the EU 
internal energy market. To overcome this problem, the EU’s approach towards these 
agreements has radically changed since the Lisbon Treaty was adopted.  
The IGA Decision requires Member States to notify the Commission of all their energy 
agreements with non-EU countries once they have been concluded. In case of agreements 
under negotiation, Member States may inform the Commission about the content to be 
negotiated but they are under no obligation to do so.61 Information included under the 
agreements may be shared with other Member States, except for any confidential part 
specifically indicated by the sender.62 The Commission verifies whether the agreements 
signed comply with EU law, in particular with the rules on internal market and 
competition. In case of breach, it invites Member States to amend or terminate the IGAs 
in question. According to public international law, a State cannot unilaterally amend or 
revoke its IGAs obligations early without the consent of the other party.63 Hence, the 
(political) renegotiation is required in the case of agreements falling foul of EU law.  
The Commission’s analysis of all notified IGAs showed that around one-third of them 
contained provisions that were not compliant with EU law.64 To date, no such agreement 
has been successfully renegotiated.65 The adoption of the IGA Decision deeply affected 
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the construction of the South Stream.66 In particular, the EC considered the IGAs signed 
between Russia and six EU members at odds with the Third Energy Package.67 Notably, 
Russia preferred not to embark in lengthy renegotiations with the countries concerned – 
it took years to conclude all the agreements – and stopped the project, even though the 
construction of the infrastructure had already started.  
To overcome the problems of ex post renegotiation, on 16 February 2016 the Commission 
presented the Sustainable Energy Security Package, which, inter alia, includes 
modifications to the IGA Decision.68 The most relevant amendment proposed is the 
adoption of a mandatory ex ante compatibility control by the Commission of the treaties 
to be signed.69 Additionally, Member States will have to send their draft IGAs to the 
Commission before concluding them, and they are obliged not to sign the relevant IGA 
until the Commission has issued its opinion or the period set out for the Commission to 
scrutinise each IGA has elapsed.70 When concluding the proposed intergovernmental 
                                                   
66 The project was meant to link the EU with Russian gas bypassing Ukraine through pipelines lying under 
the Black Sea. For an overview of the project see: <http://www.south-stream-transport.com/project/> 
accessed 20 August 2016. See also chapter I, section 7. 
 
67 See: Euractiv, ‘South Stream Bilateral Deals Breach EU Law, Commission Says’ (2013) 
<http://www.euractiv.com/section/competition/news/south-stream-bilateral-deals-breach-eu-law-commiss 
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agreement or amendment, Member States will have to take full account of the 
Commission's opinion. 
Differently from the IGA Decision, the new proposal also requires the notification of non-
binding instruments.71 Even if legally non-binding, such instruments can be used to set 
out a detailed framework for energy infrastructure and energy supply, for example in the 
form of Memorandum of Understanding, or other soft law mechanisms. In this respect, 
non-binding instruments can have an impact on the internal energy market similar to 
intergovernmental agreements as their implementation might result in a violation of EU 
law.72  
The final version of the proposal was adopted in April 2017.73 The new decision, just like 
the IGA Decision, does not cover commercial agreements between companies. The 
current control mechanism of the commercial contracts – especially with regard to EU 
competition law – has not changed.74  
Along with a positive impact on the EU security of supply, the new IGA decision could 
also have a positive influence on the business of individual companies involved in energy 
projects. Possible issues relating to non-compliance with EU law would be tackled at an 
                                                   
71 Article 2 of the proposal to reform the IGA Decision defines ‘non-binding instruments’ as ‘non-binding 
arrangement between one or more Member States and one or more third countries, such as a memorandum 
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contains interpretation of Union law, sets the conditions for energy supply (such as volumes and prices) or 
the development of energy infrastructures’. See Van Vooren (n 55) 69. 
  
72 Proposal to reform the IGA Decision, recital 11. 
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early stage, and by avoiding cancellation or delay costs, the new IGA decision provides 
legal certainty to investors and project promoters.75     
The IGA Decision was issued on the basis of Article 194 TFEU and so is the proposal to 
reform it. The mandatory ex-ante Commission control included under the new proposal 
entails a shift of competences from Member States to the EU. This action is justified by 
virtue of the application of the subsidiarity principle, whereby in case of shared 
competence, the Union can take action only when it is more effective than the action taken 
at national, regional or local level.76 Past experience has shown that the ex-post control 
included under the IGA Decision did not work, creating substantial damage for the 
investment projects concerned and, ultimately, for the EU citizens who could not benefit 
from the infrastructure envisioned. A preventive check, such as the one outlined in the 
new IGA Decision, is certainly a ‘more effective’ option to achieve the compliance of 
IGAs with EU law. 
4.2 Commercial Agreements of the EU Market Operators    
With the adoption of the new IGA Decision, all Member States concerned will receive 
the same level of information on cross-border projects. This will help avoiding double 
investments and infrastructure gaps.77 However, the IGA Decision is only one piece of a 
larger puzzle. Indeed, taken alone, it is not enough to secure the gas supply because it 
                                                   
75 European Commission, ‘Intergovernmental Agreements in Energy’ (2016) <europa.eu/rapid/press-
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International Energy Law Review 181-189 <https://ssrn.com/abstract=2911579> accessed 18 June 2017. 
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addresses only EU Members and their intergovernmental energy agreements with non-
EU countries (inter-state level).  
To tackle this issue, the Energy Union strategy adopted in February 2015 indicates that: 
‘an important element in ensuring energy (and in particular gas) security is full 
compliance of agreements related to the buying of energy from third countries with EU 
law’.78 This was reaffirmed by the European Council on 19 March 2015, when it called 
for ‘full compliance with EU law of all agreements related to the buying of gas from 
external suppliers, notably by reinforcing transparency of such agreements and 
compatibility with EU energy security provisions’.79 With this aim, the EU has planned 
to adopt a revised Regulation 2010/994/EU on the safeguard security of gas supply (the 
‘SoS Regulation’).80 This was the first detailed intervention issued as a response to the 
2009 Russian-Ukrainian gas crisis, aimed at securing the EU supply of gas. The SoS 
Regulation repealed Directive 2004/67/EC,81 which set out basic security of supply 
standards and emergency mechanisms to be used when markets alone are no longer able 
to deal adequately with a gas supply disruption.82 The SoS Regulation requires the 
designation of a competent authority in charge of guaranteeing energy security, the setup 
preventive action and emergency plans, the installation of permanent bi-directional 
capacity on all cross-border interconnections between Member States and the disclosure 
                                                   
78 European Commission, ‘Consultation on the Review of the Intergovernmental Agreements Decision’ 
(2015) <https://ec.europa.eu/energy/en/consultations/consultation-review-intergovernmentalagreements-
decision> accessed 22 August 2016.  
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81 Council Directive 2004/67/EC of 26 April 2004 concerning measures to safeguard security of natural gas 
supply [2004] OJ L127/92. 
 





to national regulatory authorities (‘NRAs’) of basic information of commercial contracts 
between undertakings and third suppliers (e.g. duration, contracted total and daily 
volumes, contracted delivery points), to be notified in aggregate form to the 
Commission.83  
At the heart of the 2016 draft proposal to revise the SoS regulation is a call for mandatory 
regional risk assessments, preventive action and emergency plans. These will follow a 
pre-set template, be peer-reviewed and require Commission approval.84 The preventive 
action and emergency plans will play a key role in the overall coordination mechanism, 
ensuring that the security of supply framework is correctly applied and that no measure 
that could jeopardise the security of supply of another Member State, region or the EU as 
a whole is taken by single EU Member States. Members of the Energy Community will 
also play a role in this coordination process.85 Further, in accordance with Articles 122 
and 194 TFEU, the proposal introduces a solidarity principle among Member States to 
ensure the supply of households and essential social services, such as healthcare, in case 
their supply was affected due to a severe crisis.86 However, the solidarity mechanism will 
apply when markets alone are no longer able to deal adequately with a gas supply 
disruption. Although a call for European solidarity was present in Regulation 994/2010 
                                                   
83 SoS Regulation, Article 13. 
 
84 European Commission, ‘Security of Gas Supply Regulation’ (2016) <http://europa.eu/rapid/press-
release_MEMO-16-308_en.htm> accessed 23 August 2016. Accordingly, a peer review team per region 
composed of experts from Member States and from the European Network of Transmission System 
Operators for Gas (ENTSOG) will be established. 
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and even in its predecessor document, in the new proposal the solidarity principle is now 
linked to clearly defined obligations for the first time.87  
The new regulation was published in the Official Journal of the European Union on 28 
October 2017 and entered into force on 1 November 2017, except for the provisions 
relating to the solidarity mechanism which will apply from 1 December 2018.88 In 
addition to the above, the text adopted requires gas companies to notify national 
authorities of all security of supply relevant contracts.89 These are contracts for more than 
one year that place more than 28% of the gas consumption in a Member State in the hands 
of a single third country supplier or of its affiliated companies.90 Moreover, the 
Commission and national authorities may ask to scrutinise contracts that do not meet the 
28% threshold, if they deem it necessary to assess security of supply, and may request 
additional information, including contractual information, in non-emergency situations.91 
This information would be added to what companies are already obliged to communicate 
under the SoS regulation.   
As for the IGA Decision, the issuance of the SoS Regulation and its reform are based on 
Article 194 TFEU and the application of the subsidiarity principle. Given the importance 
of the matter and the poor results of the first EU intervention (Directive 2004/67/EC),92   
                                                   
87 Ruven Fleming, ‘New EU Gas Security of Supply Regulation 2017/1938’ (2017) 
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this piece of legislation has been issued as a regulation, which is directly applicable in the 
territory of EU MSs.  
In any event, a fully-integrated energy market will not be easy to achieve. For example, 
it took five years to convince Romania (which has sufficient amounts of gas) Bulgaria 
(which has no gas) and Greece (which has an LNG terminal) to work together.93 
Moreover, the regional approach outlined in the SoS Regulation could, in the end, result 
in incompatible markets, missing out on the benefits of bringing disparate nations 
together.94 Indeed, EU Members widely differ in terms of energy mix and production, 
and, because of that, the needs of one Member are not always the same as another Member 
across the continent.    
5. The Characteristics of the New EU Approach  
The 2003 European Security Strategy did not include energy security in its threat 
assessment, which was dominated by the aftermath of the 9/11.95 The first attempt to set 
out a common European energy policy took place in 2006 by means of a Commission’s 
Green Paper,96 and was followed by a series of policy documents which enhanced the 
need for a coherent approach vis-à-vis third suppliers. This is because the external energy 
policy is very much the external projection of the internal market, which at that time was 
                                                   
93 Natasha Georgiou and Andrea Rocco, ’The Energy Union as an Instrument of Global Governance in EU-
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History and International Relations 257. 
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95 Van Vooren (n 55) 23. European Council, ‘European Security Strategy - A Secure Europe in a Better 
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still under deep construction. The Lisbon Treaty codified most of the policy process that 
preceded it.97 This was explicitly recognised in the 2020 programme, where we read:   
A common EU energy policy has evolved around the common objective to 
ensure the uninterrupted physical availability of energy products and services 
on the market, at a price which is affordable for all consumers (private and 
industrial), while contributing to the EU’s wider social and climate goals. The 
central goals for energy policy (security of supply, competitiveness, and 
sustainability) are now laid down in the Lisbon Treaty.98 
When carefully analysed, the policy instruments and the related documents that predate 
the Lisbon Treaty outline a trend towards the security dimension of the EU energy policy. 
The centralisation of the energy competences to the EU is the key feature of the current 
approach to the energy sector of the European institutions and finds evidence in the 
legislation issued after Lisbon, which moves from the clauses of the Treaty and makes a 
step further. This trend is reflected also in the 2016 legislative proposals analysed in the 
previous sections of this chapter. 
Thanks to the introduction of Article 194 TFEU and the application of the subsidiarity 
principle, the EU could take more ambitious policies in the energy field such as the 
Energy Union project, which, as seen above, extends the EU control not only to Member 
States’ actions but also to non-binding measures and to private undertakings’ commercial 
agreements.   
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The new EU approach to the energy sector will certainly impact on the relationship of the 
Union with third countries. Indeed, the WTO violations described in the previous chapter 
towards non-EU suppliers partly derived from the objectives of the EU regulation – 
focused since the first interventions on achieving the internal energy market rather than 
on securing the EU energy supply99 – and from the limited powers in the energy field the 
EU was granted under the Treaties before Lisbon.   
As seen in chapter I, deprived of any competence to directly intervene in the energy field, 
the EU tried to prevent EU and non-EU gas incumbents from using their market power 
through the regulation of the internal market and competition law enforcement. The 
completion of an internal market which could guarantee a level-playing field between the 
market operators was indeed the most important tool to enhance the security of supply of 
the Union.100   
The post-Lisbon approach could overcome the lack of coherence towards third countries 
underlined in Chapter I, because the key aspects of the investments to be made will be 
increasingly negotiated with one single voice with the support of the EU institutions. 
Besides, it is worth noting that most of the trade law problems detected in Chapter III 
about the Gas Directive relate to the potential discrimination of foreign providers 
operating in the EU territory. With the full implementation of the new measures, the 
security of the EU energy supply will be guaranteed both at political and at commercial 
level, without the need to adopt discriminatory internal market rules, through: (i) inter-
state negotiation, with the application of new IGA Decision and Regulation 1219/2012, 
                                                   
99 The Third Energy Package was adopted after the 2006 Commission Green Paper, which put 
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both concerning the negotiation and conclusion of international agreements; and (ii) 
company conducts’ analysis, through the scrutiny of all security of supply relevant 
agreements (new SoS Regulation) and the possibility to adopt demand aggregation 
mechanisms.  
Remarkably, the application of the new IGA Decision could indirectly extend the EU 
acquis to third countries. This is another example of export of EU law.101 Indeed, the 
request for compliance with EU law as condition precedent for the signature of IGAs 
between a Member State and a third country forces third States to abide by EU law and 
its provisions. It is worth noting that the new IGA Decision does not require only the 
respect for EU competition rules, but also demands the compliance with all EU legislation 
by the IGA to be negotiated, extending this obligation to non-binding instruments.102 The 
attempt to export the EU principles to neighbouring countries, typical of the post-2006 
Green Paper period,103 is based on the assumption that if all States adhere to these 
principles, then energy relations will improve and the market itself will ensure the security 
of the gas supply.104 However, in a break from the past – where the EU action has driven 
third entities’ behaviours – the new IGA charges Member States with the obligation to 
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Extraterritorial Effects of Legislation and Policies in the EU and US (AFET 2012). 
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make third countries abide by EU rules. MSs are thus treated as ‘agents of 
implementation’ of the EU external energy policy. This is a key aspect of the post-Lisbon 
approach to the energy sector and is reflected also by the choice of the legislative tools 
chosen: Under the security of supply perspective, the EU substituted a 2004 directive with 
a directly applicable instrument (SoS Regulation), eliminating the space of manoeuvre 
for EU Members.        
In addition to Article 194 TFEU, which deals specifically with energy, the centralisation 
of foreign direct investments at the EU level through Article 207 TFEU and Regulation 
2012/1219/EU could have a positive impact on EU energy policy. Indeed, the CJEU 
explained that the exclusive competence of the EU in this area covers almost all aspects 
of FDIs, excluding only non-direct investments (portfolio investments) and ISDS 
mechanisms.105  
In a field of exclusive EU competence, such as FDI, Member States are able to adopt a 
binding act only ‘if so empowered by the Union or for the implementation of Union 
acts’.106 Instead, since energy under Article 194 TFEU is a shared competence, MSs are 
free to conclude international agreements as long as this is in compliance with the rules 
on competence allocation – i.e. insofar the Union did not rule on the matter.107 Moreover, 
pursuant to Article 194(2) TFEU, MSs retain ‘the right to determine the conditions for 
exploiting energy resource, its choice between different energy sources, and the general 
structure of its supply’.  
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In principle, international energy agreements between the Union and third States would 
be mixed agreements which are negotiated, concluded and managed jointly by the EU 
and its MSs.108 However, as the EU has occupied the field in the areas of electricity and 
gas to a large extent, it is reasonable to assume that in case of international agreements in 
these areas, the EU would have exclusive competence by now.109 This is justified by 
Article 3 TFEU whereby ‘The Union shall also have exclusive competence for the 
conclusion of an international agreement when its conclusion is provided for in a 
legislative act of the Union or is necessary to enable the Union to exercise its internal 
competence’.  
Therefore, the EU could now sign international energy agreements with third countries 
both on the basis of the application of Article 194 combined with Article 3 TFEU and on 
the basis of Article 207 TFEU. Remarkably, the adoption of an international agreement 
has more burdensome procedures under Article 207 than under Article 194.110 The 
dividing line between the two options is the following: to the extent in which the object 
and main focus of the agreement is to generally increase energy security, EU institutions 
must rely on Article 194. By contrast, insofar the action of the EU is primarily to facilitate, 
foster and regulate trade relations with third countries, the EU shall base its action on 
Article 207.111   
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In light of the above, with the adoption of the Lisbon Treaty, the EU could improve its 
energy relationships with Russia by facilitating the negotiation of a new agreement 
substituting the PCA – and its soft commitments – as well as the single BITs signed 
between EU Members and Russia (as indicated by Regulation 1219/2012).  
From the trade law perspective, we have seen that the discrimination towards third 
countries’ providers of Article 11 of the Gas Directive depends to a large extent on 
whether the issuance of the certification required to operate as transportation system 
operator (‘TSO’) in the EU would jeopardize the security of supply of the Member State 
where the company operates and the security of supply of the Union as a whole.112 To 
evaluate the risks related to the security of supply, the relevant NRA takes into account, 
inter alia, the rights and the obligations of the EU in relation to third countries arising 
from international law (first and foremost, the treaties in force between the Union and the 
home country of the requesting entity), as well as the specific circumstances of the case.113  
The negotiation of a detailed BIT governing the energy relationship between the EU and 
Russia, possible after the Lisbon Treaty, would thus be taken into account for the positive 
assessment of the relevant NRA. However, this eventuality would not remedy the 
discriminatory effect of the Gas Directive on the other non-EU countries which have no 
energy agreement in place with the EU. In addition to that, an eventual EU-Russia 
agreement, even in accordance with the provisions of the Gas Directive as required by 
the IGA Decision, would not by default prevent Russia from bringing the Gas Directive 
before the WTO Dispute Settlement Body (‘DSB’) to challenge the issues underlined in 
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Chapter III. This is in line with the findings of Peru – Agricultural Product case-law.114 
Accordingly, the express or tacit acceptance of EU law made by Russia would not imply 
per se a consent to relinquish its rights to contest the matter before the WTO DSB.115 The 
violation of the WTO rules outlined in Chapter III would thus still be relevant and 
justiciable, unless the EU decided to amend the Gas Directive.116  
The post-Lisbon centralisation process will be a crucial means to enhance the bargaining 
power of the EU in relation to the supplier countries sitting at the negotiating table. This 
was one of the weaknesses of the pre-Lisbon approach which derived from the disjunction 
between the ‘internal energy policy’, characterised by the pervasive regulation of the 
                                                   
114 Peru — Additional Duty on Imports of Certain Agricultural Products – Report of the Appellate Body 
(20 July 2015) WT/DS457/AB/R. 
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market operators combined with a strong antitrust enforcement, and the ‘external energy 
policy’, characterised by bilateralism and inconsistency, given that the energy field was 
an exclusive competence of EU Members. In that period, the security of supply of the 
Union was mainly left to the agreements between EU companies − often acting as 
representatives of their States − and third countries’ suppliers.117 In this context, the 
conditions of the commercial agreements signed by market operators depended on the 
bargaining power of the parties involved, which, in case of European companies, was 
weakened by the antitrust and the regulatory interventions of the EU institutions. This led 
to the paradoxical situation in which a more competitive EU internal energy market would 
worsen the security of supply of the Union because of the diminished bargaining power 
of the domestic operators vis-à-vis their suppliers.118    
Things seem to have changed after the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty, with the 
adoption of a more coherent external approach. Most obviously, it was the economically 
less powerful Members which have been limited in their negotiation capacities and 
consequently have been hampered in concluding advantageous investment treaties.119 
However, it is likely that the bargaining power of the EU as a whole will be maximised, 
resulting in advantages for all EU MSs. Moreover, good deals with clear protections 
granted to the third parties involved could open the door to significant investments, 
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especially by entities not operating in the energy field, which do not have to abide by the 
unbundling rules of the Gas Directive (e.g. investment funds).120  
6. Interim Conclusion 
In this chapter, we analysed the EU post-Lisbon approach to the energy regulation and 
outlined its distinctive features. We have underlined that the innovations brought about 
by the Lisbon Treaty and the resulting regulations could overcome some of the problems 
of the pre-Lisbon approach described in Chapter I, rebalancing the pre-Lisbon 
bilateralism by setting up centralised procedures which allow fair negotiations with non-
EU countries.  
The centralisation of the energy competences in the EU could constitute the basis for a 
new international agreement in the field (in case of common political will), which 
supersedes the disparate BITs already signed by EU Members and the mild provisions of 
the PCA. All of this would be beneficial to the EU, giving coherence to its external energy 
policy, and would help to guarantee the security of its gas supply.  
However, this new approach does not change the problems related to the possible 
violation of WTO rules outlined in the previous chapter. Unless the EU amended Article 
11 of the Gas Directive, Russia still could push for a WTO decision on the case, which is 
now pending before the DSB.  
  
 
                                                   






‘Geopolitics is all about leverage. We cannot make ourselves safer abroad 
unless we change our behaviour at home’1  
This quotation from the three-time Pulitzer Prize winner and US opinion leader Thomas 
Friedman, echoes the broad definition of geopolitics that we gave in the introduction of 
this thesis, where we described geopolitics as a network of interactions of different 
categories of subjects on a global scale.2  
This thesis examined the EU-Russia energy relationship from the European perspective 
and considered the interactions that, as Friedman has observed, form the basis of 
geopolitical action. In so doing, we have also elucidated the questions posited in the 
introduction of this thesis.3   
The previous chapters reviewed the three elements of geopolitical manoeuvring as 
defined by Friedman: (i) leverage (and how it affects the security of the EU’s natural gas 
supply); (ii) ‘behaviour at home’ (i.e. EU regulations for the energy industry); and (iii) 
change of behaviour (i.e. how the adoption of the Lisbon Treaty and the promulgation of 
the ensuing  regulations changed the nature of the EU’s leverage and behaviour). In the 
context of the EU-Russian energy relationship, we have noticed that the high interaction 
                                                   
1 Thomas Friedman, ‘The Big American Leak’ (2010) <http://www.nytimes.com/2010/12/05/opinion/05f 
riedman.html> accessed 9 January 2017. 
 
2 See introduction, section 3. 
 
3 In section 8 of the introduction, we outlined the following questions: what is the actual impact of the 
current international legal framework on the energy relationships between the EU and its suppliers? Are 
the EU measures taken in the natural gas field compliant with the international law rules binding the Union? 




of the elements outlined above is explained by the strong economic interdependence 
existing between the two parties. To date, Russian supply is indispensable for the EU as 
well as European demand is fundamental for Russia.   
From a legal perspective, we analysed all the bilateral and multilateral legal instruments 
that govern the EU-Russia partnership and reached the conclusion that, for the time being, 
the only legal framework capable of determining the EU-Russia energy relation is 
provided by the World Trade Organization (‘WTO’) rules. The absence of a bilateral 
treaty crystallising a trust-based EU-Russia energy relationship leaves the task of energy 
regulation to the WTO, whose rules and precepts result from a combination of generally 
applicable multilateral treaties. Specifically, we focused on the WTO rules governing 
trade in energy goods and services, the compliance with which is the object of a case 
before the WTO Dispute Settlement Body involving the EU and Russia.   
At the EU level, we focused on Directive 2009/73/EC (‘the Gas Directive’), the primary 
piece of legislation regulating the EU natural gas market, and found that it is likely in 
breach of WTO rules in relation to its unbundling rules (Article 9) and to the restrictions 
imposed on non-EU companies (Article 11). Moreover, the Gas Directive seems to 
discourage investments by domestic and foreign market operators by imposing strict 
shareholding requirements and leaving a considerable discretion to national regulatory 
authorities and the European Commission regarding unbundling and third party access 
exemptions for new energy projects. In the end, this could go against the security 
objectives of the Union.  
The foregoing findings give Russia a powerful weapon that it can wield in favour of 




Failure to comply with a WTO Dispute Settlement Body’s ruling permits recourse of 
Russia to two remedies: voluntary compensation and suspension of concessions and other 
obligations, in accordance with Article 22 of the WTO Dispute Settlement 
Understanding.4 Besides, the possibility of putting the third country clause and ownership 
unbundling out of action would have a symbolic meaning, since the European 
Commission has strongly supported the adoption of these provisions.5 
Notwithstanding to the above, Russia does not seem willing to pull the trigger on the 
WTO adjudication, at least for now. The threat of a WTO litigation may be used as a 
bargaining chip with the EU Commission in the Gazprom antitrust case.6 This might 
explain the silence around the WTO case since the filing of the request for consultation 
in 2014. If true, the WTO case could be interpreted as another Russian retaliation against 
the EU’s gas policy, after the adoption of internal legislation aimed at hampering the EU 
antitrust investigation against Gazprom.7 Once the antitrust investigation has concluded, 
                                                   
4 Pursuant to Article 22 of the WTO Dispute Settlement Understanding: ‘1. Compensation and the 
suspension of concessions or other obligations are temporary measures available in the event that the 
recommendations and rulings are not implemented within a reasonable period of time. However, neither 
compensation nor the suspension of concessions or other obligations is preferred to full implementation of 
a recommendation to bring a measure into conformity with the covered agreements. Compensation is 
voluntary and, if granted, shall be consistent with the covered agreements. 2. If the Member concerned fails 
to bring the measure found to be inconsistent with a covered agreement into compliance therewith or 
otherwise comply with the recommendations and rulings within the reasonable period of time determined 
pursuant to paragraph 3 of Article 21, such Member shall, if so requested, and no later than the expiry of 
the reasonable period of time, enter into negotiations with any party having invoked the dispute settlement 
procedures, with a view to developing mutually acceptable compensation. If no satisfactory compensation 
has been agreed within 20 days after the date of expiry of the reasonable period of time, any party having 
invoked the dispute settlement procedures may request authorization from the DSB to suspend the 
application to the Member concerned of concessions or other obligations under the covered agreements.’ 
 
5 See Chapter II, section 2.1.4. 
 
6 Murphy shows that the European Commission uses EU competition law for geopolitical purports. See 
Aisling Murphy, ‘Juggling Geopolitics and Competition Law: An Analysis of the Role Geopolitics Plays 
in the Application of Competition Law in Upstream Gas Contracts’ (2014) <https://www.coleurope. 
eu/system/files_force/research-paper/bm> accessed 6 January 2018. 
 





we will be able to evaluate the effectiveness of the WTO threat and the validity of the 
speculation we made.  
A study similar to that made on the gas market could then be made on the EU electricity 
market given that Directive 2009/72/EC, part of the Third Energy Package, sets out 
equivalent obligations to those provided under the Gas Directive for third-country 
electricity suppliers. Similarly, the electricity market is characterised by a significant 
cross-border trade between Russia and some Eastern European countries.8 This could lead 
to the opening of a WTO case such as the one seen in case of natural gas.  
With the Lisbon Treaty, the EU adopted a radically different approach to the energy 
sector. Thanks to the introduction in the TFEU of a specific section on energy and the 
extension of EU competences under the Common Commercial Policy – which currently 
covers foreign direct investments – the EU can now negotiate with its energy partners on 
equal footing. In this way, the EU could overcome the bilateralism and the inconsistencies 
characterising the pre-Lisbon period, paving the way for a more coherent external energy 
approach.   
The post-Lisbon energy legislation focuses on the security of supply, through the 
regulation of EU Members’ energy agreements (through the IGA Decision and its 
amendments) and the scrutiny of commercial agreements between undertakings (through 
the SoS Regulation and its amendments). The measures adopted differ from pre-Lisbon 
                                                   
8 The provisions on unbundling and the third country clause laid down under the electricity and the gas 
directives are equivalent. An example of significant cross-border trade of electricity between EU Members 
and third countries can be found between Lithuania and Russia. See Monika Kokstaite, ‘Lithuania’s Energy 
Transition at a Crossroads’ (2017) <https://energytransition.org/2017/09/lithuanias-energy-transition-at-a-





legislation – which targeted the internal market, such as the Gas Directive – and are based 
on the extensive application of the subsidiarity principle, which, combined with Article 
194 TFEU, is the cornerstone of the new EU energy policy. This approach is reflected 
also in the recent proposal to amend the Gas Directive, currently under discussion.9  
The centralisation approach taken by the EU theoretically secures more compliance with 
WTO principles because all aspects related to non-EU companies can be regulated ex ante 
with the State of origin (through bilateral treaties negotiated by the Commission and 
intergovernmental agreements in compliance with EU law principles) without the need to 
adopt discriminatory market behaviours, such as the ones described in Chapter III.  
The post-Lisbon centralisation process cannot succeed without the application of the 
principle of cooperation set out under Article 4(3) TFEU, which today is regarded as the 
panacea for cases regarding the division of powers between the EU and its Member 
States.10 Indeed, cooperation is essential in ensuring coherence in the external action and 
the international representation of the EU, eliminating any incompatibility between EU 
law and the actions made or the agreements signed by MSs and third countries.11 For this 
reason, the legislative interventions after the Lisbon Treaty specifically mandate 
                                                   
9 European Commission, ‘Commission proposal for a Directive amending Directive 2009/73/EC’ COM 
(2017) 660. The proposal made aims at clarifying the applicability of the Gas Directive in the case of 
pipelines entering the European Union from third countries. The EC underlines that ‘following legal 
analysis’ of the EC legal service - dated 27 September 2017 - existing pipelines connecting the EU to third 
countries fall outside the scope of the Gas Directive. The proposal extends the provisions of the Gas 
Directive also to those pipelines. Again, this proposal does not seem to be a suitable tool to guarantee 
foreign investors. The EU itself, through Commissioner Sefcovic, warned Gazprom that this proposal could 
impact on the Nord Stream 2 pipeline. In particular, the Commissioner ironically affirmed ‘I would really 
think twice, or many more times [to invest in Nord Stream 2], simply because there are a lot of 
uncertainties’. See Andrew Rettman, ‘Russia Pipeline Is Investment Risk, EU Commissioner Warns’ 
(2017) <https://euobserver.com/energy/140404> accessed 12 April 2018. 
   
10 Leal-Arcas (n 6) 30. 
 





obligations of consultation and information.12 In this respect, the CJEU has underlined 
that EU MSs and institutions are not only expected to try their best to  inform and consult 
one another but also ‘must’ comply with these procedural obligations.13 Remarkably, the 
centralisation process which characterises the post-Lisbon approach reflects the 
worldwide tendency to regulate the energy matters at the supra-national level, which we 
described in the introduction of this work. In principle, this process allows the EU to 
become one of the leading parties of the international energy arena, as it can negotiate the 
energy needs of 500 million high-spending consumers. This is key to put downward 
pressure on the prices negotiated with suppliers and, consequently, enhance the welfare 
and the security of final consumers. 
From a business perspective, the reason why Gazprom still holds a dominant position − 
Gazprom’s gas supplies to Europe and Turkey reached an all-time record in 2017 − is 
simply because it sells its natural gas at highly competitive prices.14 With the construction 
of the Nord Stream and the plan to double its capacity through the Nord Stream 2, Russia 
                                                   
12 See for example Article 6 of Regulation 1219/2012/EU, entitled ‘Duty of Cooperation’ and recital 7 of 
the proposal for the new IGA Decision. 
 
13 Case C-459/03 Commission v Ireland [2006] ECR I-4635 para 59. 
 
14 Russia’s gas exports to Europe and Turkey rose by 8.1% to a record high 193.9 billion cubic meters 
(Bcm) in 2017. See Reuters, ‘Russian Gas Exports to Europe Hit All-Time High in 2017’ (2018) 
<https://www.epmag.com/russian-gas-exports-europe-hit-all-time-high-2017-1676781> accessed 15 April 
2018. See also Danila Bochkarev, ‘Gazprom Plays Ball: The Depoliticization of the European Gas Market’ 
(2017) <http://energypost.eu/depoliticization-european-gas-market/> accessed 16 June 2017. For an 
accurate analysis of Gazprom pricing policies see James Henderson and Jack Sharples, ‘Gazprom in Europe 
– Two ‘Anni Mirabiles’, but Can It Continue?’ (2017) Oxford Institute for Energy Studies, 3 
<https://www.oxfordenergy.org/wpcms/wp-content/uploads/2018/03/Gazprom-in-Europe-%E2%80%93-





could sell even more gas to the EU and benefit from the transit fees savings normally due 
to Ukraine.15  
Whether piped via Nord Stream or through other routes, Russian gas can be priced more 
cheaply than liquefied natural gas (‘LNG’), which, in addition to the domestic price of 
gas, includes the cost of liquefaction, ocean transportation, and regasification.16 The 
ability to procure non-Russian sourced gas from cargoes allows the EU to use LNG as a 
‘credible threat’ only if Russian piped gas becomes too expensive.17 This essentially 
lowers prices for Russian gas and puts a ceiling on Russian piped gas with respect to 
internationally sourced LNG.18    
Gazprom’s current market behaviour is part of a precise non-confrontational strategy 
towards the EU institutions, which allows the company to operate stably in the EU 
                                                   
15 In 2015 Gazprom paid to Naftogaz, the Ukraine gas monopolist, $1.7bnl transit fees for transiting 64.1 
bcm of Russian natural gas to the EU. See Thierry Bros, ‘Has Ukraine Scored an Own-Goal with its Transit 
Fee Proposal?’(2016) Oxford Institute for Energy Studies, 1 <https://www.oxfordenergy.org/wpcms/wp-
content/uploads/2016/11/Has-Ukraine-scored-an-own-goal-with-its-transit-fee-proposal.pdf> accessed 5 
January 2018. 
 
16  Nathalie Hinchey and Anna Mikulska, ‘LNG Versus Russian Gas in Central and Eastern Europe: Playing 
Poker on A Continental Scale’ (2017) <https://www.forbes.com/sites/thebakersinstitute /2017/08/24/lng-
versus-russian-gas-in-central-and-eastern-europe-playing-poker-on-a-continentalscale/#36de1ea22c3a> 
accessed 5 January 2018. 
 
17 EU shale gas production cannot be considered as a valuable substitute of piped gas. See Arthur Neslen 
and Frédéric Simon, ‘Europe Abandons Hopes of US-Style Shale Gas Revolution’ (2016) 
<https://www.euractiv.com/section/trade-society/news/europe-abandons-hopes-of-us-style-shale-gas-revo 
lution/> accessed 3 March 2018. Nowadays, LNG costs some 30% more than Gazprom’s gas in Europe 
supplied through its ‘most expensive’ route, via Ukraine. See Elena Mazneva and Anna Shiryaevskaya, 
‘Putin's Russia Seen Dominating European Gas for Two Decades’ (2017) <https://www.bloomberg.com/ 
news/articles/2017-03-01/putin-s-russia-seen-dominating-european-energy-for-two-decades> accessed 12 
November 2017.   
 
18 Nathalie Hinchey and Anna Mikulska, ‘LNG Versus Russian Gas in Central and Eastern Europe: Playing 
Poker on a Continental Scale’ (2017) <https://www.forbes.com/sites/thebakersinstitute/2017/08/24/lng-
versus-russian-gas-in-central-and-eastern-europe-playing-poker-on-a-continental-scale/#36de1ea22c3a> 
accessed 7 January 2018. As underlined by Henderson and Sharples, EU politicians concerned by the 
current market share of Gazprom in EU imports face a dilemma, since it is difficult to impose restrictions 
on a competitive source of energy when the European Commission and national governments have spent 
20 years creating a liberalised market to encourage lower prices for consumers. See James Henderson and 




market, while consolidating its position in the upstream market and investing in the long-
term diversification of its business. Indeed, because of time constraints the company faces 
the impossibility to diversify its demand side in the short-term and will operate its first 
pipeline to China only from December 2019.19 For these reasons, the EU is still vital for 
the company’s business and, consequently, for Russia’s GDP. The non-confrontational 
attitude of Gazprom is witnessed by two other facts: the 2017 decision to settle the EU 
antitrust case, offering commitments to the European Commission in a way to avoid 
possible antitrust sanctions;20 and the sale of the stakes held in European TSOs to abide 
by the Gas Directive, which find in the Lithuanian Lietuvos Dujos a case in point.21  
In the light of the above, lacking any strong bilateral commitment, it seems that to date 
EU-Russia energy relationships are still driven by market-based mechanisms and 
opportunity reasons. This scenario could change only with the signature of a new 
agreement with a balanced regulation of the respective stances of the parties. In this 
respect, in a break with the past, the post-Lisbon approach seems to offer the right tools 
                                                   
19 OAO Gazprom, ‘Press Release: Russian Gas Supplies to China via Power of Siberia to Start in December 
2019’ (2017) <http://www.gazprom.com/press/news/2017/july/article340477/> accessed 26 November 
2017. 
 
20 OAO Gazprom, ‘Proposals for Commitments – COMP/39.816 Gazprom Commitments under Article 9 
of Council Regulation No. 1/2003’ (2017) <http://ec.europa.eu/competition/antitrust/cases/g2/ 
gazprom_commitments.pdf> accessed 26 November 2017. 10% of the global turnover of the company is 
the maximum fine which can be imposed by the European Commission to sanction the breach of EU 
antitrust rules. At the time of writing (April 2017), the case is not closed yet, even though it seems the 
parties are near to settle. See Foo Yun Chee and Alissa de Carbonnel, ‘Exclusive: Gazprom Set to Gain EU 
Antitrust Approval with Concessions – Sources’ (2018) <https://www.reuters.com/article/us-eu-gazprom-
antitrust-exclusive/exclusive-gazprom-set-to-gain-eu-antitrust-approval-with-concessions-sources-idUSK 
CN1HA1V4> accessed 17 April 2018. 
 
21 Linas Jegelevicius, ‘Gazprom Drops One Arbitration Case Against Lithuania’ (2015) 





to achieve a new equilibrium in the EU-Russia energy relationship. This is a marked 
difference between the pre and the post Lisbon approaches. 





The possibility of negotiating with one voice is key for the EU. All available market data 
show that the EU will be increasingly dependent on foreign sources of gas in the future. 
According to BP, overall indigenous production of gas in Europe (EU plus Norway) has 
decreased from 299.5 bcm in 2004 to 236 bcm in 2016 (out of an overall consumption of 
about 400 bcm).22 This number could fall further to 170 bcm in 2035.23  The International 
Energy Agency forecasts that, even with the adoption of the energy efficiency and green 
production already planned,24 in the near future the EU will need massive natural gas 
                                                   
22 British Petroleum, ‘BP Statistical Review of World Energy June 2017’ (2017) 30 <https://www.bp.com 
/content/dam/bp/en/corporate/pdf/energy-economics/statistical-review-2017/bp-statistical-review-of-worl 
d-energy-2017-full-report.pdf> accessed 6 January 2018; European Commission, ‘Quarterly Report on 
European Gas Markets’ (2016) <https://ec.europa.eu/energy/sites/ener/files/documents/quarterly_report 
_on_european_gas_markets_q4_2015-q1_2016.pdf> accessed 10 January 2018. See also Henderson and 
Sharples (n 14) 9. 
 
23 Cedigaz, ‘Medium and Long-Term Natural Gas Outlook’ (2015) <http://www.snam.it 
/opencms/handle404?exporturi=/export/sites/snam/repository/media/energymorning/allegati_energy_mor
ning/20150217_1.pdf> accessed 6 January 2018. 
 
24 International Energy Agency, ‘World Energy Outlook 2016’ (2016) 32-37 <https://www.iea.org/media/ 
publications/weo/WEO2016Chapter1.pdf> accessed 6 January 2018. The ‘Current Policies Scenario’ 
depicts a path for the global energy system shorn of the implementation of any new policies or measures 
beyond those already supported by specific implementing measures in place as of mid-2016. The ‘450 




imports to fuel its economy (see Figure 4, Tagliapietra and Zachmann). Given that the 
choice of a commodity is mainly driven by its price, it is likely that Russia will be the 
main gas supplier of the Union also in the next 25 years.25 Norway, which to date is the 
second largest EU supplier (see Figure 5 below, Eurostat),26 in a few years will face 
declining production of gas,27 and its state-owned company, Statoil, rather than focusing 
on the exploitation of new gas fields, recently announced massive investments in 
renewables sources of energy in the years to come.28 




                                                   
temperature increase in 2100 to 2 degrees Celsius above pre-industrial levels. The charts have been 
elaborated by Simone Tagliapietra and Georg Zachmann in ‘Rethinking the security of the European 
Union’s gas supply’ (2016) Bruegel Policy Contributions <http://bruegel.org/2016/01/rethinking-the-
security-of-the-european-unions-gas-supply/> accessed 8 January 2018. 
 
25 EurAsia Daily, ‘What Will Russia Lose Refusing from Gas Pipelines Bypassing Ukraine?’ (2017) 
<https://eadaily.com/en/news/2017/08/04/what-will-russia-lose-refusing-from-gas-pipelines-bypassing-
ukraine> accessed 10 January 2018. Russia estimated reserves amount to 1,688 trillion cubic feet (Tcf) 
(approximately 23850 billion cubic metres), as of January 2017. See US Energy Information 
Administration, ‘Russia’ (2017) <https://www.eia.gov/beta/international/analysis.cfm?iso=RUS> accessed 
27 November 2017. 
  
26 Eurostat, ‘EU Imports of Energy Products - Recent Developments’ (2017) <http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/ 
statistics-explained/index.php/EU_imports_of_energy_products_-_recent_developments> accessed 7 
January 2018.  
 
27 Marshall Hall, ‘Norwegian Gas Exports: Assessment of Resources and Supply to 2035’ (2018) Oxford 
Institute for Energy Studies Paper 128, 2 <https://www.oxfordenergy.org/wpcms/wp-content/uploads/ 
2018/03/Norwegian-Gas-Exports-Assessment-of-Resources-and-Supply-to-2035-NG-127.pdf> accessed 7 
April 2018.  
 
28 Jude Clemente, ‘Norway's Natural Gas Problems Help U.S. LNG in Europe’ (2016) 
<https://www.forbes.com/sites/judeclemente/2016/03/02/norways-natural-gas-problems-help-u-s-lng-in-





Therefore, except for an unexpected break in the international order (which as explained 
in the introduction may occur due to technological, economic or political reasons), it 
appears that interdependence will be a key feature characterising the EU-Russia energy 
future. This is in line with International Energy Agency’s forecasts, which elect natural 
gas as ‘the clear winner for the next 25 years’ together with wind and solar powers.29  
However, we must keep in mind that while the EU security of gas supply debate to date 
is almost exclusively focused on Russia, it is in reality much wider because it potentially 
encompasses all EU gas supplies, which might be interrupted for either technical or 
geopolitical reasons – Libya is a recent example, due to the Arab Spring unrest.30 Because 
of different internal energy mixes and exposures towards Russia’ supply,31 some EU 
Members may be more vulnerable in case of gas shortages from countries other than 
Russia. For this reason, security of gas supply is an issue that concerns all EU Members, 
notwithstanding their actual dependence from Russian imports. Therefore, the EU should 
think of security of supply ‘globally’ and should not be overly concerned by the presence 
of a few key suppliers in its import portfolio, as it has at its disposal alternative supplies 
that can flexibly and rapidly be employed in case of unexpected shortages.32  
                                                   
29 International Energy Agency, ‘World Energy Outlook 2016 Sees Broad Transformations in the Global 
Energy Landscape’ (2016) <https://www.iea.org/newsroom/news/2016/november/world-energy-outlook-
2016.html> accessed 7 January 2018.  
 
30 Ali Shuaib and Marie-Louise Gumuchian, ‘Libya Stops Gas Exports to Italy After Militia Fight’ (2013) 
<https://www.reuters.com/article/us-libya-gas-italy/libya-stops-gas-exports-to-italy-after-militia-fight-idU 
SBRE92203A20130303?irpc=932> accessed 7 January 2018. 
 
31 See Chapter I, table 1. 
 
32 See chapter III, section 7, where we took the example of Czech Republic and Poland and the way they 





With that in mind, from a legal perspective, the EU should fully profit from the tools 
made available under the Lisbon Treaty and the ensuing regulations to consolidate the 
partnerships established with all its energy suppliers and prevent security of supply 
disruptions. Among the other measures to take, the EU should:  
(i) sign intergovernmental investment agreements with its current and potential 
supplier countries, which set out precise market access standards, investment 
incentives and guarantees for the undertakings willing to operate in the territory 
of the other party;33 
(ii) keep on investigating market operators’ commercial agreements (through which 
third countries can pursue their foreign policy objectives) in a way to guarantee 
their transparency, the absence of anti-competitive measures and backup 
mechanisms in case of energy shortages; 
(iii) fortify energy cooperation (e.g. in the form of memorandum of understanding, 
joint declaration etc.) with neighbouring countries, and, in particular, increasing 
the engagement with the Union for the Mediterranean − also in light of the 
possibility to exploit offshore gas discoveries between Egypt and Cyprus.34  
These actions will have to go along with business initiatives aimed at securing EU energy 
supply either directly (e.g. the development of the Southern Corridor)35 or indirectly (e.g. 
                                                   
33 These agreements could be characterised by the limitation of dispute settlement provisions as described 
in chapter IV, section 2.2. 
 
34 Tareq Baconi, ‘Pipelines and Pipedreams: How the EU Can Support a Regional Gas Hub in the Eastern 
Mediterranean’ (2017) <http://www.ecfr.eu/publications/summary/pipelines_and_pipedreams_how_the_ 
eu_can_support_a_regional_gas_hub_in_7276> accessed 8 January 2018. 
 
35 The ‘Southern Gas Corridor’ is a term used to describe planned infrastructure projects aimed at improving 
the security and diversity of the EU’s energy supply by bringing natural gas from the Caspian region to 
Europe. See Trans Adriatic Pipeline, ‘Southern Gas Corridor’ (2018) <https://www.tap-ag.com/the-




the exploitation of infrastructure unused capacity,36 investments in research and 
technology, a further push to renewable energy production and energy efficiency). In this 
respect, the Energy Union strategy seems pave the way for the achievement of EU 
security of supply interests, albeit its implementation by EU Members will require future 
analysis. 
With specific focus on Russia, the EU should firstly demonstrate the political will to 
renegotiate a new Partnership and Cooperation Agreement, now stopped as a sanction for 
the 2014 occupation of Crimea. The new agreement should cover not only trade but also 
investments, with the guarantees typical of BITs (most favoured nation, national 
treatment, fair and equitable treatment, prohibition of unlawful expropriations, guarantee 
of free transfer of funds, ISDS mechanisms). As seen in Chapter I, to date there is not a 
specific protection for the investments made after Russia’s termination of the Energy 
Charter Treaty. Until the conclusion of a new agreement, WTO rules would still be the 
only suitable legal tool to guide EU-Russia energy relationships.  
In the opinion of the author, a common EU energy policy, facilitated by the Lisbon Treaty, 
is indeed the only a way to surpass the tit-for-tat behaviours seen in the past, guaranteeing 
a framework to secure investments both for EU and Russian companies willing to invest 
in the territory of the other party. This would be coherent with the Energy Union plan – 
one of the most important pledges of the current European executive – which put ‘security 
of the energy supply’ as the cornerstone of the EU energy strategy, and would be 
                                                   
  





beneficial also for Russia, since it would secure the operation of Gazprom in Europe.37  
The possibility to negotiate with one party only representing the stances of all EU 
countries could make it easier both for the EU and for Russia to strike a proper balance 
between their sovereign interests and the protection of the investments made abroad by 
their nationals. This negotiation path would share the same logic adopted by the EU in 
the agreements with Canada (CETA) and Singapore (EUSFTA). This process will imply 
the restart of the negotiations stopped and the non-adoption of harsher sanctions against 
Russia, such as the ones voted by the US Congress in July 2017 and the others 
subsequently envisioned.  
Clearly, this proposal could call into question the EU alliance with Washington over the 
Ukrainian crisis which, in accordance with the definition of geopolitics we gave in the 
introduction of this work, extends to the interests and relations between the EU and the 
US which go beyond the energy field. However, given the strategic importance of Russian 
gas for the current and future energy security of the EU – a situation markedly different 
from the one of the US, which have no energy imports from Russia and are likely to 
become a natural gas net exporter in the next years – 38 a more pragmatic approach by the 
European institution seems to be appropriate for the benefit of EU citizens.  
 
                                                   
37 As seen in chapter I, section 3, Russian energy investments in the EU are of vital importance for the 
country. On the other side, roughly 75% of Russia’s FDIs stem from the EU and do not find sufficient 
protection. See European Commission, ‘Countries and Regions’ (2017) <http://ec.europa.eu/trade/policy/ 
countries-and-regions/countries/russia/> accessed 23 April 2017. 
 
38 US Energy Information Administration, ‘US Natural Gas Imports by Country’ (2017) 
<https://www.eia.gov/dnav/ng/ng_move_impc_s1_a.htm> accessed 20 April 2018. International Energy 






































DIRECTIVE 2009/73/EC OF THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND OF THE COUNCIL 
of 13 July 2009 
concerning common rules for the internal market in natural gas and repealing Directive 
2003/55/EC 
(Text with EEA relevance) 
THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND THE COUNCIL OF THE EUROPEAN UNION, 
Having regard to the Treaty establishing the European Community, and in particular Article 47(2) and 
Articles 55 and 95 thereof, 
Having regard to the proposal from the Commission, 
Having regard to the opinion of the European Economic and Social Committee (1), 
Having regard to the opinion of the Committee of the Regions (2), 
Acting in accordance with the procedure laid down in Article 251 of the Treaty (3), 
Whereas: 
(1) The internal market in natural gas, which has been progressively implemented 
throughout the Community since 1999, aims to deliver real choice for all consumers of 
the European Union, be they citizens or businesses, new business opportunities and 
more cross-border trade, so as to achieve efficiency gains, competitive prices, and 
higher standards of service, and to contribute to security of supply and sustainability. 
(2) 
Directive 2003/55/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 26 June 2003 
concerning common rules for the internal market in natural gas (4) has made a 
significant contribution towards the creation of such an internal market in natural gas. 
(3) 
The freedoms which the Treaty guarantees the citizens of the Union — inter alia, the 
free movement of goods, the freedom of establishment and the freedom to provide 
services — are achievable only in a fully open market, which enables all consumers 
freely to choose their suppliers and all suppliers freely to deliver to their customers. 
(4) However, at present, there are obstacles to the sale of gas on equal terms and without 
discrimination or disadvantages in the Community. In particular, non-discriminatory 
network access and an equally effective level of regulatory supervision in each Member 
State do not yet exist. 
(5) The Communication of the Commission of 10 January 2007 entitled ‘An Energy Policy 
for Europe’ highlighted the importance of completing the internal market in natural gas 
and of creating a level playing field for all natural gas undertakings established in the 
Community. The Communications of the Commission of 10 January 2007 entitled 
‘Prospects for the internal gas and electricity market’ and ‘Inquiry pursuant to 
Article 17 of Regulation (EC) No 1/2003 into the European gas and electricity sectors 
(Final Report)’ showed that the present rules and measures do not provide the necessary 
framework for achieving the objective of a well-functioning internal market. 
(6) Without effective separation of networks from activities of production and supply 
(effective unbundling), there is a risk of discrimination not only in the operation of the 
network but also in the incentives for vertically integrated undertakings to invest 
adequately in their networks. 
(7) The rules on legal and functional unbundling as provided for in Directive 2003/55/EC 
have not, however, led to effective unbundling of the transmission system operators. 
At its meeting on 8 and 9 March 2007, the European Council therefore invited the 
Commission to develop legislative proposals for the ‘effective separation of supply and 





Only the removal of the incentive for vertically integrated undertakings to discriminate 
against competitors as regards network access and investment can ensure effective 
unbundling. Ownership unbundling, which implies the appointment of the network 
owner as the system operator and its independence from any supply and production 
interests, is clearly an effective and stable way to solve the inherent conflict of interests 
and to ensure security of supply. For that reason, the European Parliament, in its 
resolution of 10 July 2007 on prospects for the internal gas and electricity 
market (5) referred to ownership unbundling at transmission level as the most effective 
tool by which to promote investments in infrastructure in a non-discriminatory way, 
fair access to the network for new entrants and transparency in the market. Under 
ownership unbundling, Member States should therefore be required to ensure that the 
same person or persons are not entitled to exercise control over a production or supply 
undertaking and, at the same time, exercise control or any right over a transmission 
system operator or transmission system. Conversely, control over a transmission 
system or transmission system operator should preclude the possibility of exercising 
control or any right over a production or supply undertaking. Within those limits, a 
production or supply undertaking should be able to have a minority shareholding in a 
transmission system operator or transmission system. 
(9) Any system for unbundling should be effective in removing any conflict of interests 
between producers, suppliers and transmission system operators, in order to create 
incentives for the necessary investments and guarantee the access of new market 
entrants under a transparent and efficient regulatory regime and should not create an 
overly onerous regulatory regime for national regulatory authorities. 
(10) 
The definition of the term ‘control’ is taken from Council Regulation (EC) 
No 139/2004 of 20 January 2004 on the control of concentrations between 
undertakings (the EC Merger Regulation) (6). 
(11) Since ownership unbundling requires, in some instances, the restructuring of 
undertakings, Member States that decide to implement ownership unbundling should 
be granted additional time to apply the relevant provisions. In view of the vertical 
links between the electricity and gas sectors, the unbundling provisions should apply 
across the two sectors. 
(12) Under ownership unbundling, to ensure full independence of network operation from 
supply and production interests and to prevent exchanges of any confidential 
information, the same person should not be a member of the managing boards of both 
a transmission system operator or a transmission system and an undertaking 
performing any of the functions of production or supply. For the same reason, the 
same person should not be entitled to appoint members of the managing boards of a 
transmission system operator or a transmission system and to exercise control or any 
right over a production or supply undertaking. 
(13) The setting up of a system operator or a transmission operator that is independent from 
supply and production interests should enable a vertically integrated undertaking to 
maintain its ownership of network assets whilst ensuring an effective separation of 
interests, provided that such independent system operator or such independent 
transmission operator performs all the functions of a system operator and detailed 
regulation and extensive regulatory control mechanisms are put in place. 
(14) Where, on 3 September 2009, an undertaking owning a transmission system is part of 
a vertically integrated undertaking, Member States should therefore be given a choice 
between ownership unbundling and setting up a system operator or transmission 
operator which is independent from supply and production interests. 
(15) To preserve fully the interests of the shareholders of vertically integrated 
undertakings, Member States should have the choice of implementing ownership 




undertaking into shares of the network undertaking and shares of the remaining supply 
and production undertaking, provided that the requirements resulting from ownership 
unbundling are complied with. 
(16) 
The full effectiveness of the independent system operator or independent transmission 
operator solutions should be ensured by way of specific additional rules. The rules on 
the independent transmission operator provide an appropriate regulatory framework 
to guarantee fair competition, sufficient investment, access for new market entrants 
and the integration of gas markets. Effective unbundling through the independent 
transmission operator provisions should be based on a pillar of organisational 
measures and measures relating to the governance of transmission system operators 
and on a pillar of measures relating to investment, connecting new production 
capacities to the network and market integration through regional cooperation. The 
independence of the transmission operator should also, inter alia, be ensured through 
certain ‘cooling-off’ periods during which no management or other relevant activity 
giving access to the same information as could have been obtained in a managerial 
position is exercised in the vertically integrated undertaking. The independent 
transmission operator model of effective unbundling is in line with the requirements 
laid down by the European Council at its meeting on 8 and 9 March 2007. 
(17) In order to develop competition in the internal market in gas, large non-household 
customers should be able to choose their suppliers and enter into contracts with several 
suppliers to secure their gas requirements. Such customers should be protected against 
exclusivity clauses, the effect of which is to exclude competing or complementary 
offers. 
(18) A Member State has the right to opt for full ownership unbundling in its territory. 
Where a Member State has exercised that right, an undertaking does not have the right 
to set up an independent system operator or an independent transmission operator. 
Furthermore, an undertaking performing any of the functions of production or supply 
cannot directly or indirectly exercise control or any right over a transmission system 
operator from a Member State that has opted for full ownership unbundling. 
(19) Under this Directive different types of market organisation will exist in the internal 
market in natural gas. The measures that Member States could take in order to ensure 
a level playing field should be based on overriding requirements of general interest. 
The Commission should be consulted on the compatibility of the measures with the 
Treaty and Community law. 
(20) The implementation of effective unbundling should respect the principle of non-
discrimination between the public and private sectors. To that end, the same person 
should not be able to exercise control or any right, in violation of the rules of 
ownership unbundling or the independent system operator option, solely or jointly, 
over the composition, voting or decision of the bodies of both the transmission system 
operators or the transmission systems and the production or supply undertakings. With 
regard to ownership unbundling and the independent system operator solution, 
provided that the Member State in question is able to demonstrate that the requirement 
is complied with, two separate public bodies should be able to control production and 
supply activities on the one hand and transmission activities on the other. 
(21) Fully effective separation of network activities from supply and production activities 
should apply throughout the Community to both Community and non-Community 
undertakings. To ensure that network activities and supply and production activities 
throughout the Community remain independent from each other, regulatory 
authorities should be empowered to refuse certification to transmission system 
operators that do not comply with the unbundling rules. To ensure the consistent 
application of those rules across the Community, the regulatory authorities should take 
utmost account of the Commission’s opinion when the former take decisions on 




Community and solidarity and energy security within the Community, the 
Commission should have the right to give an opinion on certification in relation to a 
transmission system owner or a transmission system operator which is controlled by 
a person or persons from a third country or third countries. 
(22) The security of energy supply is an essential element of public security and is therefore 
inherently connected to the efficient functioning of the internal market in gas and the 
integration of the isolated gas markets of Member States. Gas can reach the citizens 
of the Union only through the network. Functioning open gas markets and, in 
particular, the networks and other assets associated with gas supply are essential for 
public security, for the competitiveness of the economy and for the well-being of the 
citizens of the Union. Persons from third countries should therefore only be allowed 
to control a transmission system or a transmission system operator if they comply with 
the requirements of effective separation that apply inside the Community. Without 
prejudice to the international obligations of the Community, the Community considers 
that the gas transmission system sector is of high importance to the Community and 
therefore additional safeguards are necessary regarding the preservation of the 
security of supply of energy to the Community to avoid any threats to public order 
and public security in the Community and the welfare of the citizens of the Union. 
The security of supply of energy to the Community requires, in particular, an 
assessment of the independence of network operation, the level of the Community’s 
and individual Member States’ dependence on energy supply from third countries, and 
the treatment of both domestic and foreign trade and investment in energy in a 
particular third country. Security of supply should therefore be assessed in the light of 
the factual circumstances of each case as well as the rights and obligations arising 
under international law, in particular the international agreements between the 
Community and the third country concerned. Where appropriate the Commission is 
encouraged to submit recommendations to negotiate relevant agreements with third 
countries addressing the security of supply of energy to the Community or to include 
the necessary issues in other negotiations with those third countries. 
(23) Further measures should be taken in order to ensure transparent and non-
discriminatory tariffs for access to transport. Those tariffs should be applicable to all 
users on a non-discriminatory basis. Where a storage facility, linepack or ancillary 
service operates in a sufficiently competitive market, access could be allowed on the 
basis of transparent and non-discriminatory market-based mechanisms. 
(24) It is necessary to ensure the independence of storage system operators in order to 
improve third-party access to storage facilities that are technically and/or 
economically necessary for providing efficient access to the system for the supply of 
customers. It is therefore appropriate that storage facilities are operated through 
legally separate entities that have effective decision-making rights with respect to 
assets necessary to maintain, operate and develop storage facilities. It is also necessary 
to increase transparency in respect of the storage capacity that is offered to third 
parties, by obliging Member States to define and publish a non-discriminatory, clear 
framework that determines the appropriate regulatory regime applicable to storage 
facilities. That obligation should not require a new decision on access regimes but 
should improve the transparency regarding the access regime to storage. 
Confidentiality requirements for commercially sensitive information are particularly 
important where data of a strategic nature are concerned or where there is only a single 
user of a storage facility. 
(25) Non-discriminatory access to the distribution network determines downstream access 
to customers at retail level. The scope for discrimination as regards third party access 
and investment, however, is less significant at distribution level than at transmission 
level where congestion and the influence of production interests are generally greater 
than at distribution level. Moreover, legal and functional unbundling of distribution 




2007 and its effects on the internal market in natural gas still need to be evaluated. 
The rules on legal and functional unbundling currently in place can lead to effective 
unbundling provided they are more clearly defined, properly implemented and closely 
monitored. To create a level playing field at retail level, the activities of distribution 
system operators should therefore be monitored so that they are prevented from taking 
advantage of their vertical integration as regards their competitive position on the 
market, in particular in relation to household and small non-household customers. 
(26) Member States should take concrete measures to assist the wider use of biogas and 
gas from biomass, the producers of which should be granted non-discriminatory 
access to the gas system, provided that such access is compatible with the relevant 
technical rules and safety standards on an ongoing basis. 
(27) To avoid imposing a disproportionate financial and administrative burden on small 
distribution system operators, Member States should be able, where necessary, to 
exempt the undertakings concerned from the legal distribution unbundling 
requirements. 
(28) Where a closed distribution system is used to ensure the optimal efficiency of an 
integrated energy supply requiring specific operational standards, or a closed 
distribution system is maintained primarily for the use of the owner of the system, it 
should be possible to exempt the distribution system operator from obligations which 
would constitute an unnecessary administrative burden because of the particular 
nature of the relationship between the distribution system operator and the users of the 
system. Industrial, commercial or shared services sites such as train station buildings, 
airports, hospitals, large camping sites with integrated facilities or chemical industry 
sites can include closed distribution systems because of the specialised nature of their 
operations. 
(29) Directive 2003/55/EC introduced a requirement for Member States to establish 
regulators with specific competences. However, experience shows that the 
effectiveness of regulation is frequently hampered through a lack of independence of 
regulators from government, and insufficient powers and discretion. For that reason, 
at its meeting on 8 and 9 March 2007, the European Council invited the Commission 
to develop legislative proposals providing for further harmonisation of the powers and 
strengthening of the independence of national energy regulators. It should be possible 
for those national regulatory authorities to cover both the electricity and the gas 
sectors. 
(30) Energy regulators need to be able to take decisions in relation to all relevant regulatory 
issues if the internal market in natural gas is to function properly, and to be fully 
independent from any other public or private interests. This precludes neither judicial 
review nor parliamentary supervision in accordance with the constitutional law of the 
Member States. In addition, approval of the budget of the regulator by the national 
legislator does not constitute an obstacle to budgetary autonomy. The provisions 
relating to autonomy in the implementation of the allocated budget of the regulatory 
authority should be implemented within the framework defined by national budgetary 
law and rules. While contributing to the independence of the national regulatory 
authority from any political or economic interest through an appropriate rotation 
scheme, it should be possible for Member States to take due account of the availability 
of human resources and of the size of the board. 
(31) In order to ensure effective market access for all market players, including new 
entrants, non-discriminatory and cost-reflective balancing mechanisms are necessary. 
This should be achieved through the setting up of transparent market-based 
mechanisms for the supply and purchase of gas, needed in the framework of balancing 
requirements. National regulatory authorities should play an active role to ensure that 




appropriate incentives should be provided to balance the in-put and off-take of gas 
and not to endanger the system. 
(32) National regulatory authorities should be able to fix or approve tariffs, or the 
methodologies underlying the calculation of the tariffs, on the basis of a proposal by 
the transmission system operator or distribution system operator(s) or liquefied natural 
gas (LNG) system operator, or on the basis of a proposal agreed between those 
operator(s) and the users of the network. In carrying out those tasks, national 
regulatory authorities should ensure that transmission and distribution tariffs are non-
discriminatory and cost-reflective, and should take account of the long-term, marginal, 
avoided network costs from demand-side management measures. 
(33) Energy regulators should have the power to issue binding decisions in relation to 
natural gas undertakings and to impose effective, proportionate and dissuasive 
penalties on natural gas undertakings which fail to comply with their obligations or to 
propose that a competent court impose such penalties on them. Energy regulators 
should also be granted the power to decide, irrespective of the application of 
competition rules, on appropriate measures ensuring customer benefits through the 
promotion of effective competition necessary for the proper functioning of the internal 
market in natural gas. The establishment of gas-release programmes is one of the 
possible measures that can be used to promote effective competition and ensure the 
proper functioning of the market. Energy regulators should also be granted the powers 
to contribute to ensuring high standards of public service in compliance with market 
opening, to the protection of vulnerable customers, and to the full effectiveness of 
consumer protection measures. Those provisions should be without prejudice to both 
the Commission’s powers concerning the application of competition rules including 
the examination of mergers with a Community dimension, and the rules on the internal 
market such as the free movement of capital. The independent body to which a party 
affected by the decision of a national regulator has a right to appeal could be a court 
or other tribunal empowered to conduct a judicial review. 
(34) Any harmonisation of the powers of national regulatory authorities should include the 
powers to provide incentives to natural gas undertakings and to impose effective, 
proportionate and dissuasive penalties on natural gas undertakings or to propose that 
a competent court impose such penalties. Moreover, regulatory authorities should 
have the power to request relevant information from natural gas undertakings, make 
appropriate and sufficient investigations and settle disputes. 
(35) 
Investments in major new infrastructure should be strongly promoted while ensuring 
the proper functioning of the internal market in natural gas. In order to enhance the 
positive effect of exempted infrastructure projects on competition and security of 
supply, market interest during the project planning phase should be tested and 
congestion management rules should be implemented. Where an infrastructure is 
located in the territory of more than one Member State, the Agency for the 
Cooperation of Energy Regulators established by Regulation (EC) No 713/2009 of the 
European Parliament and of the Council of 13 July 2009 establishing an Agency for 
the Cooperation of Energy Regulators (7) (the ‘Agency’) should handle as a last resort 
the exemption request in order to take better account of its cross-border implications 
and to facilitate its administrative handling. Moreover, given the exceptional risk 
profile of constructing those exempt major infrastructure projects, it should be 
possible temporarily to grant partial derogations to undertakings with supply and 
production interests in respect of the unbundling rules for the projects concerned. The 
possibility of temporary derogations should apply, for security of supply reasons, in 
particular, to new pipelines within the Community transporting gas from third 
countries into the Community. Exemptions granted under Directive 2003/55/EC 





(36) The internal market in natural gas suffers from a lack of liquidity and transparency 
hindering the efficient allocation of resources, risk hedging and new entry. Trust in 
the market, its liquidity and the number of market participants needs to increase, and, 
therefore, regulatory oversight of undertakings active in the supply of gas needs to be 
increased. Such requirements should be without prejudice to, and compatible with, 
existing Community law in relation to the financial markets. Energy regulators and 
financial market regulators need to cooperate in order to enable each other to have an 
overview of the markets concerned. 
(37) Natural gas is mainly, and increasingly, imported into the Community from third 
countries. Community law should take account of the characteristics of natural gas, 
such as certain structural rigidities arising from the concentration of suppliers, the 
long-term contracts or the lack of downstream liquidity. Therefore, more transparency 
is needed, including in regard to the formation of prices. 
(38) 
Prior to the adoption by the Commission of Guidelines defining further the record-
keeping requirements, the Agency and the Committee of European Securities 
Regulators (the ‘CESR’), established by Commission Decision 2009/77/EC (8), 
should confer and advise the Commission in regard to their content. The Agency and 
the CESR should also cooperate to investigate further and advise on whether 
transactions in gas supply contracts and gas derivatives should be subject to pre- 
and/or post-trade transparency requirements and, if so, what the content of those 
requirements should be. 
(39) Member States or, where a Member State has so provided, the regulatory authority, 
should encourage the development of interruptible supply contracts. 
(40) In the interests of security of supply, the balance between supply and demand in 
individual Member States should be monitored, and such monitoring should be 
followed by a report on the situation at Community level, taking account of 
interconnection capacity between areas. Such monitoring should be carried out 
sufficiently early to enable appropriate measures to be taken if security of supply is 
compromised. The construction and maintenance of the necessary network 
infrastructure, including interconnection capacity, should contribute to ensuring a 
stable gas supply. 
(41) Member States should ensure that, taking into account the necessary quality 
requirements, biogas and gas from biomass or other types of gas are granted non-
discriminatory access to the gas system, provided such access is permanently 
compatible with the relevant technical rules and safety standards. Those rules and 
standards should ensure that those gases can technically and safely be injected into, 
and transported through the natural gas system and should also address their chemical 
characteristics. 
(42) Long-term contracts will continue to be an important part of the gas supply of Member 
States and should be maintained as an option for gas supply undertakings in so far as 
they do not undermine the objective of this Directive and are compatible with the 
Treaty, including the competition rules. It is therefore necessary to take into account 
long-term contracts in the planning of supply and transport capacity of natural gas 
undertakings. 
(43) In order to ensure the maintenance of high standards of public service in the 
Community, all measures taken by Member States to achieve the objectives of this 
Directive should be regularly notified to the Commission. The Commission should 
regularly publish a report analysing measures taken at national level to achieve public 
service objectives and comparing their effectiveness, with a view to making 
recommendations as regards measures to be taken at national level to achieve high 




to the gas system customers are informed about their rights to be supplied with natural 
gas of a specified quality at reasonable prices. Measures taken by Member States to 
protect final customers may differ according to whether they are aimed at household 
customers or small and medium-sized enterprises. 
(44) Respect for the public service requirements is a fundamental requirement of this 
Directive, and it is important that common minimum standards, respected by all 
Member States, are specified in this Directive, which take into account the objectives 
of common protection, security of supply, environmental protection and equivalent 
levels of competition in all Member States. It is important that the public service 
requirements can be interpreted on a national basis, taking into account national 
circumstances and subject to the respect of Community law. 
(45) It should be possible for measures implemented by Member States to achieve the 
objectives of social and economic cohesion to include, in particular, the provision of 
adequate economic incentives, using, where appropriate, all existing national and 
Community tools. It should be possible for such tools to include liability mechanisms 
to guarantee the necessary investment. 
(46) To the extent to which measures taken by Member States to fulfil public service 
obligations constitute State aid under Article 87(1) of the Treaty, there is an obligation 
under Article 88(3) of the Treaty to notify them to the Commission. 
(47) The public service requirements and the common minimum standards that follow from 
them need to be further strengthened to make sure that all consumers, especially 
vulnerable ones, can benefit from competition and fair prices. The public service 
requirements should be defined at national level, taking into account national 
circumstances; Community law should, however, be respected by the Member States. 
The citizens of the Union and, where Member States deem it to be appropriate, small 
enterprises, should be able to enjoy public service obligations, in particular with 
regard to security of supply and reasonable tariffs. A key aspect in supplying 
customers is access to objective and transparent consumption data. Thus, consumers 
should have access to their consumption data and associated prices and services costs 
so that they can invite competitors to make an offer based on those data. Consumers 
should also have the right to be properly informed about their energy consumption. 
Prepayments should reflect the likely consumption of natural gas and different 
payment systems should be non-discriminatory. Information on energy costs provided 
to consumers frequently enough will create incentives for energy savings because it 
will give customers direct feedback on the effects of investment in energy efficiency 
and change of behaviour. 
(48) Consumer interests should be at the heart of this Directive and quality of service 
should be a central responsibility of natural gas undertakings. Existing rights of 
consumers need to be strengthened and guaranteed, and should include greater 
transparency. Consumer protection should ensure that all consumers in the wider remit 
of the Community benefit from a competitive market. Consumer rights should be 
enforced by Member States or, where a Member State has so provided, the regulatory 
authorities. 
(49) Clear and comprehensible information should be made available to consumers 
concerning their rights in relation to the energy sector. The Commission should 
establish, after consulting relevant stakeholders including Member States, national 
regulatory authorities, consumer organisations and natural gas undertakings, an 
accessible, user-friendly energy consumer checklist providing consumers with 
practical information about their rights. That energy consumer checklist should be 




(50) Energy poverty is a growing problem in the Community. Member States which are 
affected and which have not yet done so should, therefore, develop national action 
plans or other appropriate frameworks to tackle energy poverty, aiming at decreasing 
the number of people suffering such situation. In any event, Member States should 
ensure the necessary energy supply for vulnerable customers. In doing so, an 
integrated approach, such as in the framework of social policy, could be used and 
measures could include social policies or energy efficiency improvements for housing. 
At the very least, this Directive should allow national policies in favour of vulnerable 
customers. 
(51) Greater consumer protection is guaranteed by the availability of effective means of 
dispute settlement for all consumers. Member States should introduce speedy and 
effective complaint handling procedures. 
(52) It should be possible to base the introduction of intelligent metering systems on an 
economic assessment. Should that assessment conclude that the introduction of such 
metering systems is economically reasonable and cost-effective only for consumers 
with a certain amount of gas consumption, Member States should be able to take this 
into account when implementing intelligent metering systems. 
(53) Market prices should give the right incentives for the development of the network. 
(54) Promoting fair competition and easy access for different suppliers should be of the 
utmost importance for Member States in order to allow consumers to take full 
advantage of the opportunities of a liberalised internal market in natural gas. 
(55) In order to contribute to security of supply whilst maintaining a spirit of solidarity 
between Member States, notably in the event of an energy supply crisis, it is important 
to provide a framework for regional cooperation in a spirit of solidarity. Such 
cooperation may rely, if Member States so decide, first and foremost on market-based 
mechanisms. Cooperation for the promotion of regional and bilateral solidarity should 
not impose a disproportionate burden on or discriminate between market participants. 
(56) With a view to creating an internal market in natural gas, Member States should foster 
the integration of their national markets and the cooperation of system operators at 
Community and regional level, also incorporating the isolated systems forming gas 
islands that persist in the Community. 
(57) The development of a true internal market in natural gas, through a network connected 
across the Community, should be one of the main goals of this Directive and 
regulatory issues on cross border interconnections and regional markets should, 
therefore, be one of the main tasks of the regulatory authorities, in close cooperation 
with the Agency where relevant. 
(58) Securing common rules for a true internal market and a broad supply of gas should 
also be one of the main goals of this Directive. To that end, undistorted market prices 
would provide an incentive for cross-border interconnections while leading, in the 
long term, to price convergence. 
(59) The regulatory authorities should also provide information on the market to permit the 
Commission to exercise its role of observing and monitoring the internal market in 
natural gas and its short, medium and long-term evolution, including aspects such as 
supply and demand, transmission and distribution infrastructure, quality of service, 
cross-border trade, congestion management, investments, wholesale and consumer 
prices, market liquidity and environmental and efficiency improvements. National 
regulatory authorities should report to the competition authorities and the Commission 





(60) Since the objective of this Directive, namely the creation of a fully operational internal 
market in natural gas, cannot be sufficiently achieved by the Member States and can 
therefore be better achieved at Community level, the Community may adopt measures, 
in accordance with the principle of subsidiarity as set out in Article 5 of the Treaty. In 
accordance with the principle of proportionality, as set out in that Article, this 
Directive does not go beyond what is necessary in order to achieve that objective. 
(61) 
Under Regulation (EC) No 715/2009 of the European Parliament and of the Council 
of 13 July 2009 on conditions for access to the natural gas transmission networks (9), 
the Commission may adopt Guidelines to achieve the necessary degree of 
harmonisation. Such Guidelines, which constitute binding implementing measures, 
are, also with regard to certain provisions of this Directive, a useful tool which can be 
adapted quickly where necessary. 
(62) 
The measures necessary for the implementation of this Directive should be adopted in 
accordance with Council Decision 1999/468/EC of 28 June 1999 laying down the 
procedures for the exercise of implementing powers conferred on the 
Commission (10). 
(63) In particular, the Commission should be empowered to adopt the Guidelines necessary 
for providing the minimum degree of harmonisation required to achieve the aim of 
this Directive. Since those measures are of general scope and are designed to amend 
non-essential elements of this Directive, by supplementing it with new non-essential 
elements, they must be adopted in accordance with the regulatory procedure with 
scrutiny provided for in Article 5a of Decision 1999/468/EC. 
(64) 
In accordance with point 34 of the Interinstitutional Agreement on better law-
making (11), Member States are encouraged to draw up, for themselves and in the 
interest of the Community, their own tables, illustrating, as far as possible, the 
correlation between this Directive and the transposition measures, and to make them 
public. 
(65) Given the scope of the amendments made to Directive 2003/55/EC herein, it is 
desirable, for reasons of clarity and rationalisation, that the provisions in question 
should be recast by bringing them all together in a single text in a new Directive. 
(66) This Directive respects the fundamental rights, and observes the principles, recognised 
in particular by the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, 
HAVE ADOPTED THIS DIRECTIVE: 
Article 1 
Subject matter and scope 
1.   This Directive establishes common rules for the transmission, distribution, supply and storage of natural 
gas. It lays down the rules relating to the organisation and functioning of the natural gas sector, access to 
the market, the criteria and procedures applicable to the granting of authorisations for transmission, 
distribution, supply and storage of natural gas and the operation of systems. 
2.   The rules established by this Directive for natural gas, including LNG, shall also apply in a non-
discriminatory way to biogas and gas from biomass or other types of gas in so far as such gases can 
technically and safely be injected into, and transported through, the natural gas system. 
Article 2 
Definitions 




(1) ‘natural gas undertaking’ means a natural or legal person carrying out at least one of 
the following functions: production, transmission, distribution, supply, purchase or 
storage of natural gas, including LNG, which is responsible for the commercial, 
technical and/or maintenance tasks related to those functions, but shall not include 
final customers; 
(2) ‘upstream pipeline network’ means any pipeline or network of pipelines operated 
and/or constructed as part of an oil or gas production project, or used to convey natural 
gas from one or more such projects to a processing plant or terminal or final coastal 
landing terminal; 
(3) ‘transmission’ means the transport of natural gas through a network, which mainly 
contains high-pressure pipelines, other than an upstream pipeline network and other 
than the part of high-pressure pipelines primarily used in the context of local 
distribution of natural gas, with a view to its delivery to customers, but not including 
supply; 
(4) ‘transmission system operator’ means a natural or legal person who carries out the 
function of transmission and is responsible for operating, ensuring the maintenance of, 
and, if necessary, developing the transmission system in a given area and, where 
applicable, its interconnections with other systems, and for ensuring the long-term 
ability of the system to meet reasonable demands for the transport of gas; 
(5) ‘distribution’ means the transport of natural gas through local or regional pipeline 
networks with a view to its delivery to customers, but not including supply; 
(6) ‘distribution system operator’ means a natural or legal person who carries out the 
function of distribution and is responsible for operating, ensuring the maintenance of, 
and, if necessary, developing the distribution system in a given area and, where 
applicable, its interconnections with other systems, and for ensuring the long-term 
ability of the system to meet reasonable demands for the distribution of gas; 
(7) ‘supply’ means the sale, including resale, of natural gas, including LNG, to customers; 
(8) ‘supply undertaking’ means any natural or legal person who carries out the function 
of supply; 
(9) ‘storage facility’ means a facility used for the stocking of natural gas and owned and/or 
operated by a natural gas undertaking, including the part of LNG facilities used for 
storage but excluding the portion used for production operations, and excluding 
facilities reserved exclusively for transmission system operators in carrying out their 
functions; 
(10) ‘storage system operator’ means a natural or legal person who carries out the function 
of storage and is responsible for operating a storage facility; 
(11) ‘LNG facility’ means a terminal which is used for the liquefaction of natural gas or 
the importation, offloading, and re-gasification of LNG, and includes ancillary 
services and temporary storage necessary for the re-gasification process and 
subsequent delivery to the transmission system, but does not include any part of LNG 
terminals used for storage; 
(12) ‘LNG system operator’ means a natural or legal person who carries out the function 
of liquefaction of natural gas, or the importation, offloading, and re-gasification of 
LNG and is responsible for operating a LNG facility; 
(13) ‘system’ means any transmission networks, distribution networks, LNG facilities 




linepack and its facilities supplying ancillary services and those of related 
undertakings necessary for providing access to transmission, distribution and LNG; 
(14) ‘ancillary services’ means all services necessary for access to and the operation of 
transmission networks, distribution networks, LNG facilities, and/or storage facilities, 
including load balancing, blending and injection of inert gases, but not including 
facilities reserved exclusively for transmission system operators carrying out their 
functions; 
(15) ‘linepack’ means the storage of gas by compression in gas transmission and 
distribution systems, but not including facilities reserved for transmission system 
operators carrying out their functions; 
(16) ‘interconnected system’ means a number of systems which are linked with each other; 
(17) ‘interconnector’ means a transmission line which crosses or spans a border between 
Member States for the sole purpose of connecting the national transmission systems 
of those Member States; 
(18) ‘direct line’ means a natural gas pipeline complementary to the interconnected system; 
(19) ‘integrated natural gas undertaking’ means a vertically or horizontally integrated 
undertaking; 
(20) ‘vertically integrated undertaking’ means a natural gas undertaking or a group of 
natural gas undertakings where the same person or the same persons are entitled, 
directly or indirectly, to exercise control, and where the undertaking or group of 
undertakings perform at least one of the functions of transmission, distribution, LNG 
or storage, and at least one of the functions of production or supply of natural gas; 
(21) ‘horizontally integrated undertaking’ means an undertaking performing at least one of 
the functions of production, transmission, distribution, supply or storage of natural 
gas, and a non-gas activity; 
(22) 
‘related undertaking’ means an affiliated undertaking, within the meaning of 
Article 41 of Seventh Council Directive 83/349/EEC of 13 June 1983 based on the 
Article 44(2)(g) (12) of the Treaty on consolidated accounts (13) and/or an associated 
undertaking, within the meaning of Article 33(1) of that Directive, and/or an 
undertaking which belong to the same shareholders; 
(23) ‘system user’ means a natural or legal person supplying to, or being supplied by, the 
system; 
(24) ‘customer’ means a wholesale or final customer of natural gas or a natural gas 
undertaking which purchases natural gas; 
(25) ‘household customer’ means a customer purchasing natural gas for his own household 
consumption; 
(26) ‘non-household customer’ means a customer purchasing natural gas which is not for 
his own household use; 
(27)        ‘final customer’ means a customer purchasing natural gas for his own use; 
(28) ‘eligible customer’ means a customer who is free to purchase gas from the supplier of 




(29) ‘wholesale customer’ means a natural or legal person other than a transmission system 
operator or distribution system operator who purchases natural gas for the purpose of 
resale inside or outside the system where he is established; 
(30) ‘long-term planning’ means the planning of supply and transport capacity of natural 
gas undertakings on a long-term basis with a view to meeting the demand for natural 
gas of the system, diversification of sources and securing supplies to customers; 
(31) ‘emergent market’ means a Member State in which the first commercial supply of its 
first long-term natural gas supply contract was made not more than 10 years earlier; 
(32) ‘security’ means both security of supply of natural gas and technical safety; 
(33) ‘new infrastructure’ means an infrastructure not completed by 4 August 2003; 
(34) ‘gas supply contract’ means a contract for the supply of natural gas, but does not 
include a gas derivative; 
(35) 
‘gas derivative’ means a financial instrument specified in points 5, 6 or 7 of Section C 
of Annex I to Directive 2004/39/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 
21 April 2004 on markets in financial instruments (14), where that instrument relates 
to natural gas; 
(36) ‘control’ means any rights, contracts or any other means which, either separately or in 
combination and having regard to the considerations of fact or law involved, confer 
the possibility of exercising decisive influence on an undertaking, in particular by: 
(a) ownership or the right to use all or part of the assets of an 
undertaking; 
(b) rights or contracts which confer decisive influence on the 
composition, voting or decisions of the organs of an undertaking. 
 
Article 9 
Unbundling of transmission systems and transmission system operators 
1.   Member States shall ensure that from 3 March 2012: 
(a) each undertaking which owns a transmission system acts as a transmission system 
operator; 
(b) the same person or persons are entitled neither: 
(i) directly or indirectly to exercise control over an undertaking 
performing any of the functions of production or supply, and directly 
or indirectly to exercise control or exercise any right over a 
transmission system operator or over a transmission system; nor 
(ii) directly or indirectly to exercise control over a transmission system 
operator or over a transmission system, and directly or indirectly to 
exercise control or exercise any right over an undertaking performing 
any of the functions of production or supply; 
 
(c) the same person or persons are not entitled to appoint members of the supervisory 
board, the administrative board or bodies legally representing the undertaking, of a 
transmission system operator or a transmission system, and directly or indirectly to 
exercise control or exercise any right over an undertaking performing any of the 




(d) the same person is not entitled to be a member of the supervisory board, the 
administrative board or bodies legally representing the undertaking, of both an 
undertaking performing any of the functions of production or supply and a transmission 
system operator or a transmission system. 
2.   The rights referred to in points (b) and (c) of paragraph 1 shall include, in particular: 
(a) the power to exercise voting rights; 
(b) the power to appoint members of the supervisory board, the administrative board or 
bodies legally representing the undertaking; or 
(c) the holding of a majority share. 
3.   For the purpose of paragraph 1(b), the notion ‘undertaking performing any of the functions of 
production or supply’ shall include ‘undertaking performing any of the functions of generation and supply’ 
within the meaning of Directive 2009/72/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 13 July 2009 
concerning common rules for the internal market in electricity (17), and the terms ‘transmission system 
operator’ and ‘transmission system’ shall include ‘transmission system operator’ and ‘transmission system’ 
within the meaning of that Directive. 
4.   Member States may allow for derogations from points (b) and (c) of paragraphs 1 until 3 March 2013, 
provided that transmission system operators are not part of a vertically integrated undertaking. 
5.   The obligation set out in paragraph 1(a) of this Article shall be deemed to be fulfilled in a situation 
where two or more undertakings which own transmission systems have created a joint venture which acts 
as a transmission system operator in two or more Member States for the transmission systems concerned. 
No other undertaking may be part of the joint venture, unless it has been approved under Article 14 as an 
independent system operator or as an independent transmission operator for the purposes of Chapter IV. 
6.   For the implementation of this Article, where the person referred to in points (b), (c) and (d) of 
paragraph 1 is the Member State or another public body, two separate public bodies exercising control over 
a transmission system operator or over a transmission system on the one hand, and over an undertaking 
performing any of the functions of production or supply on the other, shall be deemed not to be the same 
person or persons. 
7.   Member States shall ensure that neither commercially sensitive information referred to in Article 16 
held by a transmission system operator which was part of a vertically integrated undertaking, nor the staff 
of such a transmission system operator, is transferred to undertakings performing any of the functions of 
production and supply. 
8.   Where on 3 September 2009, the transmission system belongs to a vertically integrated undertaking a 
Member State may decide not to apply paragraph 1. 
In such case, the Member State concerned shall either: 
(a) designate an independent system operator in accordance with Article 14, or 
(b) comply with the provisions of Chapter IV. 
9.   Where, on 3 September 2009, the transmission system belongs to a vertically integrated undertaking 
and there are arrangements in place which guarantee more effective independence of the transmission 
system operator than the provisions of Chapter IV, a Member State may decide not to apply paragraph 1. 
10.   Before an undertaking is approved and designated as a transmission system operator under paragraph 9 
of this Article, it shall be certified according to the procedures laid down in Article 10(4), (5) and (6) of this 
Directive and in Article 3 of Regulation (EC) No 715/2009, pursuant to which the Commission shall verify 
that the arrangements in place clearly guarantee more effective independence of the transmission system 
operator than the provisions of Chapter IV. 
11.   Vertically integrated undertakings which own a transmission system shall not in any event be 




12.   Undertakings performing any of the functions of production or supply shall not in any event be able 
to directly or indirectly take control over or exercise any right over unbundled transmission system 
operators in Member States which apply paragraph 1. 
Article 10 
Designation and certification of transmission system operators 
1.   Before an undertaking is approved and designated as transmission system operator, it shall be certified 
according to the procedures laid down in paragraphs 4, 5 and 6 of this Article and in Article 3 of Regulation 
(EC) No 715/2009. 
2.   Undertakings which own a transmission system and which have been certified by the national regulatory 
authority as having complied with the requirements of Article 9, pursuant to the certification procedure, 
shall be approved and designated as transmission system operators by Member States. The designation of 
transmission system operators shall be notified to the Commission and published in the Official Journal of 
the European Union. 
3.   Transmission system operators shall notify to the regulatory authority any planned transaction which 
may require a reassessment of their compliance with the requirements of Article 9. 
4.   The regulatory authorities shall monitor the continuing compliance of transmission system operators 
with the requirements of Article 9. They shall open a certification procedure to ensure such compliance: 
(a) upon notification by the transmission system operator pursuant to paragraph 3; 
(b) on their own initiative where they have knowledge that a planned change in rights or 
influence over transmission system owners or transmission system operators may lead 
to an infringement of Article 9, or where they have reason to believe that such an 
infringement may have occurred; or 
(c) upon a reasoned request from the Commission. 
5.   The regulatory authorities shall adopt a decision on the certification of a transmission system operator 
within a period of four months from the date of the notification by the transmission system operator or from 
the date of the Commission request. After expiry of that period, the certification shall be deemed to be 
granted. The explicit or tacit decision of the regulatory authority shall become effective only after the 
conclusion of the procedure set out in paragraph 6. 
6.   The explicit or tacit decision on the certification of a transmission system operator shall be notified 
without delay to the Commission by the regulatory authority, together with all the relevant information with 
respect to that decision. The Commission shall act in accordance with the procedure laid down in Article 3 
of Regulation (EC) No 715/2009. 
7.   The regulatory authorities and the Commission may request from transmission system operators and 
undertakings performing any of the functions of production or supply any information relevant for the 
fulfilment of their tasks under this Article. 
8.   The regulatory authorities and the Commission shall preserve the confidentiality of commercially 
sensitive information. 
Article 11 
Certification in relation to third countries 
1.   Where certification is requested by a transmission system owner or a transmission system operator 
which is controlled by a person or persons from a third country or third countries, the regulatory authority 
shall notify the Commission. 
The regulatory authority shall also notify to the Commission without delay any circumstances that would 
result in a person or persons from a third country or third countries acquiring control of a transmission 




2.   The transmission system operator shall notify to the regulatory authority any circumstances that would 
result in a person or persons from a third country or third countries acquiring control of the transmission 
system or the transmission system operator. 
3.   The regulatory authority shall adopt a draft decision on the certification of a transmission system 
operator within four months from the date of notification by the transmission system operator. It shall refuse 
the certification if it has not been demonstrated: 
(a) that the entity concerned complies with the requirements of Article 9; and 
(b) to the regulatory authority or to another competent authority designated by the Member 
State that granting certification will not put at risk the security of energy supply of the 
Member State and the Community. In considering that question the regulatory authority 
or other competent authority so designated shall take into account: 
(i) the rights and obligations of the Community with respect to that 
third country arising under international law, including any 
agreement concluded with one or more third countries to which the 
Community is a party and which addresses the issues of security of 
energy supply; 
(ii) the rights and obligations of the Member State with respect to that 
third country arising under agreements concluded with it, insofar 
as they are in compliance with Community law; and 
(iii) other specific facts and circumstances of the case and the third 
country concerned. 
 
4.   The regulatory authority shall notify the decision to the Commission without delay, together with all 
the relevant information with respect to that decision. 
5.   Member States shall provide for the regulatory authority or the designated competent authority referred 
to in paragraph 3(b), before the regulatory authority adopts a decision on the certification, to request an 
opinion from the Commission on whether: 
(a) the entity concerned complies with the requirements of Article 9; and 
(b) granting certification will not put at risk the security of energy supply to the 
Community. 
6.   The Commission shall examine the request referred to in paragraph 5 as soon as it is received. Within 
a period of two months after receiving the request, it shall deliver its opinion to the national regulatory 
authority or, if the request was made by the designated competent authority, to that authority. 
In preparing the opinion, the Commission may request the views of the Agency, the Member State 
concerned, and interested parties. In the event that the Commission makes such a request, the two-month 
period shall be extended by two months. 
In the absence of an opinion by the Commission within the period referred to in the first and second 
subparagraphs, the Commission is deemed not to raise objections to the decision of the regulatory authority. 
7.   When assessing whether the control by a person or persons from a third country or third countries will 
put at risk the security of energy supply to the Community, the Commission shall take into account: 
(a) the specific facts of the case and the third country or third countries concerned; and 
(b) the rights and obligations of the Community with respect to that third country or third 
countries arising under international law, including an agreement concluded with one 
or more third countries to which the Community is a party and which addresses the 
issues of security of supply. 
8.   The national regulatory authority shall, within a period of two months after the expiry of the period 




national regulatory authority shall take utmost account of the Commission’s opinion. In any event Member 
States shall have the right to refuse certification where granting certification puts at risk the Member State’s 
security of energy supply or the security of energy supply of another Member State. Where the Member 
State has designated another competent authority to assess paragraph 3(b), it may require the national 
regulatory authority to adopt its final decision in accordance with the assessment of that competent 
authority. The regulatory authority’s final decision and the Commission’s opinion shall be published 
together. Where the final decision diverges from the Commission’s opinion, the Member State concerned 
shall provide and publish, together with that decision, the reasoning underlying such decision. 
9.   Nothing in this Article shall affect the right of Member States to exercise, in compliance with 
Community law, national legal controls to protect legitimate public security interests. 
10.   The Commission may adopt Guidelines setting out the details of the procedure to be followed for the 
application of this Article. Those measures, designed to amend non-essential elements of this Directive by 
supplementing it, shall be adopted in accordance with the regulatory procedure with scrutiny referred to in 
Article 51(3). 
11.   This Article, with exception of paragraph 3(a), shall also apply to Member States which are subject to 
a derogation under Article 49. 
Article 14 
Independent system operators 
1.   Where the transmission system belongs to a vertically integrated undertaking on 3 September 2009, 
Member States may decide not to apply Article 9(1) and designate an independent system operator upon a 
proposal from the transmission system owner. Such designation shall be subject to approval by the 
Commission. 
2.   The Member State may approve and designate an independent system operator only where: 
(a) the candidate operator has demonstrated that it complies with the requirements of 
Article 9(1)(b), (c) and (d); 
(b) the candidate operator has demonstrated that it has at its disposal the required financial, 
technical, physical and human resources to carry out its tasks under Article 13; 
(c) the candidate operator has undertaken to comply with a ten-year network development 
plan monitored by the regulatory authority; 
(d) the transmission system owner has demonstrated its ability to comply with its 
obligations under paragraph 5. To that end, it shall provide all the draft contractual 
arrangements with the candidate undertaking and any other relevant entity; and 
(e) the candidate operator has demonstrated its ability to comply with its obligations under 
Regulation (EC) No 715/2009 including the cooperation of transmission system 
operators at European and regional level. 
3.   Undertakings which have been certified by the regulatory authority as having complied with the 
requirements of Article 11 and of paragraph 2 of this Article shall be approved and designated as 
independent system operators by Member States. The certification procedure in either Article 10 of this 
Directive and Article 3 of Regulation (EC) No 715/2009 or in Article 11 of this Directive shall be 
applicable. 
4.   Each independent system operator shall be responsible for granting and managing third-party access, 
including the collection of access charges and congestion charges, for operating, maintaining and 
developing the transmission system, as well as for ensuring the long-term ability of the system to meet 
reasonable demand through investment planning. When developing the transmission system the 
independent system operator shall be responsible for planning (including authorisation procedure), 
construction and commissioning of the new infrastructure. For this purpose, the independent system 




system owner shall not be responsible for granting and managing third-party access, nor for investment 
planning. 
5.   Where an independent system operator has been designated, the transmission system owner shall: 
(a) provide all the relevant cooperation and support to the independent system operator for 
the fulfilment of its tasks, including in particular all relevant information; 
(b) finance the investments decided by the independent system operator and approved by 
the regulatory authority, or give its agreement to financing by any interested party 
including the independent system operator. The relevant financing arrangements shall 
be subject to approval by the regulatory authority. Prior to such approval, the regulatory 
authority shall consult the transmission system owner together with other interested 
parties; 
(c) provide for the coverage of liability relating to the network assets, excluding the 
liability relating to the tasks of the independent system operator; and 
(d) provide guarantees to facilitate financing any network expansions with the exception 
of those investments where, pursuant to point (b), it has given its agreement to 
financing by any interested party including the independent system operator. 
6.   In close cooperation with the regulatory authority, the relevant national competition authority shall be 
granted all relevant powers to effectively monitor compliance of the transmission system owner with its 
obligations under paragraph 5. 
Article 15 
Unbundling of transmission system owners and storage system operators 
1.   A transmission system owner, where an independent system operator has been appointed, and a storage 
system operator which are part of vertically integrated undertakings shall be independent at least in terms 
of their legal form, organisation and decision making from other activities not relating to transmission, 
distribution and storage. 
This Article shall apply only to storage facilities that are technically and/or economically necessary for 
providing efficient access to the system for the supply of customers pursuant to Article 33. 
2.   In order to ensure the independence of the transmission system owner and storage system operator 
referred to in paragraph 1, the following minimum criteria shall apply: 
(a) persons responsible for the management of the transmission system owner and storage 
system operator shall not participate in company structures of the integrated natural gas 
undertaking responsible, directly or indirectly, for the day-to-day operation of the 
production and supply of natural gas; 
(b) appropriate measures shall be taken to ensure that the professional interests of persons 
responsible for the management of the transmission system owner and storage system 
operator are taken into account in a manner that ensures that they are capable of acting 
independently; 
(c) the storage system operator shall have effective decision-making rights, independent 
from the integrated natural gas undertaking, with respect to assets necessary to operate, 
maintain or develop the storage facilities. This shall not preclude the existence of 
appropriate coordination mechanisms to ensure that the economic and management 
supervision rights of the parent company in respect of return on assets regulated 
indirectly in accordance with Article 41(6) in a subsidiary are protected. In particular, 
this shall enable the parent company to approve the annual financial plan, or any 
equivalent instrument, of the storage system operator and to set global limits on the 
levels of indebtedness of its subsidiary. It shall not permit the parent company to give 




concerning the construction or upgrading of storage facilities, that do not exceed the 
terms of the approved financial plan, or any equivalent instrument; and 
(d) the transmission system owner and the storage system operator shall establish a 
compliance programme, which sets out measures taken to ensure that discriminatory 
conduct is excluded and ensure that observance of it is adequately monitored. The 
compliance programme shall set out the specific obligations of employees to meet those 
objectives. An annual report, setting out the measures taken, shall be submitted by the 
person or body responsible for monitoring the compliance programme to the regulatory 
authority and shall be published. 
3.   The Commission may adopt Guidelines to ensure full and effective compliance of the transmission 
system owner and of the storage system operator with paragraph 2 of this Article. Those measures, designed 
to amend non-essential elements of this Directive by supplementing it, shall be adopted in accordance with 
the regulatory procedure with scrutiny referred to in Article 51(3). 
Article 16 
Confidentiality for transmission system operators and transmission system owners 
1.   Without prejudice to Article 30 or any other legal duty to disclose information, each transmission, 
storage and/or LNG system operator, and each transmission system owner, shall preserve the confidentiality 
of commercially sensitive information obtained in the course of carrying out its activities, and shall prevent 
information about its own activities which may be commercially advantageous from being disclosed in a 
discriminatory manner. In particular, it shall not disclose any commercially sensitive information to the 
remaining parts of the undertaking, unless this is necessary for carrying out a business transaction. In order 
to ensure the full respect of the rules on information unbundling, Member States shall ensure that the 
transmission system owner including, in the case of a combined operator, the distribution system operator, 
and the remaining part of the undertaking do not use joint services, such as joint legal services, apart from 
purely administrative or IT functions. 
2.   Transmission, storage and/or LNG system operators shall not, in the context of sales or purchases of 
natural gas by related undertakings, misuse commercially sensitive information obtained from third parties 
in the context of providing or negotiating access to the system. 
3.   Information necessary for effective competition and the efficient functioning of the market shall be 
made public. That obligation shall be without prejudice to protecting commercially sensitive information. 
Article 17 
Assets, equipment, staff and identity 
1.   Transmission system operators shall be equipped with all human, technical, physical and financial 
resources necessary for fulfilling their obligations under this Directive and carrying out the activity of gas 
transmission, in particular: 
(a) assets that are necessary for the activity of gas transmission, including the transmission 
system, shall be owned by the transmission system operator; 
(b) personnel necessary for the activity of gas transmission, including the performance of 
all corporate tasks, shall be employed by the transmission system operator; 
(c) leasing of personnel and rendering of services, to and from any other parts of the 
vertically integrated undertaking shall be prohibited. A transmission system operator 
may, however, render services to the vertically integrated undertaking as long as: 
(i) the provision of those services does not discriminate between 
system users, is available to all system users on the same terms and 
conditions and does not restrict, distort or prevent competition in 




(ii) the terms and conditions of the provision of those services are 
approved by the regulatory authority; 
 
(d) without prejudice to the decisions of the Supervisory Body under Article 20, 
appropriate financial resources for future investment projects and/or for the 
replacement of existing assets shall be made available to the transmission system 
operator in due time by the vertically integrated undertaking following an appropriate 
request from the transmission system operator. 
2.   The activity of gas transmission shall include at least the following tasks in addition to those listed in 
Article 13: 
(a) the representation of the transmission system operator and contacts to third parties and 
the regulatory authorities; 
(b) the representation of the transmission system operator within the European Network of 
Transmission System Operators for Gas (ENTSO for Gas); 
(c) granting and managing third-party access on a non-discriminatory basis between 
system users or classes of system users; 
(d) the collection of all the transmission system related charges including access charges, 
balancing charges for ancillary services such as gas treatment, purchasing of services 
(balancing costs, energy for losses); 
(e) the operation, maintenance and development of a secure, efficient and economic 
transmission system; 
(f) investment planning ensuring the long-term ability of the system to meet reasonable 
demand and guaranteeing security of supply; 
(g) the setting up of appropriate joint ventures, including with one or more transmission 
system operators, gas exchanges, and the other relevant actors pursuing the objective 
to develop the creation of regional markets or to facilitate the liberalisation process; 
and 
(h) all corporate services, including legal services, accountancy and IT services.  
3.   Transmission system operators shall be organised in a legal form as referred to in Article 1 of Council 
Directive 68/151/EEC (18). 
4.   The transmission system operator shall not, in its corporate identity, communication, branding and 
premises, create confusion in respect of the separate identity of the vertically integrated undertaking or any 
part thereof. 
5.   The transmission system operator shall not share IT systems or equipment, physical premises and 
security access systems with any part of the vertically integrated undertaking, nor use the same consultants 
or external contractors for IT systems or equipment, and security access systems. 
6.   The accounts of transmission system operators shall be audited by an auditor other than the one auditing 
the vertically integrated undertaking or any part thereof. 
Article 18 
Independence of the transmission system operator 
1.   Without prejudice to the decisions of the Supervisory Body under Article 20, the transmission system 




(a) effective decision-making rights, independent from the vertically integrated 
undertaking, with respect to assets necessary to operate, maintain or develop the 
transmission system; and 
(b) the power to raise money on the capital market in particular through borrowing and 
capital increase. 
2.   The transmission system operator shall at all times act so as to ensure it has the resources it needs in 
order to carry out the activity of transmission properly and efficiently and develop and maintain an efficient, 
secure and economic transmission system. 
3.   Subsidiaries of the vertically integrated undertaking performing functions of production or supply shall 
not have any direct or indirect shareholding in the transmission system operator. The transmission system 
operator shall neither have any direct or indirect shareholding in any subsidiary of the vertically integrated 
undertaking performing functions of production or supply, nor receive dividends or any other financial 
benefit from that subsidiary. 
4.   The overall management structure and the corporate statutes of the transmission system operator shall 
ensure effective independence of the transmission system operator in compliance with this Chapter. The 
vertically integrated undertaking shall not determine, directly or indirectly, the competitive behaviour of 
the transmission system operator in relation to the day to day activities of the transmission system operator 
and management of the network, or in relation to activities necessary for the preparation of the ten-year 
network development plan developed pursuant to Article 22. 
5.   In fulfilling their tasks in Article 13 and Article 17(2) of this Directive, and in complying with 
Article 13(1), Article 14(1)(a), Article 16(2), (3) and (5), Article 18(6) and Article 21(1) of Regulation 
(EC) No 715/2009, transmission system operators shall not discriminate against different persons or entities 
and shall not restrict, distort or prevent competition in production or supply. 
6.   Any commercial and financial relations between the vertically integrated undertaking and the 
transmission system operator, including loans from the transmission system operator to the vertically 
integrated undertaking, shall comply with market conditions. The transmission system operator shall keep 
detailed records of such commercial and financial relations and make them available to the regulatory 
authority upon request. 
7.   The transmission system operator shall submit for approval by the regulatory authority all commercial 
and financial agreements with the vertically integrated undertaking. 
8.   The transmission system operator shall inform the regulatory authority of the financial resources, 
referred to in Article 17(1)(d), available for future investment projects and/or for the replacement of existing 
assets. 
9.   The vertically integrated undertaking shall refrain from any action impeding or prejudicing the 
transmission system operator from complying with its obligations in this Chapter and shall not require the 
transmission system operator to seek permission from the vertically integrated undertaking in fulfilling 
those obligations. 
10.   An undertaking which has been certified by the regulatory authority as being in compliance with the 
requirements of this Chapter shall be approved and designated as a transmission system operator by the 
Member State concerned. The certification procedure in either Article 10 of this Directive and Article 3 of 
Regulation (EC) No 715/2009 or in Article 11 of this Directive shall apply. 
Article 19 
Independence of the staff and the management of the transmission system operator 
1.   Decisions regarding the appointment and renewal, working conditions including remuneration, and 
termination of the term of office, of the persons responsible for the management and/or members of the 
administrative bodies of the transmission system operator shall be taken by the Supervisory Body of the 




2.   The identity of, and the conditions governing the term, the duration and the termination of office of, the 
persons nominated by the Supervisory Body for appointment or renewal as persons responsible for the 
executive management and/or as members of the administrative bodies of the transmission system operator, 
and the reasons for any proposed decision terminating such term of office, shall be notified to the regulatory 
authority. Those conditions and the decisions referred to in paragraph 1 shall become binding only if the 
regulatory authority has raised no objections within three weeks of notification. 
The regulatory authority may object to the decisions referred to in paragraph 1 where: 
(a) doubts arise as to the professional independence of a nominated person responsible for 
the management and/or member of the administrative bodies; or 
(b) in the case of premature termination of a term of office, doubts exist regarding the 
justification of such premature termination. 
3.   No professional position or responsibility, interest or business relationship, directly or indirectly, with 
the vertically integrated undertaking or any part of it or its controlling shareholders other than the 
transmission system operator shall be exercised for a period of three years before the appointment of the 
persons responsible for the management and/or members of the administrative bodies of the transmission 
system operator who are subject to this paragraph. 
4.   The persons responsible for the management and/or members of the administrative bodies, and 
employees of the transmission system operator shall have no other professional position or responsibility, 
interest or business relationship, directly or indirectly, with any other part of the vertically integrated 
undertaking or with its controlling shareholders. 
5.   The persons responsible for the management and/or members of the administrative bodies, and 
employees of the transmission system operator shall hold no interest in or receive any financial benefit, 
directly or indirectly, from any part of the vertically integrated undertaking other than the transmission 
system operator. Their remuneration shall not depend on activities or results of the vertically integrated 
undertaking other than those of the transmission system operator. 
6.   Effective rights of appeal to the regulatory authority shall be guaranteed for any complaints by the 
persons responsible for the management and/or members of the administrative bodies of the transmission 
system operator against premature terminations of their term of office. 
7.   After termination of their term of office in the transmission system operator, the persons responsible 
for its management and/or members of its administrative bodies shall have no professional position or 
responsibility, interest or business relationship with any part of the vertically integrated undertaking other 
than the transmission system operator, or with its controlling shareholders for a period of not less than four 
years. 
8.   Paragraph 3 shall apply to the majority of the persons responsible for the management and/or members 
of the administrative bodies of the transmission system operator. 
The persons responsible for the management and/or members of the administrative bodies of the 
transmission system operator who are not subject to paragraph 3 shall have exercised no management or 
other relevant activity in the vertically integrated undertaking for a period of at least six months before their 
appointment. 
The first subparagraph of this paragraph and paragraphs 4 to 7 shall be applicable to all the persons 
belonging to the executive management and to those directly reporting to them on matters related to the 
operation, maintenance or development of the network. 
Article 20 
Supervisory Body 
1.   The transmission system operator shall have a Supervisory Body which shall be in charge of taking 
decisions which may have a significant impact on the value of the assets of the shareholders within the 
transmission system operator, in particular decisions regarding the approval of the annual and longer-term 
financial plans, the level of indebtedness of the transmission system operator and the amount of dividends 




those that are related to the day to day activities of the transmission system operator and management of 
the network, and in relation to activities necessary for the preparation of the ten-year network development 
plan developed pursuant to Article 22. 
2.   The Supervisory Body shall be composed of members representing the vertically integrated 
undertaking, members representing third party shareholders and, where the relevant legislation of a Member 
State so provides, members representing other interested parties such as employees of the transmission 
system operator. 
3.   The first subparagraph of Article 19(2) and Article 19(3) to (7) shall apply to at least half of the 
members of the Supervisory Body minus one. 
Point (b) of the second subparagraph of Article 19(2) shall apply to all the members of the Supervisory 
Body. 
Article 21 
Compliance programme and compliance officer 
1.   Member States shall ensure that transmission system operators establish and implement a compliance 
programme which sets out the measures taken in order to ensure that discriminatory conduct is excluded 
and ensure that the compliance with that programme is adequately monitored. The compliance programme 
shall set out the specific obligations of employees to meet those objectives. It shall be subject to approval 
by the regulatory authority. Without prejudice to the powers of the national regulator, compliance with the 
program shall be independently monitored by a compliance officer. 
2.   The compliance officer shall be appointed by the Supervisory Body, subject to the approval by the 
regulatory authority. The regulatory authority may refuse the approval of the compliance officer only for 
reasons of lack of independence or professional capacity. The compliance officer may be a natural or legal 
person. Article 19(2) to (8) shall apply to the compliance officer. 
3.   The compliance officer shall be in charge of: 
(a) monitoring the implementation of the compliance programme; 
(b) elaborating an annual report, setting out the measures taken in order to implement the 
compliance programme and submitting it to the regulatory authority; 
(c) reporting to the Supervisory Body and issuing recommendations on the compliance 
programme and its implementation; 
(d) notifying the regulatory authority on any substantial breaches with regard to the 
implementation of the compliance programme; and 
(e) reporting to the regulatory authority on any commercial and financial relations between 
the vertically integrated undertaking and the transmission system operator. 
4.   The compliance officer shall submit the proposed decisions on the investment plan or on individual 
investments in the network to the regulatory authority. This shall occur at the latest when the management 
and/or the competent administrative body of the transmission system operator submits them to the 
Supervisory Body. 
5.   Where the vertically integrated undertaking, in the general assembly or through the vote of the members 
of the Supervisory Body it has appointed, has prevented the adoption of a decision with the effect of 
preventing or delaying investments, which under the ten-year network development plan, was to be 
executed in the following three years, the compliance officer shall report this to the regulatory authority, 
which then shall act in accordance with Article 22. 
6.   The conditions governing the mandate or the employment conditions of the compliance officer, 
including the duration of his mandate, shall be subject to approval by the regulatory authority. Those 
conditions shall ensure the independence of the compliance officer, including by providing it with all the 




professional position, responsibility or interest, directly or indirectly, in or with any part of the vertically 
integrated undertaking or with its controlling shareholders. 
7.   The compliance officer shall report regularly, either orally or in writing, to the regulatory authority and 
shall have the right to report regularly, either orally or in writing, to the Supervisory Body of the 
transmission system operator. 
8.   The compliance officer may attend all meetings of the management or administrative bodies of the 
transmission system operator, and those of the Supervisory Body and the general assembly. The compliance 
officer shall attend all meetings that address the following matters: 
(a) conditions for access to the network, as defined in Regulation (EC) No 715/2009, in 
particular regarding tariffs, third party access services, capacity allocation and 
congestion management, transparency, balancing and secondary markets; 
(b) projects undertaken in order to operate, maintain and develop the transmission system, 
including investments in new transport connections, in expansion of capacity and in 
optimisation of existing capacity; 
(c) energy purchases or sales necessary for the operation of the transmission system. 
9.   The compliance officer shall monitor the compliance of the transmission system operator with 
Article 16. 
10.   The compliance officer shall have access to all relevant data and to the offices of the transmission 
system operator and to all the information necessary for the fulfilment of his task. 
11.   After prior approval by the regulatory authority, the Supervisory Body may dismiss the compliance 
officer. It shall dismiss the compliance officer for reasons of lack of independence or professional capacity 
upon request of the regulatory authority. 
12.   The compliance officer shall have access to the offices of the transmission system operator without 
prior announcement. 
Article 22 
Network development and powers to make investment decisions 
1.   Every year, transmission system operators shall submit to the regulatory authority a ten-year network 
development plan based on existing and forecast supply and demand after having consulted all the relevant 
stakeholders. That network development plan shall contain efficient measures in order to guarantee the 
adequacy of the system and the security of supply. 
2.   The ten-year network development plan shall, in particular: 
(a) indicate to market participants the main transmission infrastructure that needs to be 
built or upgraded over the next ten years; 
(b) contain all the investments already decided and identify new investments which have 
to be executed in the next three years; and 
(c) provide for a time frame for all investment projects. 
3.   When elaborating the ten-year network development plan, the transmission system operator shall make 
reasonable assumptions about the evolution of the production, supply, consumption and exchanges with 
other countries, taking into account investment plans for regional and Community-wide networks, as well 
as investment plans for storage and LNG regasification facilities. 
4.   The regulatory authority shall consult all actual or potential system users on the ten-year network 
development plan in an open and transparent manner. Persons or undertakings claiming to be potential 
system users may be required to substantiate such claims. The regulatory authority shall publish the result 




5.   The regulatory authority shall examine whether the ten-year network development plan covers all 
investment needs identified during the consultation process, and whether it is consistent with the non-
binding Community-wide ten-year network development plan (Community-wide network development 
plan) referred to in Article 8(3)(b) of Regulation (EC) No 715/2009. If any doubt arises as to the consistency 
with the Community-wide network development plan, the regulatory authority shall consult the Agency. 
The regulatory authority may require the transmission system operator to amend its ten-year network 
development plan. 
6.   The regulatory authority shall monitor and evaluate the implementation of the ten-year network 
development plan. 
7.   In circumstances where the transmission system operator, other than for overriding reasons beyond its 
control, does not execute an investment, which, under the ten-year network development plan, was to be 
executed in the following three years, Member States shall ensure that the regulatory authority is required 
to take at least one of the following measures to ensure that the investment in question is made if such 
investment is still relevant on the basis of the most recent ten-year network development plan: 
(a) to require the transmission system operator to execute the investments in question; 
(b) to organise a tender procedure open to any investors for the investment in question; or 
(c) to oblige the transmission system operator to accept a capital increase to finance the 
necessary investments and allow independent investors to participate in the capital. 
Where the regulatory authority has made use of its powers under point (b) of the first subparagraph, it may 
oblige the transmission system operator to agree to one or more of the following: 
(a) financing by any third party; 
(b) construction by any third party; 
(c) building the new assets concerned itself; 
(d) operating the new asset concerned itself. 
The transmission system operator shall provide the investors with all information needed to realise the 
investment, shall connect new assets to the transmission network and shall generally make its best efforts 
to facilitate the implementation of the investment project. 
The relevant financial arrangements shall be subject to approval by the regulatory authority. 
8.   Where the regulatory authority has made use of its powers under the first subparagraph of paragraph 7, 
the relevant tariff regulations shall cover the costs of the investments in question. 
Article 32 
Third-party access 
1.   Member States shall ensure the implementation of a system of third party access to the transmission 
and distribution system, and LNG facilities based on published tariffs, applicable to all eligible customers, 
including supply undertakings, and applied objectively and without discrimination between system users. 
Member States shall ensure that those tariffs, or the methodologies underlying their calculation are 
approved prior to their entry into force in accordance with Article 41 by a regulatory authority referred to 
in Article 39(1) and that those tariffs — and the methodologies, where only methodologies are approved 
— are published prior to their entry into force. 
2.   Transmission system operators shall, if necessary for the purpose of carrying out their functions 
including in relation to cross-border transmission, have access to the network of other transmission system 
operators. 
3.   The provisions of this Directive shall not prevent the conclusion of long-term contracts in so far as they 





Access to upstream pipeline networks 
1.   Member States shall take the necessary measures to ensure that natural gas undertakings and eligible 
customers, wherever they are located, are able to obtain access to upstream pipeline networks, including 
facilities supplying technical services incidental to such access, in accordance with this Article, except for 
the parts of such networks and facilities which are used for local production operations at the site of a field 
where the gas is produced. The measures shall be notified to the Commission in accordance with the 
provisions of Article 54. 
2.   The access referred to in paragraph 1 shall be provided in a manner determined by the Member State in 
accordance with the relevant legal instruments. Member States shall apply the objectives of fair and open 
access, achieving a competitive market in natural gas and avoiding any abuse of a dominant position, taking 
into account security and regularity of supplies, capacity which is or can reasonably be made available, and 
environmental protection. The following matters may be taken into account: 
(a) the need to refuse access where there is an incompatibility of technical specifications 
which cannot reasonably be overcome; 
(b) the need to avoid difficulties which cannot reasonably be overcome and could prejudice 
the efficient, current and planned future production of hydrocarbons, including that 
from fields of marginal economic viability; 
(c) the need to respect the duly substantiated reasonable needs of the owner or operator of 
the upstream pipeline network for the transport and processing of gas and the interests 
of all other users of the upstream pipeline network or relevant processing or handling 
facilities who may be affected; and 
(d) the need to apply their laws and administrative procedures, in conformity with 
Community law, for the grant of authorisation for production or upstream development. 
3.   Member States shall ensure that they have in place dispute-settlement arrangements, including an 
authority independent of the parties with access to all relevant information, to enable disputes relating to 
access to upstream pipeline networks to be settled expeditiously, taking into account the criteria in 
paragraph 2 and the number of parties which may be involved in negotiating access to such networks. 
4.   In the event of cross-border disputes, the dispute-settlement arrangements for the Member State having 
jurisdiction over the upstream pipeline network which refuses access shall be applied. Where, in cross-
border disputes, more than one Member State covers the network concerned, the Member States concerned 
shall consult each other with a view to ensuring that the provisions of this Directive are applied consistently. 
Article 36 
New infrastructure 
1.   Major new gas infrastructure, i.e. interconnectors, LNG and storage facilities, may, upon request, be 
exempted, for a defined period of time, from the provisions of Articles 9, 32, 33 and 34 and Article 41(6), 
(8) and (10) under the following conditions: 
(a) the investment must enhance competition in gas supply and enhance security of supply; 
(b) the level of risk attached to the investment must be such that the investment would not 
take place unless an exemption was granted; 
(c) the infrastructure must be owned by a natural or legal person which is separate at least 
in terms of its legal form from the system operators in whose systems that infrastructure 
will be built; 




(e) the exemption must not be detrimental to competition or the effective functioning of 
the internal market in natural gas, or the efficient functioning of the regulated system 
to which the infrastructure is connected. 
2.   Paragraph 1 shall also apply to significant increases of capacity in existing infrastructure and to 
modifications of such infrastructure which enable the development of new sources of gas supply. 
3.   The regulatory authority referred to in Chapter VIII may, on a case-by-case basis, decide on the 
exemption referred to in paragraphs 1 and 2. 
4.   Where the infrastructure in question is located in the territory of more than one Member State, the 
Agency may submit an advisory opinion to the regulatory authorities of the Member States concerned, 
which may be used as a basis for their decision, within two months from the date on which the request for 
exemption was received by the last of those regulatory authorities. 
Where all the regulatory authorities concerned agree on the request for exemption within six months of the 
date on which it was received by the last of the regulatory authorities, they shall inform the Agency of their 
decision. 
The Agency shall exercise the tasks conferred on the regulatory authorities of the Member States concerned 
by the present Article: 
(a) where all regulatory authorities concerned have not been able to reach an agreement 
within a period of six months from the date on which the request for exemption was 
received by the last of those regulatory authorities; or 
(b) upon a joint request from the regulatory authorities concerned. 
All regulatory authorities concerned may, jointly, request that the period referred to in point (a) of the third 
subparagraph is extended by up to three months. 
5.   Before taking a decision, the Agency shall consult the relevant regulatory authorities and the applicants. 
6.   An exemption may cover all or part of the capacity of the new infrastructure, or of the existing 
infrastructure with significantly increased capacity. 
In deciding to grant an exemption, consideration shall be given, on a case-by-case basis, to the need to 
impose conditions regarding the duration of the exemption and non-discriminatory access to the 
infrastructure. When deciding on those conditions, account shall, in particular, be taken of the additional 
capacity to be built or the modification of existing capacity, the time horizon of the project and national 
circumstances. 
Before granting an exemption, the regulatory authority shall decide upon the rules and mechanisms for 
management and allocation of capacity. The rules shall require that all potential users of the infrastructure 
are invited to indicate their interest in contracting capacity before capacity allocation in the new 
infrastructure, including for own use, takes place. The regulatory authority shall require congestion 
management rules to include the obligation to offer unused capacity on the market and shall require users 
of the infrastructure to be entitled to trade their contracted capacities on the secondary market. In its 
assessment of the criteria referred to in points (a), (b) and (e) of paragraph 1, the regulatory authority shall 
take into account the results of that capacity allocation procedure. 
The exemption decision, including any conditions referred to in the second subparagraph of this paragraph, 
shall be duly reasoned and published. 
7.   Notwithstanding paragraph 3, Member States may provide that their regulatory authority or the Agency, 
as the case may be, shall submit, for the purposes of the formal decision, to the relevant body in the Member 
State its opinion on the request for an exemption. That opinion shall be published together with the decision. 
8.   The regulatory authority shall transmit to the Commission, without delay, a copy of every request for 
exemption as of its receipt. The decision shall be notified, without delay, by the competent authority to the 
Commission, together with all the relevant information with respect to the decision. That information may 
be submitted to the Commission in aggregate form, enabling the Commission to reach a well-founded 




(a) the detailed reasons on the basis of which the regulatory authority, or Member State, 
granted or refused the exemption together with a reference to paragraph 1 including the 
relevant point or points of that paragraph on which such decision is based, including 
the financial information justifying the need for the exemption; 
(b) the analysis undertaken of the effect on competition and the effective functioning of the 
internal market in natural gas resulting from the grant of the exemption; 
(c) the reasons for the time period and the share of the total capacity of the gas 
infrastructure in question for which the exemption is granted; 
(d) in case the exemption relates to an interconnector, the result of the consultation with 
the regulatory authorities concerned; and 
(e) the contribution of the infrastructure to the diversification of gas supply. 
9.   Within a period of two months from the day following the receipt of a notification, the Commission 
may take a decision requiring the regulatory authority to amend or withdraw the decision to grant an 
exemption. That two-month period may be extended by an additional period of two months where further 
information is sought by the Commission. That additional period shall begin on the day following the 
receipt of the complete information. The initial two-month period may also be extended with the consent 
of both the Commission and the regulatory authority. 
Where the requested information is not provided within the period set out in the request, the notification 
shall be deemed to be withdrawn unless, before the expiry of that period, either the period has been extended 
with the consent of both the Commission and the regulatory authority, or the regulatory authority, in a duly 
reasoned statement, has informed the Commission that it considers the notification to be complete. 
The regulatory authority shall comply with the Commission decision to amend or withdraw the exemption 
decision within a period of one month and shall inform the Commission accordingly. 
The Commission shall preserve the confidentiality of commercially sensitive information. 
The Commission’s approval of an exemption decision shall lose its effect two years from its adoption in 
the event that construction of the infrastructure has not yet started, and five years from its adoption in the 
event that the infrastructure has not become operational unless the Commission decides that any delay is 
due to major obstacles beyond control of the person to whom the exemption has been granted. 
10.   The Commission may adopt Guidelines for the application of the conditions laid down in paragraph 1 
of this Article and to set out the procedure to be followed for the application of paragraphs 3, 6, 8 and 9 of 
this Article. Those measures, designed to amend non-essential elements of this Directive by supplementing 
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